The codes of adversarialism by Karlberg, Michael
THE CODES OF ADVERSARIALISM
by
Michael Karlberg
B.A., University of California, 1990
REd., University of Toronto, 1992
M.A., Simon Fraser University, 1995
DISSERTATION SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
in the School of Communication
© Michael Karlberg 2000
Simon Fraser University
October 2000
All rights reserved.
This work may not be reproduced in whole or in part,
by photocopy or other means, without permission of the author.
NAME
DEGREE
TITLE
APPROVAL
Michael Karlberg
PhD
THE CODES OF ADVERSARIALISM
EXAMINING COMMITTEE:
Chair
Date:
Prof. Catherine Murray
Prof. Robert Bad&tt
Senior Supervisor, School of Communication, SFU
Prof. Richard Gruneau
Supervisor, School of Communication, SFU
Prof. Pat Howard
Supervisor, School of Communication, SFU
Prof. Robert Ande~son
Internal Examiner,
Professor, School of Communication, SFU
Prof. Hoda Mahmoudi
External Examiner, Dean of the College of Arts and
Sciences, Northeastern Illinois University
13 Oct. 2000
ii
PARTIAL COPYRIGHT LICENSE
I hereby grant to Simon Fraser University the right to lend my
thesis, project or extended essay (the title of which is shown below)
to users of the Simon Fraser University Library, and to make
partial or single copies only for such users or in response to a
request from the library of any other university, or other
educational institution, on its own behalf or for one of its users.
I further agree that permission for multiple copying of this work
for scholarly purposes may be granted by me or the Dean of Graduate
Studies. It is understood that copying or publication of this work
for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written
permission.
Title of Thesis/Project/Extended Essay
THE CODES OF ADVERSARIALISM
Author::...- _
(Signature)
Michael Karlberg
(name)
(date)
111
ABSTRACT
This dissertation critiques the codes ofadversarialism that have come to dominate
contemporary Western cultures. It begins by articulating a theory of culture and cultural
change. It proceeds by analyzing the dominant concepts ofpower that inform Western-
liberal cultures and the normative adversarialism that derives from them. Next, it
demonstrates the relatively ubiquitous and indiscriminate expression of normative
adversarialism throughout the public sphere in Western cultures - within our economic,
political, legal, mass media, social advocacy, and even academic arenas. In each of these
arenas, moreover, it points out that adversarial structures and practices appear to privilege
more powerful social groups. Thus the dissertation suggests that normative adversarialism
can be understood as a hegemonic construct - a widely cultivated set of "common sense"
assumptions and beliefs that constrain the social imagination while serving the interests of
privileged segments of society who owe their ascendancy in human affairs to them. The
dissertation then critiques the culture of adversarialism from an external vantage point,
through the perspective of various non-adversarial alternatives that have been marginalized
by it. From this external vantage point, the culture of adversarialism appears both oppressive
and culturally maladaptive - especially under conditions of increasing social and ecological
interdependence. This insight, the dissertation concludes, provides a valuable new
framework for social theory, research, and praxis.
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PREFACE
This dissertation springs from a desire to reconcile the many insights I have gained from
critical discourses on culture and communication, on the one hand, with insights I have
gained through my association with the BaM.'i International Community, on the other.
Specifically, though I share the broad goals of social justice and equity that underlie virtually
all critical discourses and value the many insightful analyses that have emerged from them,
the oppositional politics that are often associatedwith them have always troubled me. I
simply am not convinced that social change is best pursued through oppositional strategies.
My skepticism in this regard is rooted directly in insights I have gained through my
association with the Baha'i International Community.
In graduate seminars and other forums, however, I have noticed that my reservations
about oppositional politics tend to be misinterpreted as a dismissal of these critical discourses
themselves. Many students and scholars, it appears, take the marriage of cultural critique
and oppositional politics for granted. They have a difficult time dissociating the two. As a
result, I know that my own efforts to dissociate the two have often appeared naIve or
"uncritical" within these circles.
Moreover, I have come to the conclusion that the critical discourses I have been engaged
with do not even offer a vocabulary with which to adequately clarify or articulate my own
thinking in this regard. Oppositional politics appear to have become so interwoven with the
language of these discourses that it is often difficult for those immersed in them to think or
talk about their separation.
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As this became clear to me, I came to understand that the tension I was experiencing
between my commitment to cultural critique, on the one hand, and my commitment to non-
adversarial strategies of social change, on the other, was the result of a clash of two cultures
- or two "discursive universes". One was characterized by a relatively adversarial worldview
and the other by what I will refer to as a relatively non-adversarial or "organic" worldview.
In the former, human nature, social organization, and the pursuit of social change are
represented, understood, and enacted largely within a discourse of conflict and opposition. In
the latter, these same phenomena are represented, understood, and enacted primarily within a
discourse of mutuality and interdependence.
This dissertation is therefore an attempt to reconcile the tensions I perceive between
cultural critique and the organic worldview I subscribe to. In this regard, it constitutes a
significant departure from most critical discourses - a re-articulation of central concepts from
various critical theories with concepts drawn from discourses that have traditionally been
dismissed by many critical theorists. This is the original scholarly contribution that this
dissertation offers. Given this departure from much critical thought, however, I anticipate
that the dissertation will appear quite "heretical" to many critical scholars. Fortunately,
"heresy" has been the leaven ofcritical thought for centuries and, by this measure, I am at
least in good company.
Though the dissertation makes an original scholarly contribution in this regard, my
underlying motivation is to articulate a theoretical framework with which I can begin to
pursue my own critical research and teaching in a manner that is true to my own ontological
convictions about human nature, social organization, and the pursuit of social change. Of
course, the validity of this theoretical framework, as well as the premises that underlie it,
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ultimately need to be tested against empirical evidence, and the dissertation does conclude
with some discussion of how this might be done. Moreover, throughout the dissertation, an
effort has been made to anchor the discussion to empirical reference points whenever
possible. But all cannot be accomplished within a single dissertation, and the larger
empirical component of this project will have to be taken up at a later time, as part of a larger
post-graduate-school research agenda. In the meantime, it is the first half of this project that
I invite my readers to evaluate: the possibility that the analysis is valid and worth considering
as a theoretical basis for further research.
And finally, though this entire dissertation is broadly informed by a Baha'i perspective,
and though an entire chapter is devoted to a discussion ofvarious Baha'i prescriptions and
practices, the dissertation was not written as a vehicle for promoting the Baha'i movement.
On the contrary, this dissertation was written simply as a means of advancing the thesis that
adversarial norms may be socially oppressive and culturally maladaptive. Toward this end,
my initial inclination was to leave out any reference to the Baha'i International Community,
lest the entire dissertation be misinterpreted as simply an intellectual Trojan horse,
constructed as a strategy to advocate Baha'i beliefs in an academic arena. Upon reflection,
however, I decided that the prescriptions and practices of the Baha'i International
Community provide invaluable illustrations of the points I was trying to make, and therefore
needed to be included, despite the red flags they might raise among some readers. In this
context, it is not my intent that readers come away from this dissertation with any interest in,
or commitment to, the Baha'i cause. I will be entirely satisfied, however, if! have spurred in
my readers some critical self-reflection regarding the codes of adversarialism that dominate
contemporary Western cultures.
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INTRODUCTION: THE CULTURE OF ADVERSARIALISM
We live in a culture of adversarialism. This is not to suggest that mutualism and
cooperation are entirely absent from our culture. But throughout the contemporary public
sphere - in our media, our politics, our economy, our legal system; and even our social
advocacy - adversarial structures and practices are the norm. Indeed, this normative
adversarialism is so ubiquitous that it appears natural and inevitable to many people. It is
widely assumed that "human nature" is essentially selfish and aggressive, and these
structures and practices simply reflect this. But is adversarialism an inevitable expression of
human nature?
Although selfishness and aggression are clearly potential human traits, the analysis
developed in the following chapters suggests that we have an equally well-demonstrated
potential for mutualism and cooperation; that human cultures, rather than human nature, are
the primary determinant of which potential is realized; and that Western-liberal cultures tend
to cultivate the former rather than the latter. In addition, it suggests that this culture of
adversarialism is becoming increasingly maladaptive under conditions of growing social and
ecological interdependence
Before proceeding with this analysis, however, some simple definitions are in order.
Throughout this dissertation, the term adversarialism refers to the pursuit of mutually
exclusive interests by individuals or groups working against one another. Contest,
competition, and confrontation are all expressions of adversarialism. Archeological and
anthropological evidence suggest that such relations were present in some form or another
2within and between the earliest human societies. l And they are clearly still present today.
In contrast, the term mutualism refers to the pursuit of mutually inclusive gains by
individuals or groups working with one another. Cooperation, collaboration, and concerted
or coordinated action are all expressions of mutualism. Again, archeological and
anthropological evidence suggest that such relations were also present in the earliest human
societies? And again, they can clearly be discerned today.
Though both strands therefore appear to have been present in all human cultures, they
have been woven together in many different ways. As the following chapters will illustrate,
adversarialism has become a dominant pattern in contemporary Western-liberal societies.
Throughout the contemporary public sphere, contest, competition, confrontation, and other
adversarial expressions are the norm. 3 Granted, these expressions of adversarialism are fairly
subtle compared to the levels of physical violence that have characterized many slave-
holding and feudal societies. In this regard, adversarialism is clearly a relative phenomenon.
Moreover, no culture is monolithic. Alternatives forms of social relations always co-exist to
some degree. Thus we must think in terms of cultural tendencies rather than cultural
absolutes.
With that said, in Western-liberal cultures, we do tend to structure our political,
economic, legal, and other public activities as contests - albeit "rational" and non-violent
ones. Indeed, this contest model of human relations is so ubiquitous that it tends to appear
normal, natural, and inevitable to those raised in Western cultures. Because of this, it is
2
Refer, for instance, to discussions in Ross, Culture ofConflict, and Biehl, Rethinking Ecofeminist Politics.
Refer, for instance, to Ross, Culture ofConflict, Leakey and Lewin, Origins, Eisler, Chalice and the Blade,
Howell and Willis, "Societies at Peace", and Carrithers, "Sociality".
Refer, for instance, to discussions in Gng, Fighting For Life and Tannen, The Argument Culture.
3often difficult for people to envision alternatives. From within a culture of adversarialism, it
is difficult to imagine a democratic government without political parties. It is difficult to
imagine a fair judicial system without contests of legal advocacy. It is difficult to imagine a
productive economy without unfettered and aggressive competition. And it is even difficult
to imagine how to reform any of the systems above without oppositional strategies of social
reform.
This dissertation seeks to exercise our social imaginations by critiquing contest models of
public life and exploring alternatives. Despite its largely theoretical nature, the dissertation
has significant practical applications. The ways we think and talk about the world influence
the ways we act within it. By articulating new ways of thinking and talking about our world,
I am suggesting the need for new ways of acting within it.
Due to the challenge this dissertation presents to much conventional as well as critical
thought, a word is also in order about how to approach the text itself. With a topic as
complex and expansive as this, it is impossible to articulate a clear and concise line of
analysis while simultaneously qualifying and elaborating upon every point to the satisfaction
of every potential reader. The linear nature of written text precludes accomplishing all things
at once, and endless qualifications and elaborations make it exceedingly difficult to follow a
central line of thought. Therefore, at various points in this dissertation, questions will
undoubtedly be raised in the minds of many readers that cannot be adequately answered until
later in the text. In this context, the reader is asked not to prejudge the analysis until it has
been presented in its entirety. For although every effort has been made to anticipate key
questions and criticisms, it has not been possible to address each of these at the moment they
may initially arise in the reader's mind. Alert readers should find, however, that many of
4their questions and criticism will have been addressed by the end of the dissertation.
The text itself is structured as follows:
In order to critically analyze culture, one needs a theory of culture - an explanation of
what culture is and how it both shapes and is shaped by those who live within it. Chapter I
draws on a range of intellectual traditions, from anthropology and sociology to semiotics and
contemporary cultural studies, to articulate a theory a culture. The chapter begins with a
conceptual definition of the term culture and a discussion regarding the complex relationship
between human nature and culture. A distinction is then drawn between psycho-cultural
dimensions of culture (i.e., culturally contingent structures of the human mind), as well as
socia-structural dimensions of culture (i.e., culturally contingent structures of social
organization) in order to draw attention to these two distinct but interrelated aspects of
culture. In tum, a theory of cultural change and adaptation is articulated, with the concept of
cultural codes as its central metaphor. Finally, the chapter concludes with a discussion of the
concept of hegemony, which serves as a useful device for understanding the way that
dominant cultural codes can come to serve the narrow interests of privileged segments of
society who owe their ascendancy in human affairs to them.
In Chapter II, I begin critiquing the culture of adversarialism by analyzing the way that
relations of power are understood and enacted within it. Toward this end, I illustrate that
power is generally theorized as something that is exercised over or against others in the
pursuit of mutually exclusive gains. I then point out that this limited understanding of power
illuminates some relations of power while it obscures others. Most notably, it obscures the
mutualistic or cooperative exercise of power - exercising power with others in the pursuit of
collective gains. In this context, I suggest that a narrow descriptive or explanatory theory of
5power tends to translate into a narrow prescriptive or normative theory of power. The result
is what I refer to as normative adversarialism - the prescription of adversarial methods as
normal and necessary social practices.
In Chapter III, I illustrate that normative adversarialism is relatively ubiquitous
throughout Western culture - albeit in "rational" and non-violent forms. I support this
assertion by surveying the way human relations are understood and enacted throughout the
public sphere. In this regard, I demonstrate that normative adversarialism underlies the
conflict and competition most people take for granted in our economic system; the partisan
structures and practices taken for granted in our political system; the adversarial contests
taken for granted in our legal system; the polarized conflicts and violence taken for granted
in our mass media content; the oppositional strategies taken for granted by many social
activists; and even the disputational models taken for granted by many academics.
Moreover, I show that all of these models appear to serve the interests ofmore powerful
social groups at the expense of less powerful ones. In addition, I show that all these models
are mutually reinforcing. They simultaneously shape and reflect the ways we think, talk, and
act throughout the public sphere as they naturalize a general culture of adversarialism that
does not serve all interests equally. In this regard, I suggest that normative adversarialism
has all the characteristics of an effective hegemonic construct, as defined in Chapter 1. In
other words, normative adversarialism can be understood as a cultivated set of "common
sense" assumptions and beliefs that serve the narrow interests of privileged segments of
society who owe their ascendancy in human affairs to them.
In order to further illustrate the hegemony of adversarialism, I examine a number of
marginalized alternatives in Chapter IV. First, I acknowledge that many cultures, past and
6present, have embodied mutualistic expressions and aspirations. In this regard, I point out
that human history embodies ongoing historical tensions between adversarialism and
mutualism. Recognizing this, I turn my attention to various contemporary expressions of the
latter. Various streams of feminism, systems theory, ecology, communication theory, and
alternative dispute resolution are surveyed as examples. Each is chosen for the unique
critical perspective it offers on normative adversarialism and the glimpse it provides of non-
adversarial alternatives. At the same time, because these alternatives are relatively isolated
from one another within the dominant culture of adversarialism, I suggest that their practical
efficacy remains difficult to evaluate. Within a culture that contradicts and undermines them
from virtually every direction, these marginalized alternatives tend to appear naive and
idealistic - an outcome that is entirely consistent with the theory of hegemony introduced in
Chapter 1.
In order to further evaluate non-adversarial models of social practice, I suggest that it is
helpful to view their application within a culture or community that consistently reinforces
rather than undermines them. I attempt to do this in Chapter V through a case study of the
Baha'i International Community - an emerging global movement that integrates a wide range
of non-adversarial structures and practices into a unified cultural system. I begin by
discussing the overall organic worldview that informs these structures and practices. Next, I
examine a number of these prescriptions and practices in some detail, including Baha'i
models of collective decision making, Baha'i institutional structures, and Baha'i strategies
for pursuing social change. In tum, I examine the assumptions about human nature that
underlie each of these elements of Baha'i normative theory. And finally, I conclude the
chapter by offering a brief assessment of the actual experience of the Baha'i community to
date.
In the final chapter, I distill my overall analysis into the following theoretical
propositions:
(1) Human beings have the potential for adversarial as well as mutualistic behaviour.
(2) The degree to which we realize either ofthese potentials is largely afunction ofthe
cultures we are raised within, and the tension between adversarialism and mutualism has
been resolved differently in different cultural contexts.
(3) Contemporary Western-liberal cultures are dominated by the codes of "normative
adversarialism "- the prescription ofadversarial methods as normal and necessary social
practice throughout the public sphere.
(4) Though adversarialism is a relative phenomenon, and though adversarial practices
are not essentially problematic in all circumstances, their relatively ubiquitous and
indiscriminate expression throughout the contemporary public sphere does not serve the
broadestpublic interest; as a dominant cultural expression, "the codes ofadversarialism"
can therefore be understood as socially oppressive and culturally maladaptive.
(5) The historical persistence ofthese socially oppressive and culturally maladaptive
codes can be explained by the theory ofhegemony; that is, the codes ofadversarialism
primarily serve the interests ofprivileged segments ofsociety who owe their ascendancy in
human affairs to them and who now occupy social positions from which they continue to
cultivate these codes (whether consciously and intentionally or not), as a form ofcultural
common sense.
After outlining these propositions, I discuss their broader theoretical as well as practical
implications. I then respond, in tum, to anticipated criticisms of this broader theoretical
7
framework. Finally, I conclude the dissertation with a discussion of how this theoretical
framework could be empirically tested.
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CHAPTER I: CULTURE
In order to critically analyze culture, one needs a theory of culture - an explanation of
what culture is and how it both shapes and is shaped by those who live within it. This
chapter draws on a range of intellectual traditions, from anthropology and sociology to
semiotics and contemporary cultural studies, to articulate a theory a culture. The chapter
begins with a conceptual definition of the term culture itself, along with a discussion of the
complex relationship between human nature and culture. A distinction is then drawn
between psycho-cultural dimensions of culture (i.e., culturally contingent structures of the
human psyche), as well as socio-structural dimensions of culture (i.e., culturally contingent
structures of social organization), in order to draw attention to these two distinct but inter-
related aspects of culture. In tum, a theory of cultural change and adaptation is articulated,
with the concept of cultural codes as its central metaphor. The chapter concludes with a
discussion of the concept of hegemony, which serves as a useful device for understanding the
way that dominant cultural codes can come to serve the narrow interests of privileged
segments of society who owe their ascendancy in human affairs to them.
Human Nature and Human Culture
The word culture has a complex history and many shades of meaning. 1 In its popular
contemporary usage, it often refers to the ensemble of arts, food, dress, and other aesthetic
For overviews of the etymology of the word culture, refer to Williams, Keywords, and Williams, Culture
and Society.
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variations that distinguish one social group from another. In semiotics and cultural studies, it
tends to refer to the systems of representation, meaning, belief, and other ideological
variations between social groups. And in its broadest sociological and anthropological use, it
also refers to the political, economic, legal, and other structural variations between social
groups. What all of these meanings have in common, however, is a reference to phenomena
that are socially learned or constructed, and therefore relatively fluid and variable, as
opposed to phenomena that are biologically inherited or determined and therefore relatively
"fixed".
For the purposes of this dissertation, culture will be defined in these very broad terms, as
the entire social heritage of a community, including its material expressions, its ideological
expressions, and its structural or institutional expressions - all of which are socially learned
or constructed and therefore contingent and highly variable? In contrast, the term human
nature will be used to signify those shared species characteristics that are biologically
inherited and therefore relatively fixed or invariable.
For instance, while the need to eat is an innate characteristic of human nature, everything
from our tastes in food to the ways we produce and distribute food are expressions ofhuman
culture. Similarly, while the capacity to use complex languages is an innate characteristic of
human nature, the diverse languages that different populations actually develop are
expressions of human culture. Likewise, while the tendency to live in social groups may be
an innate characteristic of human nature, the diverse ways that we actually structure our
social relations are expressions of human culture. Understood this way, human beings are
2 For a similar definition, refer to Bullock, Stallybrass, and Trombley, eds., Dictionary ofModern Thought,
p.195.
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remarkably (although not entirely) malleable creatures. With a finite range of fixed species
characteristics we are capable of an almost infinite range of cultural expressions.
Of course, as these examples illustrate, the relationship between nature and culture is
subtle and complex. Most human thought and behaviour is a product of the interplay
between the two. Accordingly, nature and culture need to be understood dialectically. Each
acts upon the other, and although they can be considered separately for analytical purposes,
their real-world expressions are inextricably linked. However, they still serve as useful
analytical categories. Consider, for instance, how shades of colour can be analyzed in terms
of the primary colors that constitute them. Human thought and behaviour are like shades of
colour in this regard. In one sense, green is neither blue nor yellow. It has its own
independent characteristics and can be studied accordingly. In another sense, green is
composed of both blue and yellow, and it can be analyzed in terms ofthe interplay between
the two - even as the actual eating habits of a given person can be understood in terms of the
interplay of biological impulses and culturally determined tastes and opportunities.
The dialectical relationship between nature and culture can also be seen in the fact that
our capacity for culture is itself an innate characteristic of human nature. Moreover, this
capacity for culture enables people to regulate various biological impulses. Consider human
sexuality. Though the sex impulse is part of our biological nature, most cultures establish
norms regarding its appropriate and inappropriate expressions. Therefore, when discussing
the relationship between human nature and human culture, it is important to recognize that
we have the cultural capacity to regulate various natural impulses.
To complicate things further, many anthropologists point out that the latter stages of our
biological evolution occurred within the matrix of early proto-human cultures. As the
12
anthropologist Clifford Geertz explains, culture was not a last-minute addition to an
otherwise finished evolutionary product: Homo sapiens. Rather, the earliest proto-human
cultures appear to have played a directive role in the evolutionary process that led to modem
Homo sapiens.3 Processes of physical and cultural evolution were therefore not distinct and
sequential. Rather, there was a period of overlap in which they were mutually informing,
especially with regard to the evolution of the human brain.
Although the distinction between nature and culture is therefore subtle and complex, it
can still serve as an analytically useful distinction. Indeed, after exploring the dialectical
relationship between nature and culture, Geertz himself concedes that
[while] the boundary between what is innately controlled and what is culturally controlled in
human behaviour is an ill-defined and wavering one... some things are, for all intents and
purposes, entirely controlled intrinsically: we need no cultural guidance to learn how to breathe
than a fish needs to learn how to swim. Others are almost certainly largely cultural; we do not
attempt to explain on a genetic basis why some men put their trust in centralized planning and
others in the free market... [similarly] our capacity to speak is surely innate; our capacity to speak
English is surely cultura1.4
Moreover, the distinction between nature and culture serves an especially important
purpose in cultural critique because of the problem of naturalization. When cultural
practices have been internalized, they often appear natural and inevitable to those who have
internalized them. And that which appears natural and inevitable appears impossible to
change. Therefore, as many cultural critics and reformers have learned, the first step toward
reforming specific cultural practices is denaturalizing them by demonstrating that they are
culturally contingent rather than biologically determined. For instance, in many cultures
throughout history, slavery was perceived as a natural and inevitable phenomenon.
4
Geertz, Interpretation ofCultures. Refer especially to discussions of this theme in Chapters 2 and 3.
Ibid., p. 50.
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Accordingly, one ofthe primary strategies of the nineteenth-century abolitionist movement
was to demonstrate the cultural contingency of slavery. Similarly, in many cultures
throughout history, the subordination of women has been viewed as a natural and inevitable
phenomenon. One of the primary strategies of the modem women's movement has likewise
been to demonstrate the cultural rather than natural basis of gender inequality.
In sum, the distinction between culture and nature is a starting point for critiquing the
assumptions of biological determinism - the notion that most, if not all, of what we do and
become is directly programmed by our genes.5 And though such assumptions trace back
centuries, they still echo today in discourses such as sociobiology - where they often surface
as a justification for existing social injustices and inequities. In contrast, cultural critics
question the "naturalness" of racism, sexism, nationalism, militarism, competitive
materialism, and so forth - both in their individual as well as collective or structural
expressions. In the same way, this dissertation questions the naturalness ofadversarialism as
an even more general (or underlying) category of human relations.
Of course, skeptics (including many sociobiologists) argue that human nature is
fundamentally selfish and aggressive and that adversarial relations are inevitable expressions
of this nature. Indeed, these are still widely held assumptions throughout Western societies.6
The analysis developed in this dissertation, however, suggests that these assumptions are not
only misinformed but they are socially oppressive and culturally maladaptive. In order to
prepare the ground for this larger discussion, however, the simple definition of culture
Refer, for example, to critiques of biological detenninism in Rose, Lewontin, and Kamin, Not In Our
Genes, as well as Lewontin, Biology as Ideology.
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articulated above needs to be expanded into a more comprehensive theory of culture.
Dimensions of Culture
Defining culture as that which is socially learned or constructed and therefore contingent
and variable, in contrast to those species characteristics that are biologically inherited and
therefore relatively fixed, is only a starting point for a useful theory of culture. Thus defined,
the range of phenomena that falls within the domain of culture is still so broad that its value
as an analytical category is limited. For the purpose of this dissertation, two primary
dimensions of culture also need to be distinguished. On one hand, culture can be analyzed in
terms of structures ofthe human mind. On the other hand, it can also be analyzed in terms of
structures ofsocial organization.
Like the categories of human nature and culture discussed above, these psychological and
sociological categories also need to be understood dialectically. Both are inseparably related
and mutually informing. Nonetheless, they serve as useful analytical categories because they
highlight the way that culture both shapes and is shaped by the interior world of the human
mind as well as the exterior world of social organization. As the anthropologist Marc
Howard Ross demonstrates in his work on culture and conflict, culture cannot be understood
adequately without reference to both.?
Ross uses the term psycho-cultural dispositions to refer to culturally shared attitudes,
6 Again, an excellent overview and critique of these assumptions, as well as their roots in biological
determinism, can be found in Rose, Lewontin, and Kamin, Not In Our Genes, and Lewontin, Biology as
Ideology.
Ross, Culture ofConflict.
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values, and response tendencies - or structures of the mind - acquired through processes of
sociallearning.8 The term psycho-cultural highlights the fact that these psychological
structures develop within a cultural matrix. They are widely shared rather than idiosyncratic.
Of course, individuals do develop certain unique and idiosyncratic attitudes toward, and ideas
about, the world around them. In addition, there is always tremendous variation between the
ways different individuals think within a given culture. Cultures are not monolithic entities.
Within any given culture there are always many currents, cross-currents, and sub-currents of
attitudes, ideas, and behaviours. At the same time, many of the ways that we understand and
respond to the world are socially learned and culturally contingent, and these are what Ross
is signifying through the term psycho-cultural dispositions.
Structures of social organization, on the other hand, include the political, economic, legal,
and other social arrangements (e.g., structures of authority, relations of production, systems
of resource distribution, divisions of labour) that constrain and direct human attitudes, ideas,
and behaviours. Of course, these social arrangements both shape and are shaped by the
psycho-cultural dispositions of those who live within them. Thus both categories are
inseparably linked and mutually informing. At the same time, they are analytically useful
distinctions because they provide complementary insights into human culture.
Consider the case of conflict between social groups. Socio-structural analyses tend to
highlight objective conflicts of interest within the organization of society (i.e., the
empirically identifiable relations between capital and labour in a capitalist economy, between
men and women in a patriarchal society, or between first- and third-world nations in a post-
8 Ibid., Chapter 4.
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colonial world order). Moreover, socio-structural prescriptions tend to focus on reforming
underlying economic, political, or legal structures - that is, reorganizing the relations of
production within the economy, formulating laws that guarantee the equality of men and
women, or writing off third-world debt and subordinating an unfettered global economy to
structures of democratic control.
Psycho-cultural analyses, on the other hand, tend to highlight the diversity of
interpretations and responses within otherwise objectively identifiable social arrangements
(i.e., different ways the same social arrangements are culturally justified by those who are
privileged by them as well as different cultural responses to the same social arrangements by
those who are disadvantaged by them). Accordingly, psycho-cultural prescriptions tend to
focus on reforming attitudes, values, and beliefs (i.e., the subjective structures of the mind
rather than the objective structures of social organization). Given the significant role that
early childhood development plays in the formation of these psycho-cultural dispositions,
these strategies often focus on cultivating new attitudes and values in children or youth
during their formative years. Of course, psycho-cultural dispositions continue to be formed
or reinforced throughout life by a wide range of social institutions. Accordingly, strategies to
reform these dispositions can also be directed at other age groups, as seen in contemporary
"social marketing" campaigns (i.e., media campaigns that promote attitudes, values, and
beliefs rather than material commodities).
Though disciplinary or paradigmatic blinders often privilege one perspective over the
other, each perspective reveals as much as it obscures - like looking at different sides of the
same coin. Although social arrangements may be objectively identifiable, perceptions of
interests are highly subjective and vary significantly across cultures with otherwise similar
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social structures, and psycho-cultural research is needed to understand and explain these
differences. In addition, even though socio-structural theories often admit the possibility of
multiple cross-cutting interests, psycho-cultural research is needed to explain how and why
the same interests are ranked differently by different people in otherwise similar situations.
At the same time, psycho-cultural studies can obscure larger social structures by focusing
only on internal structures of consciousness. Therefore, socio-structural analyses are also
clearly needed. As Ross explains, objectively structured conflicts of interest are half the
picture. Inter-subjective interpretations of interests are the other hale
Cultural Change and Adaptation
Given that structures of the mind and structures of social organization are both culturally
contingent rather than genetically programmed (in the strong sense of the word), a theory of
culture also needs to explain how and why these structures vary between cultures. A theory
of culture, in other words, needs to account for processes of cultural change and adaptation.
Of course, even processes of genetic adaptation (or evolution) defy simple modeling, and
cultural adaptation is an infinitely more subtle and complex process. In this regard, cultural
change and adaptation can be accounted for only through the crudest conceptual models.
Nonetheless, crude models at least provide an initial vocabulary for thinking and talking
about culture, as well as a starting point for cultural analysis and critique.
The model of cultural change and adaptation articulated below draws from a range of
theoretical traditions, ranging again from anthropology and sociology to semiotics and
9 Ibid., Chapter 10.
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cultural studies. At the core of the model is the concept of cultural codes (or conventions).
After an initial definition of this core concept, the model is developed by examining how
cultural codes function within a series of increasingly expansive cultural phenomena, from
isolated representations to more complex discursive constructs to integrated discourses to
comprehensive discursive (or cultural) formations.
Cultural Codes
Pyscho-cultural dispositions and socio-structural arrangements can vary widely between
cultures. Even within a given culture, they often change over time. However, within any
given culture at any given moment in time people are generally able to understand one
another, communicate, and interact effectively because of culturally shared conventions or
"codes".
Cultural codes, in this context, refer to widely shared rules ofcorrespondence - or
structured relationships - between the complex elements that constitute a given culture (i.e.,
the structures of mind and structures of social organization).IO Some codes are explicitly
stated and others merely implied. Some codes are learned or constructed through conscious
effort and others are learned or constructed largely unconsciously. Regardless of how they
are stated, learned, or constructed, cultural codes establish conventions or rules of
correspondence through which thought, talk, and action becomes mutually intelligible within
a shared culture.
In semiotics and cultural studies, a key concept for understanding the function of cultural
10 Refer to Hall, "Representation", for a concise discussion of cultural codes. See also Eco, A Theory of
Semiotics; Fiske, Introduction to Communication Studies; and Turner, British Cultural Studies, for
additional discussions of the concept of codes.
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codes is the concept of representation. 11 And though a full-fledged theory of representation
is not needed for the analysis developed in this dissertation, a simple overview of the concept
provides a means of understanding the way that cultural codes function. In this context,
representation refers to the social process of creating and exchanging meaning through the
use of languages or "signifying systems". 12 Languages facilitate the exchange of meaning
within a culture because words and other signs are encoded to stand for ( i.e., to represent)
the meanings and things we associate with them. In addition, the term representation also
refers to the product of this process: representations.
Representations can be understood in terms of three basic dimensions or components.
First, a representation is associated with some sign or signifier - a word, a gesture, an image,
or anything that is used to refer to something else. Second, a representation is associated
with some actual thing or practice in the world - some material or social phenomenon apart
from the signifier used to refer to it. And third, a representation is associated with some
meaning - some cognitive and/or affective association - that is conceptually linked with the
respective sign and thing. 13 Together, this three-way association between sign, thing, and
meaning constitute a given representation. 14
11
12
13
14
For the most comprehensive scholarly treatment of the field of semiotic theory and history, refer to
Bouissac, ed., Encyclopedia ofSemiotics. The discussion that follows is adapted in large part from the
work of Stuart Hall, who has woven concepts from diverse intellectual traditions, including semiotics, into
a concise and insightful theory of culture. For an edited collection of Hall's contributions in this regard,
refer to Morley and Chen, eds., Stuart Hall. For a concise discussion of many of the specific concepts
outlined below, refer to Hall, "Representation".
O'Sullivan, Hartley, Saunders, Montgomery, and Fiske, eds., Key Concepts in Communication and Cultural
Studies, p. 265.
The term meaning refers not merely to conscious and rational interpretations of things, but also to
unconscious and affective associations with signs and things. Refer, for example, to discussions of this
theme in Allan, Meaning ofCulture.
This rather simplistic sounding but analytically useful distinction between thing, sign, and meaning is
borrowed from Hall, "Representation". The genealogy of these terms can be traced to Saussure, Course in
(footnote continued on next page)
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The relationship between these three components in any given representation, of course,
is culturally determined. That is, there is no necessary correspondence between the signs,
things, and meanings we associate together in a given representation. Meanings do not
"reside" in things - as the same things can clearly have different meanings in different
cultures. Neither do meanings reside in the signs we use to refer to those things - as the
same signs can also have different meanings in different cultures. Nor does a necessary
relationship exist between any given thing and the sign we associate with it - as the same
things are frequently signified by different signs in different cultures. Thus we associate
signs, things, and meanings together in our minds and through our language in culturally
contingent rather than genetically programmed ways.
The formal study of these representational relationships and the codes that make them
culturally intelligible has yielded valuable insights into the social or cultural construction of
reality. Semiotic scholars point out, for instance, that while codes temporarily "fix" or
"stabilize" the rules of correspondence within a culture, and thus enable groups of people to
"translate" meaning in mutually intelligible ways, these codes are never entirely or
permanently fixed. Subgroups within a given culture often challenge or change widely
shared cultural codes. Alternative and oppositional codes often coexist alongside culturally
dominant ones. In addition, dominant codes shift and change over time as a result of forces
General Linguistics. Saussure conceptualized a sign as embodying both a signifier and a signified. In
Hall's usage, and in this dissertation, thetenn sign is synonymous with Saussure's signifier - the actual
word, sound, image, and so forth, used to signify something else. Saussure's tenn signified, on the other
hand, refers to the mental concept that a specific sign is associated with - or the meaning in Hall's
vocabulary. Following Saussure, other authors (e.g., Ogden and Richards, The Meaning ofMeaning) added
the tenn referent to refer to the actual phenomenon that a given sign referred to (as opposed to the mental
concept or meaning the sign was associated with). In Hall's usage, and in this dissertation, the tenn thing is
synonymous with this use of referent. Much semiotic theory has subsequently been developed around this
(footnote continued on next page)
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within and between cultures.
Of course, while representations and the codes that render them intelligible may be
among the most basic elements of culture (the "semiotic bricks" from which cultures are
constructed), narrow attention to the isolated building blocks can obscure the larger and more
complex cultural constructs that are often built from them. In this context, representations
and codes take on depth and dimension as they are articulated together into more complex
constructions. Articulation, in this sense, has a twofold meaning. 15 First, it refers to
expression through language, where language is understood as any organized system of
words or signs. In addition, it refers to the linking of two or more things together, such as the
articulation of two bones at a joint. Of course, the two meanings are not as distinct as they
appear at first glance, for expression through language always involves the joining or linking
together of multiple words or signs.
Bearing in mind the insights of semiotics, articulation thus has a deeper meaning in
cultural studies than in popular usage. Because all words or signs are parts of
representational triads that also embody associations with specific things and meanings, the
linking of signs together on the linguistic surface of communication is accompanied by the
simultaneous linking of different meanings in people's minds, as well as different things
and/or social practices in the material world. For example, the phrase "that's just human
nature" is, on the surface, a simple linguistic expression. But beneath the surface of that
three-way distinction between sign, meaning, and thing, although the vocabulary employed varies from
author to author.
15 For discussions of the concept of articulation as used in cultural studies, refer to O'Sullivan, Hartley,
Saunders, Montgomery, and Fiske, eds., Key Concepts in Communication and Cultural Studies, pp. 17-18;
Hall, "Race" and Hall, "On Postmodemism and Articulation"; and Slack, "Theory and Method of
Articulation".
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linguistic expression lies a culturally coded set of meanings and practices. In many Western
cultures, the phrase embodies a complex set of attitudes and beliefs (i.e., meanings) about the
inevitability of certain human behaviours, such as the competitive pursuit of individual self-
interests. As the discussion in subsequent chapters will illustrate, these attitudes and beliefs
frequently translate into social structures and practices that tolerate. or even encourage such
behaviours.
In this way, just as individual words are articulated together to form more complex
grammatical constructions in a given speech act, the meanings and things (or practices) that
are associated with those words (or other signs) simultaneously articulate together to form
more complex social constructions - or what will be referred to below as discursive
constructs. 16 Like the concept of articulation, however, the term discursive also has a surface
meaning and a deep meaning. 17 On the surface, it refers simply to complex linguistic
expressions that are larger than a sentence or so. On a deeper level, however, it refers to the
meanings and things or practices that are associated with these linguistic expressions. It thus
reminds us of the inseparable connection between language, thought, and things or practices
in our material and social worlds. It reminds us, in other words, that cultural ways of talking
and thinking about things influence the ways we act in relations to those things.
A discursive construct is thus a socially constructed way of talking about, thinking about,
and, by extension, acting in relation to, a given phenomenon - such as "human nature" in the
16 The tenn discursive construct, as used in this dissertation, is a loose adaptation of the concept ofstatement,
as conceptualized by Foucault, The Archeology ofKnowledge.
17 This use ofthe tenn discourse also owes much to Foucault, Ibid. See also Hall, "Representation", and
O'Sullivan, Hartley, Saunders, Montgomery, and Fiske, eds., Key Concepts in Communication and Cultural
Studies, pp. 92-94, for summaries of the concept as it has come to be used in cultural studies.
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example above. Moreover, discursive constructs also tend to be governed by cultural codes
or conventions. That is, some representations are more likely to be articulated together than
others because cultural codes determine whether a given discursive construct will "make
sense" or not within a given culture.
To extend the example above, highly individualistic and self-interested representations of
human nature are easily intelligible when interpreted through the dominant codes of modern
Western-liberal cultures. Some non-Western cultures, however, have historically represented
human nature in a much more "relational" manner, with interests being understood primarily
in communal rather than individualistic terms. In such cultures, Western representations of
human nature would be relatively unintelligible. 18 Discursive constructs are thus culturally
and historically specific. Even though they may have only a vague meaning, if any, in other
cultures or at other times, they have very specific meanings that translate into concrete
material practices within the cultures that articulate them.
To extend the analysis further: discursive constructs can be articulated together into
highly complex systems of representation - entire discourses - which tend also to be
governed by cultural codes or conventions. Discourses are widely shared systems of
representation which provide culturally and historically specific ways of thinking about,
talking about, and acting in relation to an entire class of phenomena. It is in this context that
the connection between cultural codes and social practices becomes especially apparent.
18 As the political anthropologist Marc Howard Ross points out, "The notion of the individual apart from the
group is a product of Westem thought, not of the general human experience" (Ross, Culture ofConflict, p.
19).
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For instance, for much ofthis century, Western medical discourse has provided culturally
specific ways of thinking about, talking about, and practicing medicine. It has articulated a
conceptual system - primarily a "disease model" of medicine - characterized by a specific
vocabulary for thinking and talking about the human body. It has articulated a system of
research and expertise that has determined what counts as valid medical knowledge. It has
articulated doctor-patient relations in ways that largely define the former as expert service
providers and the latter as victims of disease and passive recipients of medical intervention.
And it has articulated the institutional arrangements - hospitals, health insurance, and so
forth - that have organized and regulated modem medical practices. Other discourses, such
as discourses on education, commerce, law, politics, and so forth, can be understood in the
same way. They are all culturally and historically specific ways of thinking about, talking
about, and acting in relation to a given class of phenomena.
In this context, all discourses share a number of similar characteristics. They articulate
what is generally "sayable" or "thinkable" in relation to a given class of phenomena in any
given cultural and historical context. They articulate bodies of "knowledge", as well as
authoritative producers of this knowledge, that in tum constitute culturally and historically
specific beliefs or "truths" about these phenomena. They articulate their "subjects" - the
people that act within them or that they act upon - in such a manner that these subjects can
be seen to, or even start to, personify or conform to these representations. And finally, they
articulate social structures that organize and regulate collective practice in a manner that is
consistent with these representations.
Moreover, discourses are as much defined by what they exclude as by what they include.
They simultaneously influence what is not sayable or not thinkable in a given cultural
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context; what does not constitute authoritative knowledge or truth and who is not an
authoritative producer of such knowledge or truth; how subjects should not act; and what
institutional configurations are not present.
For instance, in the case of Western medical discourse, holistic concepts such as "health
maintenance" and "prevention" have until recently been eclipsed by reductionist concepts
such as disease management and intervention. In this manner, healing arts based in nutrition,
the use of herbs, body movement, acupuncture, and so forth have largely been excluded as
valid knowledge systems in the West for much ofthis century. In tum, the human
"subjects" of Western medicine have generally not been seen as primary agents in their own
health-maintenance and healing. Accordingly, institutional support for these alternative
approaches to health and healing have been largely absent. In all of these ways, modem
medical discourse has been defined as much by what is absent within it as by what is present.
To extend the analysis even further, while discursive constructs can be articulated
together into entire discourses, entire discourses can in turn be articulated with other
discourses into comprehensive discursive formations. 19 In this context, a comprehensive
discursive formation refers to the articulation of distinct but mutually compatible discourses
in a manner that reinforces similar ways of thinking, talking, and acting in relation to many
classes of phenomena. And once again, discourses articulate together into larger discursive
19 This use ofthe term comprehensive discursive formation is loosely adapted from Foucault's two terms
discursive formation and episteme, as conceptualized in Foucault, The Archeology ofKnowledge. In this
dissertation, a comprehensive discursive formation refers to the articulation of entire discourses into a
larger discursive complex or totality. In this way, the distinction between discursive construct, discourse,
and comprehensive discursive formation is used to indicate three distinct levels of analysis: the micro,
meso, and macro, respectively. At the same time, however, these three terms are not meant to constitute
mathematically precise units of measurement. The "boundaries" between them cannot be rigidly defined.
Rather, they are metaphorical constructs intended to aid thinking and talking about micro-, meso-, and
macro-level cultural constructions.
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formations according to cultural codes or conventions.
For instance, when the medical discourse described above is articulated with discourses
that idealize the free-market delivery of goods and services, they form a larger discursive
formation that translates, in practice, into a commercialized medical system that sells health
care as a commodity to those who can afford it and thereby operates much like any other
free-market entity - as in the United States today. On the other hand, when the medical
discourse described above is articulated with discourses that value the public delivery of
essential goods and services, they form a discursive formation that translates, in practice, into
a public health care model that provides service irrespective of the financial status of its
recipients - as in Canada today.
In this regard, a discursive formation can be thought of as a sort of discursive universe -
a constellation of relevant discourses that characterize a given culture at a given historical
time, and within which its members are born, grow and develop, and learn "normal" ways of
thinking, talking, and acting.20 And though this constellation of discourses is never
permanently fixed and might always be re-articulated in new ways, it tends to appear entirely
"natural" to those who were raised within it. In other words, we tend to take our cultural or
discursive environment for granted.
None of this, of course, implies that these discursive formations should or even could be
avoided. Discourses enable as well as constrain us. They provide the productive scaffolding
for human talk, thought, and practice, even though that scaffolding simultaneously limits us
20 The tenus worldview, ideology, paradigm, episteme, weltanshauung, or knowledge system all approach this
same abstraction from only slightly different angles. In the context of this dissertation, however, the
advantage of a discursive analysis is that it focuses on the relatively tangible and accessible communicative
traces or indicators of these more abstract mental and cultural phenomena.
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in various ways. Either way, discourses are an inevitable and necessary feature of social
existence. Human beings are discursive creatures. We will always exist within discursive
environments. The challenge, from a cultural studies standpoint, is to remain aware that
these environments are culturally constructed and that they can be reformed.
Moreover, even though semiotic and cultural studies scholars tend to use the concept of
discourse to emphasize the crucial role that systems of language and representation play in
the formation of cultures, the role that collective social structures and practices play should
not be overlooked. Languages provide a model for thinking about culture because languages
provide the means of thought and communication that make cultures possible. But language
is only a partial model or metaphor for culture. Once the insights provided by this metaphor
are grasped - especially the central role played by cultural codes - it is helpful to translate
the concept of discourse back into the broader concept of culture. In this regard, one can
think not only in terms of discursive constructs but also in terms of cultural constructs.
Similarly, one can think not only in terms ofcomprehensive discursive formations but also in
terms of comprehensive cultural formations. In both cases, the former terms highlight the
linguistic or representational dimensions of culture while the latter terms bring our attention
back to the full breadth of cultural expression, including social structures and practices. In
subsequent chapters of this dissertation, I will therefore use these terms interchangeably,
depending on whether I am emphasizing "representational" or "practical" expressions of
culture.
Influences on Cultural Codes
Moving from the analysis of isolated representations to the analysis of increasingly
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complex discursive systems to the analysis of integrated cultural formations provides an
increasingly expansive vantage point from which to examine and critique culture. From each
of these vantage points, one of the more obvious features of any discursive or cultural
system, as discussed above, is its social and historical relativity. Different societies employ
different codes, which yield different discursive or cultural formations.
Recognition of this historical specificity raises questions such as how and why do
specific cultural formations arise in a given historical context? What are the social
consequences and implications of these different formations? And how, as well as on what
basis, can the codes that underlie these formations be critiqued, evaluated, or reformed? The
theoretical framework outlined above provides conceptual categories with which we can
begin to answer these questions as well as influence or reform our cultural environment.
Consider the question: How do different cultural codes gain prominence (or dominance)
within a given culture?
On the most obvious level, natural environment appears to play some role. Cultural
codes can be understood at least partially as social adaptations to environmental features and
pressures. Thus many cultures have developed complex systems for talking and thinking
about unique features of their natural environments, from tropical rainforests to tundra and
from deserts to oceanic atolls. On another level, historical chance and circumstance
undoubtedly playa role in the propagation of various cultural codes, as when diverse cultures
come in contact with one another through migration and exploration, and the cross-
fertilization of words, ideas, and practices occurs. On yet another level, individual leaps of
imagination and invention undoubtedly playa role in the genesis of new cultural codes, as
when individual minds articulate radical new insights - such as Einstein's grasp of the
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relation between energy and matter (i.e., e=mc2) that in tum exert profound influences on
social thought, talk, and practice (in this example, by ushering in the atomic era).
The Role ofSocial Relations
But beyond these basic forces, many critical scholars have also turned their attention to
the important role that social relations - relations of production, gender, race, nationality,
age, and so forth - play in the ascendance of various cultural codes. Much of this scholarship
has focused on the role that unequal power relations play in these processes.21 From this I
vantage point, cultural codes can at least partially be understood as the outcome of ongoing
historical struggles between competing social groups seeking to construct our cultural worlds
- from our structures of consciousness to our structures of social organization - in ways that
serve their own self-interests.22
Though it can be argued that not all social groups are motivated to promote their own
self-interests at the expense of others, the historical record clearly demonstrates that many
have been, and continue to be, motivated in these ways. For instance, even as historical
instances of slavery provide glaring examples of this phenomena, the more subtle forms of
racism that are still prevalent today can also be understood in the same way. Economic
exploitation and gender domination provide other obvious examples of the same
For overviews as well as seminal edited collections of this scholarship, refer to Turner, Cultural Studies:
An Introduction; Storey, Cultural Studies; Hardt, Critical Communication Studies; During, ed., The
Cultural Studies Reader; Grossberg, Nelson, and Treichler, eds., Cultural Studies; Surber, Culture and
Critique; Dirks, Eiey, and Orthner, eds., Culture, Power, History; Giroux and Shannon, eds., Education
and Cultural Studies; Scannell, Schlesinger, and Sparks, eds., Culture and Power; Gurevitch, Bennett,
Curran, and Woollacott, eds., Culture, Society and the Media; and Morley and Chen, eds., Stuart Hall.
22 It should be noted that mutualism and cooperation also appear to play very important roles in social or
cultural evolution. To date, however, most critical analyses have tended to neglect mutualism and
cooperation as important determinants of discourse and culture - a theme that will be picked up again in
subsequent chapters of this dissertation.
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phenomenon.
Moreover, even though history can be interpreted (in part) as a process of competing
social groups seeking to construct the world in ways that best serve their own self-interests, it
must be remembered that a level playing field has not always characterized this competition.
Historically, some groups have had clear advantages over others in their abilities to propagate
cultural codes that promote their own self-interests. By depriving women of equal access to
higher education and in tum to the means of cultural production, men have gained many
historical advantages. Many ethnic minorities and the working poor have also experienced
unequal access to the means of cultural production, with similar results. For various material
and historical reasons, then, some social groups (and alliances of groups) have historically
occupied privileged positions from which to define or construct our cultural worlds.
The Question ofIntentionality
To say that power relations influence the ways we think, talk, and act need not imply,
however, that such influence is necessarily conscious or intentional- although in some cases
it clearly is. The leadership in Nazi Germany, for instance, was clearly pursuing intentional
designs through its articulation of discourses around German nationalism, militarism, and
racial supremacy.
Even though efforts to define reality may sometimes be conscious and intentional, self-
interested definitions ofreality need not always be arrived at through conscious and
deliberate processes. People are often inclined to "see" the world in ways that serve their
31
own self-interests, without necessarily being aware that they are doing SO.23 We do not
always consciously decide that we want to interpret things one way rather than another after
weighing the extent to which other possible interpretations might promote our self-interests.
Rather, our interpretations of reality emerge through the interplay of complex, subtle, and
often subconscious processes of motivation, rationalization, socialization, and so forth.
Moreover, because of the complex "chicken-and-egg" nature of causality between
language, thought, and social practice, efforts to attribute intentionality are doubly
problematic. How can intentionality be solely and definitively attributed to individuals or
groups when the intentions of those individuals or groups are influenced by the language,
thoughts, andpractices that preceded them? Intentions are at least partially shaped by
psycho-cultural dispositions that we do not choose to inherit. This is not to suggest that
individuals or groups should be excused from any responsibility for their own actions.
Rather, it is simply to suggest that issues of intentionality are often complicated and
conscious intentionality cannot always be assumed. We do exercise free will, but we
exercise it within mental and social structures that were not entirely of our own choosing.
Regardless of whether these processes are conscious and intentional or not, the ultimate
ascendancy and establishment of some cultural codes over others can still be a function of
social relations. For example, because some groups are in more privileged positions from
which to determine how various phenomena are represented, it follows that their systems of
23 Refer, for instance, to the concept ofelective affinity articulated by Weber in Essays in Sociology, pp. 62-
63, 284-85, and elaborated by Clement in Canadian Corporate Elite, pp. 283-4, 92. In brief, elective
affinity refers to the ways that people have a natural affinity for ideas that support their material interests
and they elect, either consciously or unconsciously, to adopt those ideas over others. Moreover, as Clement
illustrates, those with the most control over the means ofcultural production are often able to project ideas
that they have an affinity for onto others, even though those others might have different material interests.
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representation will dominate - whether intentionally or not - within a given culture at a given
historical moment.24 In this regard, one of the most consistently supported empirical findings
in mass communications research is the existence of a "hierarchy of access" to the
commercial media, characterized by a relatively exclusive population of elite voices at the
top?5 Furthermore, in contemporary societies, those who have better access to the means of
mass communication occupy a privileged position from which to construct the dominant
representations, or preferred definitions, of reality. 26 The ascendancy of a remarkably
narrow range of interpretations on most issues does not mean, however, that the individuals
positioned at the top of this hierarchy of access are consciously "conspiring" with one
another to promote self-serving interpretations of reality. Many of them may well be entirely
sincere in their efforts to simply interpret, and respond to, the world as they see it. The ways
that they see the world, however, often unconsciously coincide with their own self-interests.
Moreover, the degree to which such privileged groups are successful in their discursive
construction of reality is the degree to which the codes they cultivate appear normal or
natural within their culture. And the degree to which these codes appear normal or natural is
in turn the degree to which alternative cultural codes are ignored or marginalized. On the
other hand, cultural codes are never completely fixed, and efforts to advance alternatives
from the margins are sometimes successful. In this regard, the histories of cultures can at
24 The genealogy of this theme can be traced, for instance, to Marx and Engels, The German Ideology. Refer
also to Eagleton, Ideology, for a more contemporary discussion of this theme.
25 Refer, for example, to Hackett, "Hierarchy of Access"; Gandy, "Structuration of Dominance"; Schlesinger,
"Rethinking the Sociology of Journalism"; Ericson, Baranek, and Chan, Negotiating Control; Gans,
Deciding What's News; and Sparks, "The Media and the State".
26 For more detailed discussions of this theme, refer to Eagleton, Ideology; Larrain, The Concept ofIdeology;
Hall, "Rediscovery of 'IdeologyIII. Many contemporary discussions of this theme can in tum be traced to
Marx and Engels, The German Ideology.
33
least in part be interpreted as ongoing processes of discursive or cultural "negotiation" -
whether conscious or not - between diverse social groups.
Hegemony
The process of establishing and maintaining, as well as challenging or reforming,
dominant discursive or cultural formations was explored over three-quarters of a century ago
by Antonio Gramsci.27 Central to Gramsci's analysis was his reworking of the traditional
concept of hegemony. Historically, the concept of hegemony referred to the spatial or
geographical extension of dominance by one political entity over others. This type of
hegemony was typically achieved and sustained largely through force. In contrast, Gramsci's
concept of cultural hegemony referred to the relative ability of various social classes to
project their own ways of se.eing and representing the world on others. This was
accomplished, according to Gramsci, not primarily through physical force but through
cultural leadership.
Since Gramsci's original reworking of the concept of hegemony, the term has fallen into
rather cliched usage through which it has lost much of its value as a theoretical construct.
The term is often used simply to refer to dominance of any kind. In Gramsci's usage,
however, the term signified the ability of dominant social classes to cultivate, through non-
coercive means, a popular worldview that naturalized their dominant social positions and
made these structural arrangements appear to serve the interests of all other social classes.
Force was not needed provided subordinate social classes would consent to their own
subordination based on the assumption that it was inevitable or that it actually served their
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best interests.
Of course, Gramsci developed his analysis primarily in terms of economic class
dominance. Retaining Gramsci' s original sense of the term, contemporary cultural theorists
have also applied the concept of hegemony to relations of race, gender, nationality, and so
forth. In this expanded context, hegemonic dominance is achieved when any social group (or
alliance of groups) is able to establish their representations of reality so effectively that they
become the accepted "common sense" not only within their own group but also within other
groups whose interests are subordinated in the process. The key point, however, is that
hegemony is not achieved perceptibly, through force. Rather, it is achieved relatively
imperceptibly, through the cultivation of consent to a given social order. To the degree that
this is effective, the result is the normalization or naturalization of particular ways of
thinking, talking, and acting - along with the marginalization of alternatives. In this manner,
hegemonic dominance legitimates some cultural codes while simultaneously discrediting
others.
For example, historical efforts to exclude women from many arenas of public life,
ranging from higher education to public decision making, and to consign them primarily to
domestic affairs, can be understood as a hegemonic process. It involved the cultivation of
"common sense" notions among both men and women regarding the "appropriate" role of
women in society. Of course, not all women historically accepted these common sense
notions and many struggled against them. On the other hand, many women did accept these
notions, as demonstrated by women who organized in opposition to women's suffrage
27 Refer to Gramsci, "Prison Notebooks".
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movements on the conviction (among others) that the moral purity of women would be
compromised by their entrance into public life and that the entire social fabric would thereby
be weakened.28
As this example demonstrates, of course, hegemonic dominance is never final or
absolute. Even though much remains to be achieved, Western women (as well as many
ethnic and other historically oppressed minorities) have gained significant ground in recent
decades. History can therefore be understood as an ongoing process of hegemonic struggle
or negotiation. Discursive "boundaries" shift and change over time along with the cultural
codes that underlie them. Sometimes they remain relatively unchanged for extended periods.
Other times they go through radical transformations. In any given period of hegemonic
dominance, however, change tends to come from the margins - from outside of the dominant
cultural common sense.
Efforts to change established cultural codes therefore tend to be uphill struggles. Even
when such changes may be in the widest popular interests, populations whose language,
thought, and actions have been largely prefigured by existing discursive or cultural
formations, and who have thus internalized views that may ultimately subordinate their own
interests to other historically privileged groups, can be expected to resist those very changes
that might emancipate them from their own oppressive conditions. Simply put, it is often
difficult to step outside of a discursive universe that you have been born and raised in. It is
difficult to imagine what the world might look like outside it. Moreover, it can be difficult
even to recognize that you are living in a culturally and historically specific discursive
28 For an overview of the arguments put forward by women who opposed women's suffrage, refer to
Cholmeley, The Women's Anti-Suffrage Movement, and Adams, "American Anti-Suffrage Women".
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formation at all. To the extent that hegemonic dominance has been effective, that formation
will appear not as a cultural construct at all but simply as "reality" itself - normal, natural,
and inevitable.
We are thus born into culturally constructed worlds that are not of our own making. This
is not to suggest that people cannot be agents in changing or reconstructing the cultural
worlds they inhabit. In light of the ultimate fluidity of cultural codes, such possibilities are
always present. Such changes, however, are contingent upon our ability to recognize the
historical specificity of our cultural environment and to step outside of it, if only in our
imaginations at first - as subsequent chapters of this dissertation attempt to do with regard to
the culture of adversarialism.
CHAPTER II:· POWER
Given the model of culture outlined in Chapter I, discourse analysis has become a widely
used method ofcultural critique. In this chapter, discourse analysis is used to begin
deconstructing the culture of adversarialism through an examination of one of its most
fundamental concepts: power.
Representations of power and contests over power dominate the contemporary public
sphere. From political and economic competition to legal and social advocacy, we have
constructed elaborate systems of thought, talk, and practice around adversarial relations of
power. Relations of power have thus, either implicitly or explicitly, become central
constructs in contemporary Western thought. Like all discursive constructs, however,
Western representations of power are culturally and historically specific. They illuminate
some facets of reality even as they obscure others.
Models of Power
"Power To" versus i'Power Over"
For several decades now, theorists of power have drawn a distinction between two broad
ways of thinking and talking about power - a distinction that is generally made by
contrasting the expressions "power to" versus "power over".l As Wartenberg explains,
This distinction is discussed by many theorists of power, including Wartenberg, Forms ofPower; Wrong,
Power; Lukes, Power: A Radical View; Hartsock, Feminist Historical Materialism; Pitkin, Wittgenstein
and Justice; Macpherson, Democratic Theory; Connolly, The Terms ofPolitical Discourse; Coser, "Notion
of Power"; Dowding, Power; and others.
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the expressions power-to and power-over are a shorthand way of making a distinction between
two fundamentally different ordinary-language locutions within which the term "power" occurs.
Depending upon which locution one takes as the basis of one's theory of power, one will arrive at
a very different model of the role of power in the social world.2
In this context, "power to" is understood as a generalized capacity to accomplish
something. Thus people may have the "power to" bear children, erect a bridge, coordinate a
journey to the moon, or establish a system of democratic governance. On the other hand,
"power over" is understood as the capacity of some people to exercise control over others -
to dominate or exploit them in some manner.3 In this sense, "power over" relations are
adversarial relations in which one party exercises some power advantage against the other in
an oppressive manner. The historical domination of capitalists over labourers, men over
women, or colonizing nations over colonized ones, are all classic examples that have
received much attention in this literature.
After setting up this distinction between "power to" and "power over", many scholars
either implicitly or explicitly dismiss the first as largely irrelevant to social theory. For
example, Steven Lukes, one of the more influential theorists of power, explicitly dismisses
the concept of "power to" by arguing that it is "of less value" than the concept of "power
over" for two reasons. 4 First, he asserts that "power to" theories "are out of line with the
central meanings of 'power' as traditionally understood and with the concerns that have
always centrally preoccupied students of power". Thus Lukes invokes scholarly tradition as
2
4
Wartenberg, Forms o/Power, p. 27.
This latter definition characterizes most social and political theories of power. This can be seen, for
example, in Weber, "Domination"; Dahl, "The Concept of Power" and "Power as the Control of
Behaviour"; Bachrach and Baratz, "Two Faces of Power"; Lukes, ed., Power; and de Jouvenel, On Power-
all of whom were highly influential theorists of power.
This quote, and the quotes that follow, are taken from Lukes, Power: A Radical View, pp. 30-31.
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his first reason for dismissing the relevance of "power to" theories. Second, Lukes asserts
that when one focuses on "power to" concepts "the conflictual aspect of power - the fact that
it is exercised over people - disappears altogether from view. And along with it there
disappears the central interest of studying power relations in the first place". 5 In this vein,
Lukes argues that "power to" theories end up "concealing from view the central aspects of
power which they define out of existence". Ironically, however, by dismissing "power to"
theories, Lukes does exactly the same thing in reverse. He conceals "power to" categories
from view by defining them as irrelevant to serious scholarly inquiry. 6
In this regard, even though theorists like Lukes sometimes acknowledge that "power
over" is only one category of power relations, they explicitly privilege it as the exclusive
focus - the central category - of analysis.? Most other scholars, however, do not even
acknowledge other categories of power relations in their writing. They simply assume that
the word power is synonymous with "power over", without any qualifying discussions -
which are seldom needed because the terms are synonymous for most readers as well.8
6
?
8
As the discussion below will illustrate, the opposite appears actually to be the case. "Power over" analyses
figure prominently within the broader category "power to", while "power to" analyses are obscured within
the more narrow category "power over".
Lukes's argument is doubly ironic given his reference to scholarly tradition (above) as ajustification for
dismissing "power to" theories. The irony arises here because scholarly tradition is seen by most critical
theorists as a potential hegemonic constraint on critical thought - and thus something to be perpetually
critiqued rather than uncritically accepted. Yet Lukes invokes tradition while at the same time explicitly
subscribing to the theory of hegemony.
This explicit focus on "power over" relations also characterizes the work of many other theorists of power.
For instance, after drawing the distinction between "power to" and "power over", Wartenberg, in Forms of
Power, p. 5, goes on to argue that "a theory of power has, as a first priority, the articulation of the meaning
of the concept of power-over because social theory employs this concept as a primary means of
conceptualizing the nature of the fundamental inequalities in society". "Power over", he thus asserts, is
"the primary meaning ofpower". And, like Lukes, he in tum argues that a focus on "power to" relations
merely "shifts the theorist's gaze away from the set of phenomena that a theory of social power must
comprehend, namely the illegitimate inequalities that exist in modem societies".
Refer, for example, to essays in Scannell, Schlesinger, and Sparks, eds., Culture and Power; and Dirks,
Eley, and Orthner, eds., Culture. Power, History.
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Similarly, in popular discourses, the terms are also generally synonymous. In discussions of
social relations (as opposed to discussion of energy or physics), references to power tend to
imply adversarial relations of domination, oppression, or struggle. Western-liberal discourses
thus tend to illuminate only one category of social power relations while they obscure all
others.
As the discussion in Chapter I reminds us, however, discursive constructs are not simply
passive or neutral linguistic devices. They affect the ways that people think and act in
relation to the phenomena they represent. By privileging adversarial aspects of power, we
primarily "see" adversarial "power over" relations in their analyses, while other types of
power relations recede from view. This is not to assert that "power over" relations are
figments of our imagination. They are real and very worthy of attention. Rather, it is simply
to point out that these particular relations tend to be highlighted and emphasized in Western
discourses while other relations of power tend to be obscured.
In order to understand the implications of this narrow understanding of power relations,
including the ways that it informs our broader culture of adversarialism, it is helpful to step
back from the adversarial "power over" construct and situate it within the full field of power
relations. Situating "power over" within this wider context allows us to recognize what is
obscured or excluded by a narrower focus on adversarialism. The recognition ofthese
discursive blind-spots in turn provides a framework for evaluating alternatives to the culture
of adversarialism. Toward this end, a more comprehensive framework for thinking and
talking about power relations is outlined below.
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"Power To" and "Power Over" in Context
Aside from the fact that "power to" categories tend to be dismissed or obscured in
Western-liberal discourses, the distinction between "power to" and "power over" is
problematic in its own right. When it is used at all, it tends to be used in a manner that
implies the two concepts are distinct but parallel categories. If power is not understood in
terms of "power to", it must be understood in terms of "power over". Conversely, if power is
not understood in terms of "power over", it must be understood in terms of "power to". On
closer inspection, however, this parallel distinction is problematic. Cannot "power over"
more accurately be understood as a subcategory of "power to"? For instance, if! have
"power over" someone, is this not simply another way of saying that I have the "power to
exercise control over" that person? In fact, all possible forms of "power over" can be
conceived in terms of the power to exercise control over - thus making "power over" a
specific sub-category of the more general category "power to".
The more general nature of "power to" is further illustrated by considering that other
forms of "power to" do not entail exercising "power over" others at all. For instance, a group
of people that makes a consensual decision to collectively build a bridge are exercising their
"power to" pursue a common goal by acting in a cooperative manner. The very terms
consensus and cooperation denote the fact that within the group no individual or alliance of
individuals exercises "power over" the others in the sense of dominating or exploiting them. 9
9 Of course, as Lukes points out in Power: A Radical View, a subordinate group can arrive at a consensus
that unwittingly sacrifices its own interests to the interests of a dominant group, as a result of the
hegemonic influence that the dominant group can exercise over the subordinate group's common sense
views. This is, in fact, the key insight of all hegemonic/ideological models of"power over" relations.
Such examples, however, could be called examples of false or imposed consensus. They do not negate
examples of fully informed consensus arrived at through transparent and cooperative means.
11
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These terms denote a different kind of "power to" than that denoted by "power over". They
denote the power to act together in the pursuit ofa common goal. Therefore "power over" i's
only one possible subcategory of "power to". 10
In this context, it is problematic to understand "power to" and "power over" as parallel or
equivalent categories. Rather, "power to" - which could be restated in the general terms of
power as capacity - is an over-arching definitional category within which "power over" can
be located. But if this is the case, what other sub-categories ofpower as capacity are being
obscured by a narrow focus on "power over"? What other subcategories can be
conceptualized in order to provide a more comprehensive framework for thiilking and talking
about (as well as enacting) relations of power?
On the most basic level, it is possible to distinguish between two broad subcategories of
power as capacity. On the one hand, people have the capacity to exercise "power together"
in a cooperative manner. This type of power relation will be referred to below simply as
cooperative power relations. 11 Yet the concept of "power over" - as it is typically used in
the sense of domination, exploitation, or oppression - is still too narrow to serve as the
alternate parallel category to cooperative power relations. To illustrate this, consider that a
stalemate arrived at by two equally powerful adversaries is not an example of cooperative
power relations, yet it also is not an example of "power over". If two people are equally
10
"Power over" is sometimes acknowledged as a special case of the more general category "power to".
Refer, for example, to Wrong, Power, p. xiii; Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theory; and Parsons,
"Power and the Social System". None of these authors, however, develop a schema for conceptualizing the
full range of power relations as outlined below.
In fairness, some feminist scholars have theorized various forms of cooperative or "co-active" power
relations, and these theories will be discussed in some detail in Chapter IV. These feminist theories of
power, however, are not consistent with most theories of social and political power. In this regard, due to
their relatively marginalized status, they actually illuminate the boundaries of traditional discourses on
power.
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powerful, one cannot be said to have "power over" the other, even if they are locked in an
adversarial relationship. Rather, the capacity people have to exercise "power against" one
another in a generalized adversarial manner would be the parallel, mutually exhaustive,
alternate category to cooperative power relations - for it encompasses both "power over" as
well as the contrasting possibility of the stalemate. 12 Thus, on this first level of distinction,
people either exercise "power together" in a cooperative manner, or they exercise "power
against" one another in an adversarial manner. For the sake of clarity, the second of these
categories will be referred to below as adversarial power relations. Cooperative power
relations and adversarial power relations can therefore be conceptualized as the first-level
subcategories of the more general definitional category power as capacity.
In this context, "power over" is a subcategory ofadversarial power relations. The
example of the stalemate introduced above - which can be expressed in terms of a "balance
of power" within an adversarial relationship - is the parallel, alternative subcategory.13
Moreover, the distinguishing characteristic of these two subcategories is power equality
versus power inequality. In the case of a "balance of power", power is distributed equally
between adversarial agents such that neither can dominate the other. In the case of "power
over", power is distributed unequally between adversarial agents such that one can dominate
the other.
12 In Power, p. 237, Wrong does, in passing, use the phrase "power against" to indicate a particular fonn of
"power to". He does not, however, provide a comprehensive schema within which to locate that insight.
13 The concept of balance of power, sometimes referred to as "intercursive power", has been theorized to
some extent in Blau, Exchange and Power in Social Life, p. 118; Gamson, Power and Discontent; and
Reismann, Denny, and Glazer, The Lonely Crowd. In many respects, all pluralistic models of partisan
democracy embody some notions of balance of power. To my knowledge, however, the concept has never
been situated within a comprehensive framework in order to clearly distinguish how it relates to other
relations of power. .
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It is only this third-level subcategory - power inequality as a subcategory of adversarial
power relations, as a subcategory of power as capacity - that most people, including most
power theorists, are referring to when they use the word "power". This narrow definition of
power, however, clearly obscures other important relations of power. Moreover, when some
power theorists contrast this third-level subcategory as parallel and equivalent to the
overarching definitional category of "power to" - which in tum tends to be dismissed as
irrelevant to social theory - all of these other categories disappear from view. In addition,
the concepts ofpower and inequality - which refer to entirely distinct phenomena - tend to
be conflated.
The "power to" versus "power over" distinction becomes even more problematic when
you consider that the subcategories ofpower equality and power inequality within
adversarial power relations have parallel counterpoints within the category of cooperative
power relations - which in tum are also obscured when the term power becomes
synonymous with the concept of "power over". To illustrate this, consider that two'or more
agents acting cooperatively can also be characterized by either equal or unequal distributions
of power, and the distinction is again significant. In this context, power equality within
cooperative power relations could be said to result in the "mutual empowerment" of all
cooperating agents. For example, this would be the case when a group of equals deliberate
together and agree to cooperate in a project that mutually benefits all involved. In cases such
as this, power equality expressed within cooperative power relations results in the "mutual
empowerment" of the entire group.
In contrast, power inequality within cooperative power relations could be said to result in
the "assisted empowerment" of the less powerful agents by the more powerful agents. For
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instance, the relation between a parent and child involves certain power inequalities. But this
does not mean that the parent need oppress or exploit the child. Rather, parent-child relations
are more commonly characterized by nurturing - a form of "assisted empowerment" - in
which the child actually benefits from the unequal power relationship. The same can be said
of healthy teacher-student relationships.14 In both of these cases, power inequalities can
actually be understood as necessary and desirable characteristics of these relationships. In
addition, though necessary and desirable, these power inequalities are often merely
temporary or transitional. The goal of these relationships is often to nurture the unequal
parties until they arrive at a state of equality.
The framework outlined above is thus more nuanced and comprehensive than the simple
and problematic distinction between "power to" and "power over" - as the visual summary
on the following page illustrates.
14 In Forms ofPower, Wartenberg does acknowledge the possibility that some unequal power relationships
can be beneficial to the less powerful agents in the manner described above. He refers to these as
"transformative power" relationships, and uses the same examples of nurturing and education to illustrate
his point. However, because he does not clarify the distinction between adversarial and cooperative
relations on the one hand, and between equality and inequality on the other, he conflates the two and thus
views transformative power simply as another type of"power over" relationship. Various feminist
theorists have also articulated theories of"nurturing" power which will be discussed in some detail in
Chapter IV.
POWER AS CAPACITY
"power to"
(overarching defmition of power)
ADVERSARIAL
POWER RELATIONS
"power against"
COOPERATIVE
POWER RELATIONS
"power together"
examples: examples:
• competition • collaboration
• confrontation • concerted action
• opposition • co-action
• partisanship • unity/solidarity
• war • peace
• dissonance • harmony
[zero-sum or negative-sum] [positive-sum / mutual gains]
POWER POWER POWER POWER
INEQUALITY EQUALITY INEQUALITY EQUALITY
"power over" "balance of "assisted "mutual
power" empowerment" empowerment"
examples: examples: examples: examples:
• domination • compromise • nurturing • reciprocity
• exploitation • gridlock • education • coordination
• oppression • stalemate • assistance • mutuality
• subjugation • mutual • affirmative • synergy
• coercion frustration action • teamwork
[win -lose] [lose-lose] [(win)- win] [win-win]
FIGURE 1: Power and Power Relations (ideal type categories).
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The schema above, of course, is merely a conceptual model - a visual and mental
representation intended to aid thought and discussion regarding what are ultimately highly
complex and subtle phenomena. In this sense, the categorizations are not intended to be rigid
or precise. Rather, they are intended merely to provide a vocabulary of ideal types, as Weber
used the term, by which broad patterns and distinctions can be recognized and discussed. In
this sense they are more metaphorical than mathematical.
This metaphorical schema, however, helps us make a number of distinctions that are
often lost in discussions ofpower. 15 Most obviously, it visually demonstrates that "power
to" and "power over" are not equivalent categories. But beyond this, the schema also
provides a framework within which to understand many other types of social relations that
are generally obscured in discourses on power. For instance, within the schema, power
inequality cannot be automatically equated with relations of domination, exploitation, and so
forth. Power inequality may be oppressive when coupled with adversarial power relations,
but in the context of cooperative power relations, inequality can actually be empowering, as
in the nurturing relationship between a parent and child, or the educational relationship
between a teacher and student. Relations of domination between entire social groups can
even potentially be reformed into relations of assisted empowerment in order to rectify
historical inequities of power. Affirmative action policies and progressive taxation schemes
are all potential examples of such assisted empowerment.
15 At the same time, of course, a number of other important distinctions are obscured by this schema. For
instance, the schema does not distinguish between different sources of conflict (e.g., between conflicts that
arise from simple misunderstandings as opposed to ideological convictions or structural disparities). Nor
does it distinguish between different manifestations of adversarialism (e.g., rational debate as opposed to
physical warfare). However, everything cannot be accomplished within a single schematic. In addition,
some attention will be paid to these other distinctions in subsequent chapters.
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Hierarchy, as an organizational principle, can also be seen as a potentially desirable form
of inequality. In a social or organizational context, hierarchy refers to unequally structured
power relations. Not surprisingly, many people equate hierarchy with oppression. But this
equation conflates unequal power relations with adversarial power relations. In the context
of cooperative relations, however, hierarchy can be recognized as a valuable and often
necessary organizing principle. When any group of otherwise equal people is too large to
effectively engage every member in every decision-making process, the group may benefit
by intentionally delegating certain decision-making powers to smaller, often elected, sub-
groups. This consensually structured inequality - or hierarchy - can in turn empower a
group to accomplish things it could otherwise not accomplish. In the process, it can also
relieve the burden of ongoing decision-making responsibilities from large numbers of people
who are thereby freed to devote their time and energy to other productive pursuits that can
benefit the entire group. Hierarchy can therefore be a valuable and desirable organizing
principle under the right conditions. But these conditions include cooperative relations
between otherwise equal people. In this respect, while the schema outlined above illustrates
that hierarchy cannot automatically be equated with oppression, it also cautions that
hierarchy cannot automatically be equated with empowerment, as many conventional
"functionalist" theorists often conversely assume. 16 Under conditions of adversarial
relations, hierarchy does tend to lead to oppression.
16 Refer, for example, to the functionalist theory of power and hierarchy developed by Parsons, "Power and
the Social System". As Wrong points out in Power, p. 249, "to argue that permanent hierarchies of power
relations are indispensable in any modem complex society is not, of course, to stamp the seal of necessity
on the power structures of particular existing societies. Functionalist arguments have too often been
vulnerable to the charge that they imply just this ... as in the case of Parsons.... Parsons, as we have seen, is
open to the accusation that he idealizes the status quo because he minimizes to the point of neglect the use
ofpower on behalf of some group interests at the expense of others".
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Another insight offered by the schema is the recognition that all adversarial relations
themselves cannot be lumped together. Rather, adversarial relations take very different
forms depending on the relative equality or inequality of power between the antagonists.
While inequality between antagonists leads to the domination, exploitation, or oppression of
one by the other, equality often merely leads to mutual frustration. In this context, even
though equality may be preferable to inequality in adversarial relations - at least from the
perspective of the victims of oppressive relationships - both can be essentially
disempowering (in the former case, for one of the parties, and, in the latter, for both).
Consider, for instance, the partisan gridlock that defines so much contemporary political
decision making in Western-liberal democracies. Such gridlock disempowers not only the
respective political parties, it also disempowers the entire public by bringing its only means
of collective decision making to a grinding halt.
Or consider the more extreme example of the nuclear-arms doctrine known as Mutually
Assured Destruction (M.A.D.) that reigned throughout the cold war (and arguably still reigns
today with the continued existence of massive nuclear stockpiles around the world). M.A.D.
is a classic example of an adversarial relationship defined by that otherwise desirable
characteristic: power equality (in this case, equality of nuclear capacity). Yet this adversarial
expression of equality keeps people hanging in a delicate balance that, if upset, could result
in mutual annihilation. At the same time, it also places a massive burden of ongoing military
expenditures on the backs of the very people whose lives are unceasingly threatened by it -
namely, all of us. In this respect, it not only threatens to destroy us, but it also guarantees to
disempower us. The doctrine of M.A.D. - which is in many ways an inevitable outcome of
an adversarial geo-political structure characterized by relative equality of nuclear capacity -
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might just as well stand for Mutually Assured Disempowerment.
As these few examples illustrate, the framework above provides an expanded vocabulary
with which to think about and talk about relations of power. It gives us a more useful map of
power relations. In fact, by representing this schema in a two-dimensional manner, it can
literally allow us to "map" various power relations relative to the two axes
adversarialism+-K:ooperation and equalityHinequality, as the figure on the following page
illustrates.
ADVERSARIALISM
balance
ofpower
power
over
EQUALITY
mutual
empowerment
assisted
empowerment
INEQUALITY
COOPERATION
FIGURE 2: Mapping Power Relations
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In this two-dimensional representation, domination, exploitation, and other oppressive
"power over" relations are situated only in the lower-left quadrant, defined by the
combination of adversarialism and inequality. Compromise, gridlock, and other "balance of
power" relations are situated in the upper-left quadrant, defined by the combination of
adversarialism and equality. Nurturing, educating, and other "assisted empowerment"
relations are situated in the lower-right quadrant, defined by cooperation and inequality. And
reciprocation, coordination, and other "mutual empowerment" relations are situated in the
upper-right quadrant, defined by cooperation and equality.
This two-dimensional representation also helps us recognize (more effectively than the
schema in Figure 1) the relative nature of both adversarialism~ooperationon the one
hand, and equalityHinequality on the other. Some relations are more or less adversarial or
more or less cooperative than others, just as some distributions of power might be more or
less equal or unequal than others. Thus extreme adversarialism or extreme inequality can be
distinguished from more moderate expressions of both. Moreover, within this schema it is
possible to conceptualize movement along either axis. A nurturing relationship may begin
with a high degree of inequality and steadily progress toward a state of relative equality, as in
the case of both parenthood, education, and other developmental relationships. Or,
conversely, a relationship may become either more adversarial or more cooperative over
time, as in oscillations toward or away from political partisanship and bipartisanship.
Finally, this two-dimensional representation provides another way of recognizing the
spurious nature of "power to" versus "power over" distinctions. For while "power over" is
represented as the lower-left quadrant above, the concept of "power to" - or power as
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capacity - can be understood as the entire plane on which both of the axes
(adversarialismHCooperation and equalityHinequality) are inscribed. Again, of course, this
conceptual map is primarily a metaphorical construct. Actual social relations cannot be
precisely located and compared according to exact, ordinal coordinates on this plane.
Nonethelesss, the schema can serve as a useful aid for thought and discussion.
From Theory to Practice: Normative Adversarialism
Although the discussion above articulates alternative ways of thinking and talking about
power relations, the purpose of the discussion is not to refute the existence of domination,
exploitation, and other "power over" phenomena. Indeed, oppressive social relations exist
and require urgent attention. Recognizing them, understanding them, analyzing them, raising
popular awareness of them, and actively working to change them are all crucially important
tasks. Oppressive relations of power are not simply academic abstractions; they are a reality
for countless people around the planet. The critical work that is being done in these areas has
a valid empirical as well as normative basis. In fact, given the state of contemporary
societies around the world and current trends toward increasing disparities of wealth and
power, attention to these areas needs to be significantly expanded.
At the same time, however, the analysis above suggests that "power over" concepts need
to be situated within a more comprehensive conceptual framework because narrow
conceptual frameworks easily translate into narrow frameworks of social practice or praxis.
After all, thought, perception, and practice are mutually informing. In this context,
adversarial theories of power easily translate into adversarial praxis.
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This should come as little surprise. If adversarial relations appear to be the driving forces
of human history (because this is what our theories of power tend to implicitly or explicitly
focus on), it makes sense to structure our collective affairs in ways that harness those forces
for the maximum social good. However, even if adversarial relations have been the primary
driving force of history (a questionable assumption in itself), it is easy to confuse human
affairs as-they-have-been or as-they-are with human affairs as-they-could-be or as-they-
ought-to-be. In this context, descriptive/explanatory frameworks tend to carry over into
normative/prescriptive ones - hence adversarial theory easily translates into adversarial
praxis. When social relationships are assumed to be essentially adversarial, because that is
primarily what our perceptual models lead us to notice, even projects of social reform appear
to require methods that harness these adversarial forces in the service of emancipatory goals.
Thus normative adversarialism - the prescription of adversarial methods as normal and
necessary social practices - becomes the framework ofmuch conventional as well as critical
praxis.
As a result, however, we often overlook the significant role that non-adversarial relations
can and do play in human affairs - including the role they can and do play in social reform.
Given the relative absence of a framework for thinking and talking about non-adversarial
social relations, alternative social structures and alternative strategies of social change tend to
be overlooked and undervalued. These non-adversarial alternatives therefore remain under-
theorized, under-researched, and seldom practiced or prescribed. And yet, as will be
discussed in subsequent chapters of this dissertation, a case can be made that non-adversarial
social structures, as well as non-adversarial strategies of social reform, may be more just,
sustainable, and effective than their adversarial counterparts. Hence the practical need for a
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more comprehensive conceptual framework. Aside from expanding our abstract knowledge
of social power relations, it may also expand our possibilities for social praxis.
CHAPTER III: NORMATIVE ADVERSARIALISM
Adversarialism Throughout the Public Sphere
Normative adversarialism is a culture-wide phenomenon with a complex genealogy. It is
rooted not only in contemporary theories of power but in a range of Western traditions,
including the oppositional dualisms of ancient Semitic thought, the antagonistic nature of
ancient Greek rhetorical practices, and the Hobbesian conception of society as "a war of all
against all".l Normative adversarialism, in other words, is deeply embedded in the codes of
Western culture.
The ultimate adversarial practice, of course, is war itself, and Western societies have had
no shortage of war in recent centuries. But beyond the actual practice ofwar,
martial/military concepts have been articulated into metaphors (discursive constructs) that
shape social perception and practice throughout the public sphere.2 In the economic arena,
we speak of "market wars", "trade wars", and "hostile takeovers". In the political arena, we
speak of election "campaigns" funded by "war chests" and characterized by "wars of
words". In the media, virtually every social issue is at one time or another framed through
the metaphor of war - from the "war in the woods" over old-growth forests to the "war on
poverty" in the inner cities to the "war on drugs" that spans international boundaries.
2
Refer to Kehoe, "Conflict is a Western Worldview", and Ong, Fighting For Life, for two insightful
discussions of the complex genealogies of Western adversarialism.
Refer to Lakeoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, for a seminal discussion ofthe role that metaphors
play in shaping human thought. For a concise overview of literature on the subject, refer to Thornburg,
"Metaphors Matter".
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Closely related to these martial/military metaphors is the way that masculinity is
conceptualized throughout Western societies.3 From the battlefield to the playing field to the
workplace, competition and aggression against adversaries have been central to the
construction of Western male identities. Moreover, given the long histories of male
domination of the public sphere in most Western societies, these masculine-adversarial ideals
have carried over into virtually every sphere of public life from the market to the legislature
to the courts and beyond.
All of these adversarial ideals and metaphors, and many more that echo throughout
Western societies, reflect the underlying codes that structure much Western thought, talk, and
practice. In order to illustrate the practical implications of these underlying cultural codes,
this chapter will examine their expression throughout the contemporary public sphere.
Before beginning, however, several notes of qualification are in order. First, the survey
contains an admittedly Anglo-American bias, drawing primarily on illustrations from the
English-speaking West - especially the United States. However, with the exception of the
Anglo-American legal adversary system, most of the illustrations used are consistent with
cultural practices throughout the West, due to the common cultural influences of Greco-
Roman and Judeo-Christian traditions, the legacy of Renaissance and Enlightenment thought,
as well as many other social, economic, and intellectual ties between Western societies.
Moreover, although this dissertation does not attempt to generalize beyond Western cultures,
many of these adversarial structures and practices are clearly present in other parts of the
world. This is due, on the one hand, to parallel traditions of militarism, masculinity, and so
For discussions of the historical associations between masculinity and adversarialism, refer to Hartsock,
Feminist Historical Materialism; Spretnak, "Cultural Forces"; Strange, "Feminist View of the Arms Race";
(footnote continued on next page)
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forth in many non-Western cultures. On the other hand, it is also due to the powerful
international influence, or cultural imperialism, of many Western countries in recent
centuries. At the moment, this influence can be seen most conspicuously in the global
domination of mass media content by the United States, which exports cultural expressions
of violence, conflict, partisanship, and litigousness not only to other Western countries but to
virtually every region of the planet.
In addition, it must be pointed out that the survey below is meant to be illustrative rather
than exhaustive. In the interest of brevity, I examine only the most salient features of a
number of the most influential arenas of public life - the economic arena, the political arena,
the judicial arena, the commercial mass media, social advocacy, and academia. 4
Furthermore, in my focus on adversarialism, my intent is not to imply that non-adversarial or
cooperative practices are entirely absent from each of these spheres. Rather, my intent is to
illustrate the presence of adversarialism as a dominant normative ideal within each of them.
As my introductory chapter acknowledges, strands of adversarialism and mutualism are
present in all cultures. Accordingly, examples of cooperation can be found in each of the
social arenas discussed below. These examples tend to occur, however, within larger
structures of adversarialism that shape and constrain them.
Finally, in my critical treatment of adversarialism, my intent is not to imply that all forms
of adversarialism are problematic or undesirable under all conditions. Adversarialism may
be necessary and appropriate in some contexts. For example, some forms of competition can
4
Brocke-Utne, Feminist Perspectives; and Reardon, Women and Peace and Sexism and the War System.
Throughout the survey, footnotes direct the reader to more detailed discussions of particular points by other
authors. In addition, Tannen provides an excellent socio-linguistic analysis of adversarialism (or what she
calls agonism) in The Argument Culture, which touches on a number of the same points made below.
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be very healthy. In addition, because adversarialism is a relative phenomenon, some
expressions of adversarialism may be more desirable than others. Rational debate, for
instance, is clearly a more desirable alternative than physical violence or war in most
circumstances. Even the use of physical or military force, however, can be necessary and
appropriate when it is used to uphold just laws, protect individuals or groups from injury or
abuse, and protect populations from military aggression. My critique, therefore, is not
directed at all expressions of adversarialism. Rather, it is directed at the relatively ubiquitous
and indiscriminate expression of adversarialism throughout the public sphere. In this
context, the following survey suggests that structured and habitual reliance on adversarial
practices may be an obstacle on the path to social justice and equity.
Economics
Given that capitalist economics has become a dominant influence in contemporary
Western societies, it will be the first arena examined in this survey. Throughout the
contemporary public sphere, people have corne to be defined largely in economic terms, as
self-interested beings whose satisfaction lies in the consumption of ever-increasing levels of
material goods and services within a competitive free market. In this context, economic
competition has emerged as one of the dominant organizing principles of modem Western
societies. Competition, moreover, is a form of adversarial relation. In any competition,
parties compete against one another. In the economic arena, parties compete against one
another for material wealth, jobs, capital, market share, and so forth.
As a normative ideal, economic competition has a genealogy that traces back to classical
economists such as Adam Smith, who articulated the basic principles of modem capitalism.
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The theory of capitalism rests on Smith's assertion that a free market, unfettered by state
interference, is capable of generating the greatest good for the greatest number of people.
According to Smith, the "invisible hand" of a competitive free market naturally harmonizes
the self-interested pursuits of individual consumers and private businesses by balancing
supply and demand in the most efficient manner possible, which in turn generates the
maximum collective wealth.5
Smith - who was a moral philosopher - thus provided a moral justification for capitalism
by implicitly transforming the pursuit of self-interest from a vice into a virtue. Granted, as a
moral philosopher, Smith also assumed that self-interested individualism would be expressed
within a larger moral framework. 6 In place of market regulation by the state, Smith believed
that individuals pursuing their own interests in a competitive free market would be self-
regulated by an intrinsic framework of moral values or virtues.
Since Smith's time, however, morality has generally been neglected in economics in
favour of a strictly utilitarian focus on material self-interests.7 This focus on material self-
interests, in tum, has had a two-fold result. On the one hand, in keeping with Smith's
assertion that self-interests could be maximized only if governments minimized their
interference in the market, a competitive economy has emerged that is largely unfettered by
external state regulations.8 On the other hand, through the neglect of Smith's larger moral
6
7
8
Smith, Wealth ofNations.
Smith, Theory ofMoral Sentiments.
Thus, little more than a century after Smith, Edgeworth penned his now famous dictum: "the first principle
of economics is that every agent is actuated only by self-interest" (Edgeworth, Mathematical Physics, p.
16).
Refer to Kuttner, Everythingfor Sale, for an excellent critique of current trends toward deregulation in
contemporary economies.
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philosophy, the relative absence ofexternal state regulation has been accompanied by the
relative absence of internal moral regulation. Thus material self-interest has become
virtually the only relevant economic "virtue" within an economy that has become little more
than an arena for competitive acquisition.
In the relative absence of both state regulation and moral restraint, moreover, competitive
ideals have led to widespread social conflict in the modem world. On the most obvious
level, the valorization of material self-interests within a competitive economy has led to
extreme disparities of wealth and poverty, both within and between nations, as workers
compete against other workers for wages, and capitalists compete against other capitalists for
profits. These extremes of wealth and poverty, in tum, keep the world in a perpetual state of
instability that fosters political conflict, crime, terrorism, and war.
In addition, the valorization of competitive self-interests has exacerbated the structural
tendencies toward conflict that already exist between capitalists and workers (i.e., conflicts
that derive from their different relations to the means of production). Thus, in the relative
absence of both state regulation and moral restraint, many capitalists transfer the
competitive/adversarial ideals that characterize their relations with other capitalists to their
relations with labour. In doing so, they attempt to extract the maximum surplus value from
the labour force that is a primary source of their wealth. In response, workers organize in an
oppositional struggle for a more equitable allocation of the surplus value they play an
indispensable role in generating. The results, of course, are the class conflicts that Marx so
clearly understood.
The competitive pursuit of material self-interests also translates into adversarial rivalries
between entire nations. Every modem capitalist nation, in an attempt to pursue the maximum
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possible gains for its own consumer-citizens, currently competes with every other nation in
the global market. Struggles over the accumulation and control of resources, capital, labour,
commodities, and information are thus played out daily in the global market - with the
citizens of each nation regularly alerted to the state of the competition through comparisons
of Gross Domestic Product, balance of trade reports, currency exchange rates, and other
indicators of relative national advantage. Moreover, in a largely wrregulated international
economy that is not even characterized by the pretence of fair play and a level playing field
between nations, these economic contests yield few winners and many losers, as the residual
advantages conferred by colonialism and imperialism play themselves out in the continued
exploitation of weaker nations by stronger ones.
Finally, the valorization of material self-interests, in the relative absence of both state and
moral regulation, has also led to unprecedented conflict between humanity and most other
species on this planet. Transformations in human productive capacity and population size,
combined with the unfettered pursuit of material self-interests, have resulted in a seemingly
insatiable consumer society which has, in effect, placed the human species in direct
competition with most other species on the planet, as we compete on a global scale for
habitat, food, energy, and raw materials. Granted, competition between species is as old as
the process of evolution itself. What makes this current competition unique, however, is its
planetary scale combined with the overwhelming dominance of the competition by one
species - Homo sapiens. In this context, as the relative absence of both state and moral
regulation results in the permanent extinction of increasing numbers of species, the
sustainability of the competition itself is ealled into question.
In all of these ways, the valorization of self-interested competition in the economic arena
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reflect the underlying codes of normative adversarialism. Competitive ideals pit worker
against worker, capitalist against capitalist, and worker against capitalist, in ongoing contests
ofmaterial acquisition and control. They also pit nation against nation, and humanity against
nature, in similar contests writ large. And in this context, as Patrella asserts, competitiveness
has "ceased to be a means" and instead, "it has become the main objective not only of
business enterprises but also of governments and the whole society".9
Granted, the modem economy is not entirely devoid of cooperative relations. In
business, as in sport, agreeing to compete within even a minimal set of rules or regulations
requires a basic level of cooperation between otherwise competing opponents. In addition, in
business, as in sport, internal cooperation within a corporation or team is often a requisite of
success. Competition can thereby be an effective means of training for cooperative skills. IO
Moreover, by making reward contingent on effort and risk, competition CaJ,J. spur individuals
as well as groups toward excellence, creativity, innovation, and efficiency - all of which are
generally desirable goals in the economy or on the playing field.
On the other hand, unlike most athletic competitions, the contemporary economy is
characterized by minimal regulation. Athletic competitions are among the most regulated of
all human activities. Extensive rules exist to ensure fair play and a level playing field in all
Petrella, "Beyond the Myth of Competitiveness", p. 246.
10 Given the normative complexities ofeconomic competition, motive and context are important to consider
in the critique of any specific instances or forms of competition. Competition that is motivated by mutual
gains (e.g., mutual recreation and enjoyment or collective innovation and efficiency) is arguably more
desirable than competition motivated by the struggle over lasting, mutually exclusive gains and losses (e.g.,
warfare or economic exploitation). Moreover, competition in the context of rules that ensure fair play and
a level playing field (e.g., athletic competitions or carefully regulated economies) is arguably more
desirable than competition lacking such rules (e.g., wars or unregulated economies). Some economists are
beginning to distinguish these contrasting models of competition with the phrases cooperative-competition
and conflictual-competition. Refer, for example, to Papini, Pavan, and Zamagni, "Towards Co-operative
Competition" and Merloni, "Cooperative Competition".
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athletic competitions. If markets are analogous to athletic competitions, then trends toward
deregulation and market liberalization represent a shift away from fair play and level playing
fields. And the absence of these conditions exacerbates economic conflict, alienation,
domination, and exploitation.
Some would argue, of course, that the current trends toward market liberalization,
especially at the global level, are fair and equitable because they are intended to ensure that
all economic competitors face the same rules. This argument, however, is flawed on
numerous levels. First, fair competition requires not only that all competitors operate under
the same rules, but that all competitors begin the contest at the same time. Within the current
global economy, however, some competitors have been accumulating capital for generations,
while others have only recently been invited into the contest, and thus find themselves at a
serious disadvantage. It is as if a few people began a game of Monopoly, played until they
bought up all the property, and then invited a number of others to join them. The latecomers
would be perpetually handicapped by a constant need to pay rent and no opportunities to
accumulate their own properties. Thus they would never be able to compete on equal terms.
Second, labourers are also players within the global economy, yet current trends toward
market liberalization address the rules by which capitalists compete against other capitalists
while largely ignoring the rules that govern their relations with labour. Third, by equating
uniformity of rules with minimization of rules, or what many have called a lowest common
denominator approach to market regulation, current trends toward market liberalization
remove any restraints on the tendencies of natural monopolies to emerge in sectors of the
economy that are prone to this. Even by the standards of classic capitalist theory,
monopolies are sources of both inequity and market inefficiency. And finally, by adopting
65
this lowest common denominator approach to regulation, rules that govern the relationship
between economic activity and the environment tend to be undermined. Ironically, this leads
not only to a reduction in the quality of life for most of the inhabitants on the planet (whom
liberalized markets allegedly serve) but it also threatens to undermine the basis of the entire
economy itself, as economic competition becomes an unsustainable process through which
long-term ecological capital is squandered in the pursuit of short-term financial gains.
Either way, the modern economy embodies numerous competitive or adversarial ideals.
It defines human beings as self-interested and competitive, and structures human relations
accordingly. For better or worse, it situates economic thought, talk, and practice largely on
the left side of the adversarialism+-x:ooperation continuum sketched in Figure 2: the domain
of "power against" relations. Moreover, given the absence of fair play and a level playing
field in many economic arenas (i.e., given the relative absence of both state and moral
regulation, as well as the inequalities between and among capitalists and labourers, between
"first world" and "third world nations", and even between Homo sapiens and most other
species inhabiting the planet), economic competition often translates, in practice, into the
oppressive "power over" relations located in the lower left quadrant of the same schema.
Politics
Western partisan political systems likewise embody a range of adversarial structures and
practices. Indeed, political scientist Jane Mansbridge refers to these systems simply as
"adversary democracy". 11 Not surprisingly, the evolution of these systems is closely
11 In Beyond Adversary Democracy, Mansbridge discusses many of the limitations of partisan political
systems and prescribes a non-partisan, consensus-based "unitary democracy" as an appropriate alternative
in many contexts.
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interwoven with the evolution of capitalist economic systems. Both are legitimated through
fundamentally self-interested representations of human nature, which are used to naturalize
competitive/contest models of social organization and practice. In economics, of course, it is
the distribution of material commodities and capital - or the distribution of economic power
- that is determined through a competitive contest. In politics, on the other hand, it is the
distribution of public authority and decision making - or the distribution ofpolitical power -
that is determined through a contest. In both cases, however, the underlying cultural codes
are remarkably similar.
At the core of all partisan political systems is the concept of political interests, which
refers broadly to the needs, values, and/or desires of an individual or group. Interests, thus
conceived, are assumed to underlie the preferences of individuals and groups in political
decision-making processes. Interests guide appraisals (either consciously or unconsciously)
of what is best for one's self or one's group. Moreover, in pluralistic societies, different
individuals and groups often appear to have divergent or conflicting interests.
In this context, Western-liberal philosophy assumes that one of the primary functions of a
political system is to negotiate conflicting interests within a society in a utilitarian manner
that satisfies the widest possible range of those interests. 12 The standard by which Western
societies tend to evaluate political systems is thus very similar to the standard by which they
evaluate economic systems: how well they allegedly maximize the satisfaction of competing
12 There are, of course, other Western political philosophies that assume the possibility of consensual interests
(Le., the elimination or transcendence of historically conflicting interests). For instance, Marxism,
anarchism, and communitarianism all subscribe to this idea in one form or another. However, all of these
alternative political philosophies have been marginalized by the liberal philosophy that currently dominates
Western political thought.
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self-interests. Toward this end, the political arena has in fact been structured much like the
capitalist free market:- an arena within which individuals and groups or parties try to advance
their particular ideals and interests in a self-interested and competitive manner. 13 As Lyon
explains, even though the self-interested dimension of party performance is widely
acknowledged,
supporters of party government argue that if one looks at the larger picture and sees the "political
market" in which several parties, the media, interest groups, and individuals all interact,
democratic needs are served in a kind of mysterious way... [as though] another "invisible hand"
is at work. I4
In this regard, Western political systems have largely evolved into arenas of political
"entrepreneurship" in which politicians compete for control over the means of public
decision making in a manner that parallels competition for control over the means of
production in the economy. IS This occurs initially through the formation of political parties
that represent competing ensembles of interests. Competitive political "campaigns" (a
military metaphor) then determine leadership and control within and between parties - as
politicians and parties organize to fight and win elections. I6 Moreover, in their efforts to
"defeat" their opponents and "win" these campaigns, politicians engage in antagonistic
exchanges, often characterized by expressions of overt hostility, as demonstrated by the
mudslinging and negative advertising that has come to dominate many modem partisan
;, 13 Briand, Practical Politics, p. 154.
14 Lyon, "Green Politics", p. 129. In the next sentence, Lyon goes on to comment that "the analogy drawn
with the economic market is, however, not reassuring when one notes the ways in which the unregulated
economic marketplace threatens public interest".
IS Refer, for example, to discussions in Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, and Downs, An
Economic Theory ofDemocracy.
16 As Held notes in Models ofDemocracy, p. 170, "parties may aim to realize a programme of 'ideal'
political principles, but unless their activities are based on systematic strategies for achieving electoral
success they will be doomed to insignificance. Accordingly, parties become transformed, above all else,
into means for fighting and winning elections".
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campaignsY
Once political leadership and control is determined through these adversarial contests,
processes of public decision making are also structured in an adversarial manner. Decision
making is organized as a partisan debate - a "war of words" - between the representatives of
opposed interest groupS.18 Within these debates, political adversaries maneuver and joust in
an effort to defeat their opponents and gain the political high ground in the arena of public
opinion. The extent to which this oppositional model of debate has become institutionalized
is demonstrated most clearly in the parliamentary concept of "the loyal opposition" - a
concept which is either explicitly or implicitly enshrined in many Western parliaments and
congresses.
These oppositional debates tend, in tum, to be characterized by positional argument as
opposed to principled deliberation. 19 Parties stake out positions at the outset, and the goal is
to ensure that one's own position prevails. As a result, the identity of a party is bound up
with the position it takes, and defeat of a position involves a loss of "political capital" for the
party. In this way, decision-making processes become inseparable from election processes,
as partisan debates become the stage for "permanent campaigns" - never-ending contests
over political capital - in anticipation of the next round of elections.20
17 Refer, for example, to Jamieson, Dirty Politics.
18 Granted, much contemporary political decision making actually occurs outside of these formal partisan
debates - which often serve as little more than a dramatic veneer on complex processes of political
maneuvering and negotiation. However, even these behind-the-scenes processes are generally
characterized by the same adversarial dynamics. Refer, for example, to Clift and Brazaitis, War Without
Bloodshed, for illuminating insights into the adversarial nature of behind-the-scenes partisan politics.
19 Refer to Fisher, Dry, and Patton, Getting to Yes, for a discussion of the distinction between "positional"
versus "principled" decision making.
20 For an insightful analysis of this phenomenon refer to Blumenthal, The Permanent Campaign.
21
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Encircling these integrated structures of partisan electioneering and decision making is
another sphere of political contests in which lobby groups and political action committees vie
with one another to pressure parties and shape public opinion in ways that advance their own
interests. Adversarial contests within the formal institutions of government are thus mirrored
by adversarial contests among their informal counterparts. 21
Lobbying and political organizing, however, are expensive activities that require access
to significant material resources. Not all interests are represented equally in the contest to
influence partisan decision making. In this way, the political economy of partisan systems
tends to subordinate public decision making to pressures from powerful economic interests.
Moreover, political processes are further subordinated to economic pressures through
mechanisms such as campaign financing. Political campaigns, like war, are expensive -
hence the metaphor of a "campaign war chest" to describe the substantial funds that partisan
candidates raise in preparation for partisan elections. In this context, successful campaigns
are waged either by people with tremendous personal wealth or by people who have the
support of others with significant wealth - and political decision making is thereby further
linked to the logic and outcomes of the capitalist economy.z2
Western-liberal apologists defend this partisan system of electioneering, debate,
lobbying, and so forth as the rational alternative to political violence and war. Based on this
In fact, many political analysts argue that lobby groups and political action committees have largely
replaced elected representatives as the primary political agents in many Western-liberal democracies, and
thus contests among organized interest groups outside of formal legislatures have become more influential
than the partisan contests within those legislatures. Refer, for example, to The Harwood Group, Citizens
and Politics.
22 Ofcourse, this problem can be minimized by campaign finance reform and similar measures. However, as
the discussion in Chapter V suggests, refining the electoral procedures within partisan political systems
does not address many of the other underlying problems with partisan politics.
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common sense premise, we structure our political systems as non-violent contests, even
though most people recognize that the political economy of these contests tends to favour
more powerful social groups. This tradeoff is widely accepted as a "necessary evil" based on
the premise that rational partisanship is more desirable than the irrational alternatives of
violence or war. But this common sense premise embodies a false choice because it conceals
the possibility that a third alternative might be more desirable than both partisan politics and
violence or war in many circumstances (a theme that will be discussed further in Chapters IV
and V).
For better or worse, the codes ofadversarialism thus situate most public decision making
on the left side of the adversarialismf--X:ooperation continuum sketched in Figure 2 - the
domain of "power against" relations - though not as far to the left as physical violence and
war. Even when relative equality is present within the political arena, adversarial contests
between equally powerful opponents tend to result in gridlock, mutual frustration, alienation,
or compromise - as expressed within the "balance ofpower" domain in the upper left
quadrant of that figure. 23 At its worst, due to the political economy of partisan systems,
adversarial politics often translates into a politics of domination.24 In this regard, partisan
politics, like capitalist economics, tends to combine the relations of adversarialism and
inequality identified in the bottom left quadrant of Figure 2: the domain of "power over". In
these ways, both partisan politics and capitalist economics articulate together within a larger
23 Refer, for example, to Cox and Kernell, eds., Divided Government; Johnson and Broder, The System; Jones,
"Parties, Institutions, and Gridlock"; Brady, Revolving Gridlock; Gray, "Democratic Gridlock"; Scott,
"Legislative Gridlock"; and Chrislip, "Pulling Together".
24 Held, for instance, refers to this as "competitive elitist democracy" in Models ofDemocracy. See also
Parenti, Democracy for the Few; Greider, Betrayal ofAmerican Democracy; and Edsall, The New Politics
ofInequality.
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cultural formation characterized by mutually reinforcing adversarial structures and practices
- many of which are oppressive and exploitative.
Justice
Like their political and economic counterparts, Western legal systems - at least within
Anglo-American traditions - also embody the codes of adversarialism. And the evolution of
the legal adversary system is, once again, closely interwoven with the evolution of Western
political and economic systems. All of them were products of the same shifts in social
thought that characterized the early European Enlightenment: movements away from
religious dogma toward secular rationalism, from authoritarianism toward liberalism, and
from antiquated and static Greco-Roman knowledge systems toward intellectual
progressivism.
These shifts in thought, however, did not occur in a cultural vacuum. Rather, they
involved the rejection of some cultural constructs and the re-articulation of others. In Anglo-
American jurisprudence, these processes involved the rejection of priestly authority as the
arbiter of truth, but the retention of assumptions that in an open contest between good and
evil, or truth and falsehood, the former would prevail. They involved the rejection ofjuries
as political instruments of the sovereign's will, but the reformation ofjuries as neutral
arbiters ofjudicial contests among free individuals. They involved the rejection of the
Roman-canon system ofjurisprudence (an amalgamation of various aspects of Roman law
and medieval ecclesiasticism), in which judges simultaneously directed investigations,
weighed evidence, and rendered a verdict; at the same time, however, they involved the
retention of argumentative or forensic practices of disputation and debate (whose genealogies
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traced back through Greek, medieval, and Renaissance traditions), in which truth was
assayed through the proposal and refutation of facts or ideas.25 In the Anglo-American
tradition, they involved the rejection of continental assumptions that truth was best discerned
through a process directed by a neutral third party. In addition, they involved the adoption
of liberal political economy assumptions (discussed in the previous two sections) that
fairness and efficiency in a free society were best achieved through contests motivated and
directed by the pursuit of competing self-interests - in this case, the competing self-interests
of legal adversaries.26
Through this selective process of re-articulation, a highly adversarial forensic process
emerged. This process was characterized by elaborate rules of procedure and rules of
evidence designed "to produce a climactic confrontation between the parties" in a legal
dispute. 27 As the complexity of these rules increased, and as the outcome of these
confrontations became dependent on increasingly refined forensic skills, the parties in legal
disputes became increasingly dependent on skilled legal attorneys. In tum, as the number
25 In The Adversary System, Landsman provides a concise overview of the historical development of the legal
adversary system, including the reformation of the jury structure and the rejection of the Roman-canon
system referred to above. For additional background, including discussions of the tradition of disputation
and debate, refer to Moulton, "Adversary Method"; Maieru, University Training in Medieval Europe;
Menkel-Meadow, "Trouble With the Adversary System"; Ong, Fighting For Life; and Strick, Injustice For
All.
26 For an insightful discussion of this point, refer to Strick, Injustice For All, Chapter 11. See also Franklin,
Legal Dispute, p. 94; and Cound, Friedenthal, and Miller, Civil Procedure, p. 2.
27 Landsman, The Adversary System, pp. 4-5. As Landsman points out, "the forensic clash of parties in the
adversary system seems so like combat, it is tempting to suggest that the real source of the adversary
process was the ancient mode of resolving disputes referred to as trial by battle" (p.8). In defence of the
adversary system, however, Landsman goes on to argue that there is little evidence to support a direct link
between the "trial by battle" and the evolution of the legal adversary system. What he fails to consider,
however, is the larger cultural milieu of adversarialism that made them both possible. This cultural milieu
was characterized, for instance, by the coexistence of the legal adversary system and the duel- the latter of
which was considered a culturally acceptable dispute resolution practice well into the nineteenth century.
For discussions of the many cultural links between trial by battle and the legal adversary system, refer to
Strick, Injustice For All.
73
and prominence of legal attorneys increased, so did the vigor of their advocacy.
Commitments to "zealous advocacy" replaced commitments to "truth" as lawyers devoted
themselves solely to their client's interests, attempting to "win" judicial contests on their
behalf.28 In such an environment, truth-obscuring tactics - such as the omission of relevant
but potentially harmful information, the advancement of exaggerated or false representations,
the obfuscation and distortion of evidence, and the coaching of witnesses - have flourished.29
Thus Freedman, in his classic text on Ethics in the Legal Adversary System, could
unabashedly assert that lawyers have "a professional obligation to place obstacles in the path
of truth". 30
Within this system, legal advocates have, in essence, become "legal mercenaries" hired
by clients to do battle on their behal[.31 Moreover, the forensic skills and expertise of the best
legal advocates as well as the investigative research that is often required to build their cases
does not come cheap. Even though all people may be equal before the law in an abstract
28
29
30
31
For a classic articulation of zealous advocacy and the lawyer's goal of winning a contest on behalf of a
client, regardless of truth, refer to Dershowitz, The Best Defence.
In fact, in countries like the United States, modem lawyers can make patently false and destructive (but
strategically effective) statements in a court oflaw with full impunity, because they enjoy the same
"absolute immunity" from slander or libel that applies to witnesses. Unlike witnesses, however, they are
not required to swear an oath of truthfulness and cannot be prosecuted for perjury - a privilege that is
increasingly abused by lawyers who defame innocent victims and third parties in order to bias a jury in
favour of their own client. Among the most troubling examples of this is the re-victimization of rape
victims in adversarial cross-examination. As Taslitz concludes in Rape and the Culture ofthe Courtroom,
these processes ofrevictimization are structured into the legal adversary system. For discussions of many
other destructive and truth-obscuring practices in the legal adversary system, refer to Sparkman, Failed
Justice; Menkel-Meadow, "Transformation of Disputes"; Strick, Injustice For All; Gorsky, "The Adversary
System"; Pye, "Suppression of Truth"; Frankel, Partisan Justice and "Search for Truth"; Shuchman, "The
Question of Lawyers' Deceit"; and Zacharias, "Reconciling Professionalism and Client Interests".
Freedman, Lawyers' Ethics in an Adversary System, p. 3. As the legal scholars Zitrin and Langford
conclude in Moral Compass, p. 168, "the adversary system fosters deceit whether the lawyers are involved
in negotiation, litigation, or the day-to-day advice they give while putting deals together, drafting wills and
estate plans, or helping clients comply with government regulations".
For an insightful analysis of the countless adversarial metaphors that shape the legal adversary system,
refer to Thornburg, "Metaphors Matter".
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sense, the political economy of the legal adversary system clearly favours those who can
afford the best legal advocacy (not to mention those who can afford to influence the
legislative processes through which laws themselves are articulated).32 Simply put, the legal
adversary system tends to privilege more powerful social groups. As Strick explains in his
critique of this adversarial system, this "fight ethic"
serves not only the lawyers and judges who directly administer it, but society's power-holders
down the ranks. For adversariness is a mode that singularly advantages power. Most of its
beneficiaries therefore worship adversary procedure "like motherhood itself', and either remain
blind to its defects, hold that despite those defects it serves a higher good, or work at screening its
fraud from public gaze. Yet fraud it is. For by its nature the adversary approach to dispute
settlement disserves the rest of us - almost totally. 33
Indeed, the non-litigious are emotionally disadvantaged in the adversary courtroom as surely as
the impecunious are financially disadvantaged.34
[Yet] our adversary legal system, its assumptions and values, is one of the major taken-for-
granted, practically never questioned institutions of our culture. More, I believe it is an
anachronism, a relic of a primitive way of seeing and thinking about the world.35
Of course, apologists of the legal adversary system again defend it as a rational
alternative to the arbitrary judgments of an elite judiciary, on the one hand, or to violent
means of dispute resolution, on the other. Based on this common sense assertion, we
structure our (Anglo-American) legal systems as rational, non-violent contests, even though
most people recognize that the political economy of these contests again tends to favour more
powerful social groups. Again, this tradeoff is widely accepted as a "necessary evil", based
on the premise that rational advocacy is more desirable than its irrational or violent
alternatives. But this common sense assertion again embodies a false choice because it
32 Refer, for example, to discussions in Galanter, "Why the 'Haves' Come Out Ahead"; Aaseng, The OJ.
Simpson Trial; Saltzburg, "Lawyers, Clients, and the Adversary System"; Sparkman, Failed Justice; Strick,
Injustice For All; Smith, Courts and the Poor; and Curtin, Class Justice.
33 Strick, Injustice For All, pp. 16-17.
34 Ibid., p. 110.
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conceals the possibility that other alternatives might be more desirable than any of the above
options.
Like the political system, the legal adversary system is therefore also linked to the
competitive economy in a way that permits disparities of wealth and power to influence
judicial processes. In this regard, while legal adversary systems clearly situate judicial
practice on the left side of the adversarialismHCooperation continuum sketched in Figure 2
(the domain of "power against" relations), they also tend to reinforce the "power over"
relations that are situated in the bottom left quadrant of that figure. Moreover, even when
relative equality is present between opposing parties within a legal contest, the adversary
system still tends to result in high degrees of inefficiency, mutual frustration, and alienation -
as expressed within the upper left quadrant of Figure 2.36 In all ofthese ways, the legal
adversary system articulates with partisan politics and capitalist economics within a larger
cultural formation characterized by a range of adversarial structures and practices - many of
which are oppressive and exploitative - across each of these spheres.37
Mass Media
Mass-mediated discourse at the end of the twentieth century also tends to embody the
codes of adversarialism. Significant portions of both news and entertainment content are
35 Ibid., p. 21. For a feminist discussion of this same phenomena vis-a-vis the revictimization of rape victims
within the legal adversary system, refer to Taslitz, Rape and the Culture ofthe Courtroom.
36 For discussions of these and many other problems inherent in the legal adversary system, as well as
proposals for non-adversarial reform, refer to Sparkman, Failed Justice; Taslitz, Rape and the Culture of
the Courtroom; Strick, Injustice For All; Olson, Litigation Explosion; Menkel-Meadow, "Trouble With the
Adversary System"; and Rehnquist, "The Adversary Society". See also Valparaiso University, "State of the
Adversary System".
37 For an insightful discussion of how the legal adversary system is contributing to this larger culture of
adversarialism, refer to Garry, Nation ofAdversaries.
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made up of conflict, competition, and violence. Adversarial contests in the political, legal,
and economic arenas provide much of the raw material for this content. In turn, this raw
material is selected, framed, and emphasized in a manner that distorts, exaggerates, and over-
represents the already high levels of adversarialism in Western societies.38 In this way, the
mass media help to construct, amplify, and reinforce adversarialism throughout the public
sphere. Public life, as viewedthrough most commercial media, is little more than an
adversarial spectacle.
The commercial logic that drives these adversarial representations is multifaceted. First,
most contemporary mass media earn a significant portion of their profits through advertising
revenue. The primary goal of advertising-supported media is the "manufacture" or "harvest"
of audiences in order to sell their attention to advertisers in a competitive market for
audiences.39 In this context, adversarial spectacle provides much of the bait that media
industries use to attract audiences. And as the competition for audiences becomes more
competitive due to the proliferation of new channels and new media, increasingly spectacular
contests and controversies are used to attract the attention of increasingly distracted
audiences.
In addition, in commercial media that are not primarily advertising supported, such as the
film industry, the globalization ofthe market has exerted its own pressures for increasing
conflict and violence in media content. This is not because international audiences have
38 Refer, for example, to Gerbner and Gross, "Violence Profile"; Allen and Seaton, eds., Media ofConflict;
Amo and Dissanayake, eds., News Media in National and International Conflict; Rubenstein, Botes,
Dukes, and Stephens, Frameworks for Interpreting Conflicts; and Glassner, The Culture ofFear.
39 Refer to discussions in Smythe, Dependency Road; Leiss, Kline, and Jhally, Social Communication in
Advertising; and Jhally, Codes ofAdvertising.
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baser tastes in film content than domestic ones. Rather, it is largely a result of the need for
films that are easily translated.40 The production expenses of many modem films are barely
offset by domestic sales and profits often come through international redistribution. Films
constructed around violence and action (as well as sex) are most profitable because the
dialogue they contain is simple, and thus easily translated, and the narrative is delivered
primarily through universally interpretable and highly visual action sequences (fights, car
chases, sex, etc). Conflict and violence are thus the most profitable forms of content to
produce and export in an increasingly competitive global market.
Adversarial spectacle is not limited, however, to the traditional entertainment media.
Pressures on contemporary journalism also compel it toward the exaggeration and over-
representation of contest and conflict. On the one hand, most journalism is also advertising
supported, and the same pressures to attract audiences through the manufacture of spectacle
also apply. In addition, in their efforts to appeal to the broadest possible mass market,
modem journalists have adopted a creed of "objectivity" and "balance" that involves the
routine framing of complex issues in terms of two diametrically opposed sets of
interpretations and interests. Journalists thus construct "adversarial news frames" by
composing news stories in terms of "dueling" interpretations and interests.41 The reduction
of complex forestry issues into a "war in the woods" between loggers and environmentalists
is a classic example. Moreover, beyond these discrete news stories, entire news-analysis
programs have emerged in which pundits from "the right" and "the left" square off against
40 Dyson, Mind Abuse. Refer also to interviews with George Gerbner in Jhally, "Crisis of the Cultural
Environment" .
41 Karlberg, "News and Conflict".
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each other as they acrimoniously debate the current issue of the day from polarized
oppositional perspectives.42
In all of these ways, the commercial mass media fully articulate with the economic,
political, and judicial systems discussed above. Each of these adversarial systems provides a
steady supply of raw material with which adversarial media content - whether news or
entertainment - is constructed. Thus the conflicts between and among capitalists and
labourers, the confrontations of partisan politicians and pundits, the courtroom dramas of
prosecutors and defence lawyers, as well as any other available social conflicts (including
many social advocacy efforts, as discussed below), are all processed and packaged as media
content, reinforcing and amplifying adversarial representations of human nature and society.
Like its political and legal counterparts, the commercial media system tends to
manufacture content that falls on the left side of the adversarialism(--X;ooperation continuum
sketched in Figure 2: the domain of "power against" relations. Moreover, given that media
representations have significant social and political consequences,43 that many social groups
therefore vie with one another to shape these media representations,44 and that a hierarchy of
media access allows some groups to shape media content more effectively than others,45 the
42 CNN's "Crossfire" and the CBC's "Face Off' are both prime examples of this genre.
For discussions of various social and political consequences of media representations, refer to Altschull,
Agents ofPower; Heibert, ed., Impact ofMass Media; Kellner, Crisis ofDemocracy; Dahlgren, Television
and the Public Sphere; Hall, "Rediscovery of 'Ideology"'; Hall, Critcher, Jefferson, Clarke, and Roberts,
Policing the Crisis; Herman and Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent; Gitlin, Whole World is Watching;
Gandy, Beyond Agenda Setting; Hackett, News and Dissent; Hackett and Zhao, Sustaining Democracy;
Morgan and Signorielli, "Cultivation Analysis"; and Gerbner, "Epilogue".
44 Refer, for example, to Ericson, Baranek, and Chan, Negotiating Control; Gandy, "Structuration of
Dominance"; Anderson, "Source-Media Relations"; Dale, Greenpeace; and Nelson, Public Relations.
This is one of the most widely supported conclusions of the sociology of media production. Refer, for
example, to Hackett, "Hierarchy of Access"; Gandy, "Subsidized News" and "Structuration of
Dominance"; Schlesinger, "Rethinking the Sociology of Journalism"; Ericson, Baranek, and Chan,
Negotiating Control; Gans, Deciding What's News; and Sparks, "The Media and the State".
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mass media tend to operate as yet another field of social domination. In this regard,
contemporary media discourses, like their economic, political, and judicial counterparts,
further reinforce many of those same "power over" relations that are situated in the bottom
left quadrant of Figure 2. Even at its best, when various social groups are relative equals in
their ability to shape media representations, the result is often mutual aggravation between
contesting social groups as well as cynicism and frustration among audiences who are left to
view public life as an unending stream of polarized and apparently intractable conflicts.46
Social Advocacy
With the many cultural shifts that have occurred throughout the world in recent centuries,
struggles against oppression, domination, and exploitation of all forms have expanded and
diversified. Labour, civil rights, feminist, environmentalist, post-colonial, and other social
advocacy movements have emerged as prominent features of the contemporary cultural
environment. In their pursuit of social reforms, these movements have employed a wide
range of methods. And like many of the institutions and practices that are the targets of
reform, many of these methods have been adversarial. Partisan-political organizing,
litigation, strikes, protests, demonstrations, and acts of civil disobedience have become the
tools of the trade within many social advocacy movements. In more extreme cases, violence
and terrorism are also employed in the pursuit of social change.
Of course, the legitimacy and urgency of many of these movements, the histories of
oppression that have prompted them, and the desperation that often fuels them is not in
46 Refer, for example, to Cappella and Jamieson, "Political Cynicism" and Spiral ofCynicism; as well as
Fallows, Breaking the News; Dionne, Why Americans Hate Politics; Rosen, Getting the Connections Right;
Merritt, Public Journalism and Public Life; and Mathews, Politics For People.
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question here. What is being questioned is the manner in which they have internalized the
codes of adversarialism that inform the systems they are attempting to reform. For these
movements, adversarialism creates a paradox. On the one hand, adversarial strategies often
appear to be the only means available for the pursuit of social reform. How else can social
activists bring about change butthrough partisan organizing, litigation, or "taking to the
streets"? On the other hand, these same adversarial strategies often prove to be self-limiting.
As the discussion below illustrates, adversarial strategies of social change frequently
degenerate into political infighting and factionalization, which undermines the capacity of
social advocacy movements to accomplish their goals. At the same time, adversarial
strategies also tend to legitimate the codes of adversarialism underlying the social structures
and practices these movements are attempting to reform.
This is not to suggest that adversarial strategies of social change are entirely ineffective.
Indeed, limited gains have been made by many adversarial movements throughout history.
Nor is it to suggest that such strategies are problematic under all circumstances.
Adversarialism may be a necessary and appropriate response in some contexts.
Furthermore, if strategies of social reform are viewed on a continuum ranging from highly
adversarial to relatively cooperative, the threat of extreme conflict may sometimes promote
more moderate or cooperative approaches to social change. However, as the discussion
below suggests, the normalization of adversarial strategies comes with a high price that is
often overlooked, and routine reliance on such strategies may not be the most effective long-
term approach to social change.
Consider the internal factionalization that adversarial movements tend to suffer from.
Virtually all of the social projects of the "left" throughout the twentieth century have been
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plagued with internal conflicts. The opening decades of the century were marked by political
infighting among vanguard communist revolutionaries. The middle decades of the century
were marked by theoretical disputes among leftist intellectuals. And the closing decades of
the century have been marked by the fracturing of the "new left" under the centrifugal
pressures of identity politics. Underlying this pattern of infighting and factionalization, it
appears, is the tendency to interpret differences - of class, race, gender, perspective, or
political approach - as sources of antagonism and conflict.
Reflecting on more than three decades of experience as a leading activist and scholar of
the new left, Todd Gitlin has written extensively on this phenomenon.47 As Gitlin observes,
the initial unity of the new left was forged by the exigencies of the Vietnam War and the
commonalities of 1960s youth culture. Gradually, however, differences of race, sex, class,
and so forth began to split the movement along increasingly narrow identity lines. The one
thing that each new identity group claimed, Gitlin explains, were adversaries among the
ranks of the different. 48 According to Gitlin,
the very language of collectivity came to be perceived by the new movements as a colonialist
smothering - an ideology to rationalize white male domination... Soon, difference was being
practiced, not just thought, at a deeper level than commonality. It was more salient, more vital,
more present... It was more than strictly intellectual; it was more a whole way of experiencing
the world. Difference was now lived and felt more acutely than unity.49
Reflecting on the self-limiting nature of these divisive attitudes, Gitlin concludes that
"the politics of difference is built on a deep philosophical error: the insistence that people are
47 For a concise summary, refer to Gitlin, "Rise ofIdentity Politics". For a more extended critique of the
experience of the new left, as well as the wider "culture wars" that characterize American society at the
close of the twentieth century, refer to Gitlin, Twilight a/Common Dreams.
48 Gitlin, Twilight a/Common Dreams, p. 34.
49 Gitlin, "Rise of Identity Politics", pp. 175-77.
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and must remain incomprehensible to one another, and what divides people must overwhelm
what unites them".50
What even Gitlin appears to overlook, however, is that the distinctions between "left" and
"right" that he continues to invoke (while condemning the factionalization of the left) are
expressions of the same underlying codes of adversarialism. The political left and right both
define themselves in terms of a common adversary - the other - defined by political
differences. In turn, advocates of both the left and right frequently invoke the need for
internal unity in order to prevail over their adversaries on the other side of the alleged
political spectrum. However, because the terms "left" and "right" are both reified categories
that do not reflect the complexity of actual social relations, there is no way to achieve lasting
unity within either camp because there are no actually existing boundaries between them. In
reality, social relations, attitudes, and ideas are infinitely complex and variable. But once an
adversarial posture is adopted by assuming that differences are sources of conflict, initial
distinctions between left and right are inevitably followed by subsequent distinctions within
left and right. And once this centrifugal process is set in motion, it is difficult, if not
impossible, to restrain.
In addition to this self-limiting tendency toward factionalization, when social advocates
employ adversarial methods, they also legitimate the codes of adversarialism that underlie
the structures of domination they are attempting to reform. For instance, when social
advocates engage in partisan political organizing, they legitimate the adversarial models of
governance that keep them at a perpetual disadvantage in the political arena due to the
50 Gitlin, "After the Failed Faiths", p. 66.
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political economy of partisan politics.51 Likewise, when social advocates engage in
litigation, they legitimate the adversarial systems ofjurisprudence that keep them at a
perpetual disadvantage in the courts due to the political economy of legal adversary
systems.52
Granted, social advocates of various causes do "win" occasional "battles" in these
adversarial arenas, but the root causes of their concerns largely remain unaddressed, and the
larger "wars" arguably are not going well. For example, consider the case ofenvironmental
lobbying and litigation. Countless environmental lobbies and lawsuits have been mounted by
advocates throughout the Western world, and many small victories have been won. Yet
environmental degradation on the whole continues to accelerate at a rate that far outpaces the
highly circumscribed advances made in these limited battles.53 The political economy of
these adversarial institutions does not lend itself to the long-term, holistic decision making
that is a requisite of environmental sustainability.
A similar case can be made for the labour movement, which, despite over a century of
strikes, protests, and political organizing, has witnessed steadily increasing disparities
between rich and poor, capitalists and workers, both within and between countries. 54
Granted, limited victories (e.g., minimum wage laws and 40-hour work weeks), have been
won in various countries. But in ongoing contests against capital, workers are generally
51 Refer to the discussion earlier in this chapter on partisan politics.
52 Refer to the discussion earlier in this chapter on the legal adversary system.
53 Refer, for example, to Brown, Renner, and Halweil, eds., Vital Signs; and Brown, Flavin, and French, eds.,
State ofthe World 2000, for excellent overviews of these environmental trends.
54 Refer, for example, to Ackerman, The Political Economy ofInequality; Shapiro and Greenstein, The
Widening Income Gulf, Fishlow and Parker, Growing Apart; and Haseler, Unjust New World ofGlobal
Capitalism.
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unable to compete. Of course, it may be true that workers' status and rights have historically
improved more in the presence of militant trade unions than in their absence. However, in
the context of an emerging global economy, these adversarial strategies may have reached
the limits of their effectiveness because they fail to account for new global conditions. The
current global political economy is characterized by sovereign nations that compete against
one another for capital investment and accumulation within an arena that is devoid not only
of international labor standards but of institutions capable of formulating or enforcing them.
Within this environment, national governments cannot develop or enforce meaningful labor
standards even within their own domestic economies for fear of massive capital flight to
more "competitive" regions without such standards.
In addition, because national governments themselves are structured according to partisan
models, their internal political economies tend to subordinate decision making to the dictates
of corporate capital, including multi-national corporations that wield more political and
economic power than many domestic governments, thus making the possibility of
meaningful domestic labor standards and regulations even more remote. Even the
progressive taxation schemes needed to reduce extremes of wealth and poverty by
redistributing resources within a capitalist economy are virtually impossible to establish
under these circumstances. This is due, on one hand, to the subordination of domestic
governance to the logic of capital accumulation, as discussed above. On the other hand, it is
also due to the constant risk of capital flight in a system of competing nation states with no
international taxation standards. Within these national and international political economies,
each structured according to adversarial models, all localized labor strategies are highly
circumscribed in their effectiveness - and they are likely to become increasingly irrelevant as
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long as unrestrained global capitalism continues to outpace the development of integrative,
coordinated, and responsive political structures at both the national and international levels
(as discussed, for instance, in Chapter V).
Aside from these socio-structural considerations, relations between capital and labour
also have psycho-cultural dimensions. That is, values, attitudes, and beliefs that are socially
cultivated but individually expressed also playa role in class conflict. In this context,
eliminating extremes of wealth and poverty and improving the conditions of working people
in all sectors ofthe economy will require a twin strategy of external (socio-structural) change
and internal (psycho-cultural) change. These latter changes require concerted efforts to
cultivate new values, attitudes, and beliefs on a society-wide scale. Such a program, in tum,
requires the active support and participation of the public-policy-making bodies that fund
public education, public broadcasting, and so forth. However, in the current political
economy of our capitalist/partisan systems, such support is again virtually impossible to
achieve or sustain. Integrative, coordinated, and responsive political structures are again
needed.
On a closely related note, labour and other social advocacy groups have also been unable
to compete with dominant social groups within the political economy of the commercial
mass media - an institution that also plays a central role in the cultivation of psycho-cultural
dispositions. In this context, some of the most significant contests that play out in
democratic societies are commercially driven mass-mediated contests to influence public
attitudes and opinions. As discussed in the previous section, however, most advocacy groups
have to engage in extreme and confrontational tactics in order to gain any voice at all in the
commercial mass media. By providing raw material for the manufacture of adversarial
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spectacle, these groups end up simplifying and distorting their messages, which in tum
simplifies and distorts public perceptions regarding the issues they are trying to address.
Packaging social advocacy as adversarial spectacle thus undermines the ability of any group
-labour, environmentalists, feminists, and so forth - to address complex and subtle
problems.
Greenpeace media campaigns provide classic illustrations of this Faustian bargain that
social advocacy groups face when they seek a voice in the public sphere.55 Even Greenpeace
staff recognize that their campaigns often result in the "dumbing down" of complex issues, as
well as the obfuscation of important connections between issues.56 Moreover, as one of the
original media-savvy advocacy organizations, Greenpeace and its media strategies have
served as models for countless other social advocacy groups. But as these strategies
proliferate, the political currency of any given adversarial spectacle is devalued, which
results in the escalation of increasingly extreme and dramatic media strategies. This process
of escalation further simplifies and distorts the concerns of social advocates. In addition, it
alienates segments of the population who might otherwise be sympathetic. Adversarialism
thus keeps social advocates at a perpetual disadvantage in the arena of public opinion
formation while simultaneously legitimizing the commercial media structures that dictate the
terms of entrance into the public sphere.
For all of these reasons, adversarial strategies of social change may have reached the
limits of their effectiveness. Granted, a detailed comparative analysis of particular
adversarial strategies would reveal significant differences between them, including the fact
55 Refer to Dale, Greenpeace, for an in-depth discussion of this theme.
56 Refer, for example, to Peerla, quoted in Dale, Greenpeace, pp. 183-89.
87
that some may still be relatively more effective than others. For instance, there are obvious
differences, in both practical and moral terms, between the non-violent, non-cooperative
resistance advocated by Mahatma- Gandhi or Martin Luther King and strategies of violent
revolution or terrorism. Indeed, the category "adversarial strategies" could be broken down
into a nuanced typology that distinguishes between strategies that are violent or non-violent,
anarchist or organized, popular or vanguard, and so forth. Such a typology might be very
revealing. Unfortunately, such a project is beyond the scope of this dissertation. In the
meantime, the category of "adversarial strategies" at least brings into focus a significant
common property of these otherwise diverse strategies. Provided internal distinctions are
acknowledged within this broad category, it is an analytically useful category because it
points to the existence of an entire domain of non-adversarial alternatives that are frequently
overlooked (as discussed in Chapters IV and V).
Moreover, even if adversarial strategies may have been necessary and viable in the past,
when human populations were less socially and ecologically interdependent, such conditions
no longer exist. Because our reproductive and technological success as a species has led to
conditions of unprecedented interdependence, no social group on the planet is any longer
isolated. Under these new conditions, new strategies are not only becoming possible, they
may have become essential. An interdependent social body cannot coordinate its collective
actions as long as its component members are locked in adversarial relationships. Yet
pressures for coordinated collective action are mounting daily. Threats of ecological
degradation, of nuclear and biological contamination (both military and industrial), of global
health pandemics, and of unrestrained capital growth and economic exploitation, are all
pressing us to find new modes of collective and coordinated action. Under these conditions,
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adversarial strategies may have reached a point of diminishing social and ecological returns
(a point that will be taken up again in Chapter V).
It could be argued, of course, that adversarial strategies actually complement non-
adversarial strategies. For instance, the extreme adversarial fringe of a social movement can
raise public awareness of an issue and then make the moderate centre of the movement look
attractive by comparison, thus providing an incentive to those who would otherwise resist
reform to cooperate with more moderate reformers. Adversarial groups may thus serve as
the cutting edge of a social movement, even though substantial change is often achieved
through more collaborative means. However, even if this is true, one needs to weigh the
potential gains against the potential costs. If adversarial tactics simultaneously marginalize a
social movement, simplify its message, and alienate many potential supporters, the costs may
outweigh the gains. Moreover, if such tactics end up legitimating the adversarial structures
and practices that lie at the root of the problems that social advocates are seeking to address,
the net costs be even more substantial. Unfortunately, there is no empirical calculus by
which we can easily measure the net costs or gains in such circumstances. In the absence of
such a calculus, the analysis above at least raises some red flags about the potentially
counter-productive implications of adversarial strategies that tend to be widely taken for
granted.
In summary, the paradox of social advocacy is that adversarial strategies of social change
articulate fully with the adversarial structures and practices (e.g., partisan politics, legal
advocacy, unregulated capital accumulation, media as adversarial spectacle) that keep social
reformers at a perpetual disadvantage. By buying into the adversarial rules of the game - or
the codes of adversarialism - many social advocates end up legitimating the social structures
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that underlie the problems they are addressing. At the same time, they often end up
simplifying and distorting their messages, marginalizing and discrediting themselves, and
alienating potential supporters.57 For all of these reasons, normative adversarialism may not
be the most effective long-term strategy of social change. Granted, not all adversarial
strategies are equivalent, and many limited battles have been won. But the larger wars may
not be going well.
Academia
To bring this discussion around full circle, modem scholarship has also internalized many
of the same codes of adversarialism discussed above. These can be seen, on one hand, in the
prevailing theories of power discussed in Chapter II, as well as the political, economic, and
other academic theories underlying many of the arenas discussed above. But beyond the
content of particular theories, adversarialism is also part of the structure and practice of
modem academia. Its milder expressions can be seen, for instance, in the structure of
competitive grade-based evaluations. Rather than recognizing and building upon the unique
strengths and weaknesses of individual students, these evaluative systems pit students against
one another in ongoing series of academic contests. More significantly, however,
adversarialism is also deeply embedded in Western epistemology. In this context, knowledge
57 A case could also be made that adversarial struggles for power tend to be self-corrupting as a strategy of
social or political change. History provides countless examples of adversarial movements that have
overthrown one oppressive class or regime merely to replace it with another. This experience has been
repeated across the full spectrum of revolutionary movements, from vanguard communism to Islamic
fundamentalism. Even the American revolution largely replaced one privileged class with another, as the
property-owning European men that led it subsequently excluded women and other minorities from the
sphere of public decision making, pursued a systematic program of exterminating and displacing native
peoples, and established an economic order that has increased the disparity between the wealthiest and
poorest segments of the population.
90
is widely pursued through a contest of ideas. Granted, Western scholarship is also
characterized by a degree of collaboration and collegiality. Nonetheless, the contest of ideas
has deep roots in Western culture and these roots continue to nourish much contemporary
scholarship.
In tracing the roots of this adversarial epistemology, one can begin with one of the
earliest literate Western civilizations: the Greeks. In a general sense, Greek literature reveals
a remarkable propensity for thinking in polar opposites.58 Of course, such oppositional
dualisms were not unique to the Greeks. Indeed, ancient Semitic and Zoroastrian cultures
also had highly oppositional or dualistic worldviews. Nor are dualisms entirely without
basis. They can and do provide useful models for thinking and talking about many things.
More than any other ancient culture, however, the Greeks translated these oppositional
modes of thought into oppositional approaches to knowledge. And these oppositional or
adversarial epistemologies have left a lasting legacy in the Western world. As Ong has
written,
the Greeks seem to have made more careful use of adversativeness than did other cultures, both
as an analytic tool and as an operational intellectual procedure. Adversativeness sets the stage for
the central Greek development that has changed the world: formal logic and all that goes with
it.. .. With logic, ancient Greece formalized adversativeness as no other culture had done.59
Formal logic, Ong points out, did not grow out of a dispassionate or contemplative search
for truth but out of a tradition of verbal disputation and intellectual contest that was closely
intertwined with Greek political and rhetorical practices. The center of political and
economic activity in ancient Greece was the agora - a combined political forum, market
58 Refer, for instance, to Lloyd, Polarity and Analogy.
59 Ong, Fighting For Life, pp. 21-22.
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place, and meeting place in which citizens gathered for many purposes, including to discuss
and debate issues of public policy, morality, and even philosophy. To glimpse the tone of
this discussion and debate, consider that the word agora derived from the Greek word agon,
which literally meant contest - a word that in tum passed into English usage through words
like agonistic (characterized by contest or struggle) or the more familiar antagonistic (acting
in opposition or hostility). The world of the agora, then, was characterized by varying
degrees of verbal and intellectual contest.
This agonistic tradition was best exemplified by the Sophists - itinerant philosophers or
sages noted for their mastery of persuasive and argumentative rhetorical techniques. At the
height of their influence, the Sophists were sought out for rhetorical training by citizens with
legal and political aspirations. Among the most famous of the Sophists was Protagoras, who
was reputedly the first person to write a formal treatise on the techniques of argument and
who claimed that through these techniques, even the weaker side of any argument could be
made to prevail (an objective which is still pursued today by students who engage in
competitive debate or "forensics" tournaments, ~s well as by lawyers in the Anglo-American
legal system).60
It was within this intellectual and rhetorical milieu, then, that formal logic emerged in
ancient Greece.61 Aristotle, the first Greek philosopher to devise and publish a formal system
60 Of course, not all Greek philosophers engaged in this style of argumentative persuasion or debate. It
appears that Socrates, for instance, engaged in much more dialogical and cooperative methods of
instruction and inquiry, in which he prompted others to reevaluate their own assumptions and beliefs by
posing questions (in a relatively self-effacing manner) in order to encourage critical thinking (as recorded
in Plato's Dialogues). For an insightful discussion of the way that the "Socratic method" has since become
confused with more adversarial modes of logic and inquiry, refer to Moulton, "Adversary Method", pp.
155-57.
Ong, "Agonistic Structures in Academia" and Fighting For Life.
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of logic, drew on a number of Greek intellectual traditions, including the body of
argumentative techniques referred to above.62 To this day, both formal and informal systems
of logic continue to be expressed in terms of logical "arguments". The term argument refers,
on one hand, simply to a thesis or a set of logical propositions. On the other hand, it
simultaneously refers to the logical process whereby different parties set out to justify their
own theses or propositions and refute others. Thus the seeds of an adversarial epistemology
were planted in Greek formal logic. As Ong writes:
This seemingly most neutral and objective of subjects [formal logic] had its origins not in isolated
scholarly musings, but in the analysis of dispute. It was a product of the rhetorical world of the
agora. When the question was asked, "Why does what you say refute what I say?" the stage was
set for formal logical analysis.63
In this context, it is also important to note that the world of the agora, as well as the
Greek academies within which formal logic was conceived, were almost exclusively
populated by men. The agonistic model of inquiry described above thus originated, not
surprisingly, in a highly masculine (and often misogynistic)64 culture of learning.
This male culture of learning, with few exceptions, continued to characterized Western
scholarship from the ancient Greeks to the mid-twentieth century. As historian David Noble
notes in the title of his history of Western science, science has emerged largely inA World
Without Women.65 The modern origins of this exclusively male world can be traced most
directly to the rise and consolidation of the Latin Church and the emergence of all-male
62 Honderich, ed., The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, p. 496.
63 Ong, "Agonistic Structures in Academia", p. 2.
64 Aristotle, for instance, viewed the female state as a deformity of the human condition.
65 The following historical synopsis is heavily indebted to Noble, A World Without Women.
93
monasteries around the fourth century. 66 Shunning women as temptations and distractions
on the path to both knowledge and redemption, these monasteries served as the primary sites
for the pursuit and preservation of knowledge throughout the early medieval period. In time,
these early monastic schools gave rise to more sophisticated cathedral schools, housed and
supported directly by the church, run by the clergy, and dedicated to clerical training. Still
all-male, these cathedral schools represented the height ofmedieval learning during the
eleventh and twelfth centuries and the seedbeds of the earliest Western universities.
By the time the earliest European universities emerged in the twelfth and thirteenth
centuries, a familiar pattern was merely repeated in more sophisticated form. Although the
function of these new institutions was expanded beyond clerical training to include training
for an expanding church bureaucracy and a wide range of church-dominated and controlled
professions, they continued to function as ecclesiastical institutions with all-male
populations, run by celibate male clerics (it was not until 1882, for instance, that Fellows at
Oxford and Cambridge were no longer required to remain celibate). These birthplaces of the
modem sciences remained exclusive male strongholds until well into the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries.
As monastic schools evolved into cathedral schools and cathedral schools evolved into
universities, one could also see a common thread ofmisogynistic beliefs and attitudes - most
notably a distrust and dread of women as earthly and sinful and a corresponding belief that
men could be purified through the shunning of women. Another common thread was a
66 Though Western science is often understood as a reaction against religious authority, and a departure from
the Christian clerical tradition, this view is profoundly ahistorical, for Western science emerged squarely
within the Christian clerical culture.
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highly militaristic culture. These institutions were typically characterized by rigorous
discipline and military-like regimens. Indeed, their members frequently conceived of
themselves as "warriors" trained for spiritual and sometimes even physical battle against
"heretics" and "heathens" - as exemplified not only by spiritual missions but also by
crusades and inquisitions. In the earliest universities, students also divided themselves
internally into "nations" and engaged in ritualized armed contests with one another. At
times, this ritualized aggression spilled over into surrounding communities as armed students
took to the streets at night, terrorizing local inhabitants - especially women.
It was within this masculine, misogynistic, and militaristic environment, that Western
science incubated for over one thousand years. Little wonder, then, Western science came to
embody an adversarial epistemology. By the time the earliest universities had been founded,
scholarly disputation - reminiscent of the agonistic Greek tradition but more formalized and
ritualized in its new institutional setting - was a primary method of intellectual training and
inquiry.67 Within this setting, knowledge or truth naturally came to be assayed through the
proposal and refutation of ideas within intellectual contests.
Once firmly established by the early clerical culture of Western science, these adversarial
practices were retained largely intact through the secularization of learning that eventually
followed. With the emergence of the humanist movement in the late sixteenth and early
seventeenth century, relatively secularized Renaissance academies began to emerge under
aristocratic rather than church sponsorship. In tum, secular universities were founded and
increasing numbers of ecclesiastical universities were gradually secularized as well. In all
67 See also Maieru, University Training in Medieval Europe, and Ong, "Agonistic Structures in Academia",
for discussions offormal disputation in medieval pedagogy.
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cases, these institutions remained almost exclusively male well into the nineteenth and in
many cases the twentieth century, and the adversarial heritage of the Latin clerical culture
was retained.
In the all-male world of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Western colleges and
universities, ritualized enmity between teachers and students was a well-established tradition,
including adversarial methods of teaching and testing as well as frequent threats of corporal
punishment.68 Beyond the manner of instruction, the content was also shaped by agonistic
traditions. Subjects that lent themselves to scholarly disputation were favoured over subjects
that did not. Moreover, texts were filled with histories of violence and tales of valor,
together with orations pitting one speaker against another, in order to train the young
scholars' minds accordingly. As Dng describes it, "the combined effect of physical threat
from switching, agonistic methods of teaching and testing, and highly martial subject matter
could often be an academic setting something like that of a present-day survival course";
indeed, those who survived tended to develop a strong sense of "male bonding" based on an
experience of shared hardships.69
When women finally began to gain entrance into the male world of learning in the mid-
nineteenth century, some ofthese more extreme traditions began to gradually fade. 70 But
agonistic modes of thought and inquiry continued to shape contemporary scholarship in
subtle ways. Among the most conspicuous expressions of this are the public "defenses" of
68 Refer to Dng, "Agonistic Structures in Academia" for a more detailed discussion of this theme.
69 Quotation is from Dng, "Agonistic Structures in Academia", pages 5-6. For more detailed discussions of
this theme, to which the above summary is indebted, refer also to Dng, Fighting For Life.
70 It should be pointed out, however, that even when women gained entrance into the modem world of
university education, they were soon confronted by the emergence of all-male professional societies that
more or less held the line against women until the middle of the twentieth century.
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theses, dissertations, and comprehensive examinations that most graduate schools still
require. The more general underlying expression of this, however, is what Janice Moulton
refers to as the "adversary paradigm" that still characterizes much contemporary scholarship.
Describing the expression of this paradigm within her own discipline of philosophy, Moulton
explains that
under the Adversary Paradigm, it is assumed that the only, or at any rate, the best, way of
evaluating work in philosophy is to subject it to the strongest or most extreme opposition. And it
is assumed that the best way of presenting work in philosophy is to address it to an imaginary
opponent and muster all the evidence one can to support it. The justification for this method is
that a position ought to be defended from, and subjected to, the criticism of the strongest
opposition; that this method is the only way to get the best of both sides; that a thesis which
survives this method of evaluation is more likely to be correct than the one that has not; and that a
thesis subjected to the Adversary Method will have passed an "objective" test, the most extreme
test possible, whereas any weaker criticism or evaluation will, by comparison, give an advantage
to the claim to be evaluated and therefore not be as objective as it could be.71
As Moulton concludes, the adversary paradigm is a "methodology that accepts a positive
view of aggressive behaviour and uses it as a paradigm of philosophic reasoning".72 This
conclusion is echoed by Burtt in an article entitled "Philosophers as Warriors". Describing
this process of scholarly debate, Burtt explains that
each debater's part is presented in a systematic logical sequence aimed at convincing those who
listen or read that if certain plausible premises are accepted certain important conclusions follow.
Philosophers have carried on their discussions through the centuries in this fashion; their
meetings, journal articles, and books consist mainly (and often wholly) of argumentative debate.73
Intellectual contests thus continue to serve as normative models for the contemporary
pursuit of knowledge and understanding. 74 And the implications are complex. On the one
hand, this contest model of scholarship has advanced the pursuit of human knowledge and
71 Moulton, "Adversary Method", p. 153.
72 Ibid., P 149.
73 Burtt, "Philosophers as Warriors", p. 33, parentheses in the original.
97
understanding to previously unattained heights. Much of the science and technology we
take for granted in this age is the product of this model. We are all familiar with these
accomplishments, and they need no elaboration here. On the other hand, an adversarial
epistemology comes with a number of costs that are all too frequently overlooked in the
shadow of these tremendous accomplishments.
Among the costs of a contest model of scholarship are the many voices who are excluded
or withdraw from the arena of scholarship due to its frequently adversarial atmosphere. Such
an atmosphere can exclude or inhibit individuals who, by nature or nurture, are neither
inclined toward nor comfortable with adversarial contests - even though they may have
important scholarly insights to offer. In this regard, adversarial debate can undermine lucid
reasoning even among the most confident and aggressive people.75 Such conditions can
entirely silence less confident and less aggressive individuals.
By extension, adversarial contests arguably tend to privilege many male scholars who,
whether by nature or nurture or some combination of the two, have historically tended to be
more aggressive than women and thus frequently find themselves at a relative advantage
within this contest model.76 The resulting disadvantage experienced by many women may
also be experienced by many minority groups who have often had to learn to adopt
subordinate postures in relation to dominant social groups. Moreover, women and minorities
may be further disadvantaged because even though male or dominant-group expressions of
74 Refer also to Tompkins, "Fighting Words", Cope-Kasten, "Domination Rationality", and Tannen, The
Argument Culture, for similar conclusions by scholars in a range of disciplines.
75 As Moulton states, "conditions of hostility are not likely to elicit the best reasoning" ("Adversary Method",
p.153).
76 Refer, for example, to discussions in Moulton, "Adversary Method", and Lakoff, Language and Woman's
Place.
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aggression are often considered natural and appropriate, the same kinds of expressions, when
employed by women or subordinate minorities, are often viewed as unnatural and
inappropriate. Thus the same rewards do not necessarily accrue to women and minorities for
the same adversarial behaviours.77
Beyond the exclusions, inhibitions, and double standards identified above, the adversary
paradigm also tends to limit and/or isolate the diversity of perspectives available even among
those who are willing and able to play by adversarial rules. Adversarial debate assumes that
some theories will be proved right and others wrong - or some will win, while others lose.
Ideally, of course, the theory that most adequately explains reality prevails. This assumes,
however, that reality can adequately be explained though a single theoretical framework. But
if there is one epistemological lesson that should have been learned throughout the past
century, it is that an adequate grasp of any given phenomenon often requires multiple
complementary theoretical frameworks - each of which illuminates different facets of the
same phenomenon.
This insight applies not only in the social sciences but even within physics and other
natural sciences. The classic example of this is particle/wave duality in subatomic physics.
In fact, the original debates about whether electromagnetic energy could best be understood
in terms of particle theory or wave theory are perfect illustrations of the exclusive and
reductionistic tendencies of the adversary paradigm. Only after a generation of debate
between particle theorists and wave theorists, did physicists eventually accept that an
adequate grasp ofthe subject required the use of both apparently contradictory models.
77 Refer again to Moulton, "Adversary Method", and Lakoff, Language and Woman's Place.
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Parallel debates have since played out in many other fields - most recently in the field of
ecology.78 The manner in which those debates have been resolved provides a glimpse of an
epistemological alternative to the adversary paradigm. An adversarial epistemology,
however, tends to militate against the consideration of complementary perspectives, for
complementarity implies that there is no clear winner or loser, no single right or wrong. By
privileging single perspectives over multiple perspectives, the adversary paradigm favours
reductionistic and absolutist thought.
Another set of costs associated with the adversary paradigm are the emotional,
psychological, and relational costs to those who participate in it. Intellectual skepticism and
constructive critique can undoubtedly be important tools of intellectual inquiry when
exercised within an atmosphere ofpersonal detachment and a sincere desire for truth. In the
abstract, the adversary paradigm is generally understood in this manner - as a contest of .
ideas rather than a contest between people. In practice, however, the line between ideas and
egos is a fine one, and intellectual debates frequently become personalized and hostile.
Indeed, such a tone of personalized hostility has become commonplace within many
academic conferences and journals.
In an essay entitled Fighting Words, Jane Thompson eloquently captures this tendency.
Recalling a familiar scene at a recent academic conference, she describes a scholar delivering
a paper that is critical of another scholar's work. Her description is quoted at length here for
the insight it offers into the frequently adversarial world of contemporary scholarship:
A woman is giving a paper. It is an attack on another woman's recent book; the entire paper is
devoted to demolishing it, and the speaker is doing a superb job. The audience has begun to catch
the spirit of the paper, which is witty, elegant, and razor sharp; they appreciate the deftness, the
78 Refer to discussion in Chapter IV.
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brilliance, the grace, with which the assassination is being conducted; the speaker's intelligence
flatters their intelligence... They are inside her paper now, pulling with the speaker, seeing her
victim in the same way she does, as the enemy...
Listening to the paper, which I admired very much for the performance values I've mentioned, I
began to feel more and more uncomfortable ... I was afraid this woman might one day turn her
attack on me - indeed, in one of her devastating sideswipes, I thought I had already been
anonymously grazed by her dagger - and I imagined the audience, which only the day before had
enthusiastically applauded my own presentation, turning on me like a pack of dogs. By the time
the paper was over, I felt as if I had been present at a ritual execution of some sort, something
halfway between a bullfight, where the crowd admires the skill of a matador and enjoys his
triumph over the bull, and a public burning, where the crowd witnesses the just punishment of a
criminal. For the academic experience combined the elements of admiration, bloodlust, and
moral self-congratulation.
Afterwards, I began to recall in a kind of phantasmagoria all the essays I had read where similar
executions had occurred. It wasn't the essays themselves that came to mind as much as the
moves they characteristically made... I remembered the times I had seen someone's diction
ridiculed, or their unhappy choice of metaphor derided ... the innumerable times people had been
garroted by their own self-contradictions. But most vivid of all were the moments when the
characterological defects implicit in someone's style or point of view were indignantly paraded
by. Following traditional lines of thought was translated into cowardice; dependence on another
scholar's work into toadyism; failing to mention another scholar's work into lack of generosity,
and so on. The list is practically endless. In veiled language, I realized, we accuse one another of
stupidity, ignorance, fear, envy, pride, malice, and hypocrisy...
[Then] I remembered something else, an essay I had published in 1981 that, twice anthologized
since then, had been in many ways the making of my career... The essay began with a frontal
assault on another woman scholar. When I wrote it I felt the way a hero does in a Western. Not
only had this critic argued a, b, and c, she had held x, y, and z! It was a clear case of outrageous
provocation. Moreover, she was famous and I was not... In this David and Goliath situation-
my slingshot against her ca(n)non - surely I was justified in hitting her with everything I had.
And so, casting myself as the champion of the oppressed, and wielding scare quotes and
withering sarcasm, I showed the world the evil of her ways and out of the shambles of her
position went on to build the temple of my own.79
Granted, this relatively extreme mode of intellectual contest (or combat) is not
commonplace in all disciplines. As Tompkins concludes, however, "it's practiced at some
time or other by virtually everyone" in the more critical social science and humanities
disciplines. 8o The irony, moreover, is that such combative approaches might not only be
judged offensive on moral or humanitarian grounds, but those who engage in them also tend
79 Tompkins, "Fighting Words", pp. 587-89.
80 Ibid., p. 589.
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to entrench rather than convince their "opponents". As Burtt points out, adopting such an
approach "reveals a lack of awareness that the hostile and pugnacious urge, which cannot be
wholly hidden if it is there, instead of cowing people into submission provokes a similar urge
in response... [with] the opponent almost sure to remain unconvinced".81
Aside from these more extreme modes of adversarialism, the competitive nature of the
entire academic environment and the political economy of knowledge associated with it
influence scholarly activity in all disciplines. In Western-liberal democracies, material
contests over scarce resources shape and constrain all scholarly activity. These contests play
out first in partisan legislative systems that determine public spending priorities which in turn
impact research and education. They also play out in capitalist free markets, as powerful
corporations exert lobbying pressures to influence the public spending priorities alluded to
above, and as crises in public financing force scholars to turn directly to private corporations
for grants and research support. Finally, they play out most conspicuously on college and
university campuses as individual scholars, as well as entire departments, compete with one
another for funding, recognition, career advancement, and so forth.
In this context, the abstract ideal of an impersonal and detached contest of ideas
translates, in practice, into a wide range of motivations and expressions that often have little
to do with the pursuit of knowledge and understanding. Thus the internal politics of
academic institutions are frequently characterized by adversarial negotiation and posturing,
as battles over theoretical, disciplinary, or ideological primacy combine with "turf wars" over
funding to create environments within which the activities of teaching and research are
81 Burtt, "Philosophers as Warriors", p. 35.
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carried out. In this atmosphere, the politics of ambition frequently prevail, and winning,
rather than the collective pursuit of knowledge and understanding, becomes the primary goal.
This atmosphere, moreover, is further promoted and reinforced by values and attitudes that
are imported from the larger culture of adversarialism that exists outside of academia.
In summary, even though scholarly contests of ideas have advanced human knowledge
and understanding to previously unattained heights, they come with a number of costs that
are all-too-frequently overlooked in the shadow ofthese accomplishments. Granted,
intellectual debate is a far cry from physical violence. But by fostering an atmosphere of
intellectual conflict and competition, it can exclude or inhibit less confident and aggressive
people from participating in scholarly inquiry. By militating against the consideration of
complementary truths, it can limit or isolate the diversity of perspectives available even
among those who are willing and able to play by adversarial rules. By normalizing a tone of
personalized hostility, especially in more critical scholarly discourses, it can exact a high
emotional, psychological, and relational toll within these disciplines. And finally, within the
context of the competitive political economy that characterizes all contemporary disciplines,
it can foster an atmosphere in which winning, rather than the collective pursuit ofknowledge
and understanding, becomes the primary goal. Of course, apologists of this adversary
paradigm defend rational debate on the basis that it is more desirable than irrational or even
violent alternatives. Thus the costs identified above can be written off as necessary tradeoffs.
But this common sense assertion again embodies a false choice because it conceals the
possibility that equally rational yet non-adversarial alternatives might be possible.82
82 While a full-fledged discussion of such alternatives is beyond the scope of this paper, elements of such
alternatives are discussed in subsequent chapters. Refer, for instance, to the discussion in Chapter IV under
(footnote continued on next page)
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Adversarialism as a Comprehensive Cultural Formation
As the survey above illustrates, the codes of adversarialism find relatively ubiquitous and
indiscriminate expression throughout the contemporary Western public sphere. In this
regard, each of the social arenas discussed above are mutually compatible and mutually
reinforcing. No matter which direction one turns, adversarial structures and practices tend to
dominate one's view. Even the adversarialism of many social activists is consistent with, and
reinforces, the adversarialism ofthose social structures and practices that are the objects of
their critiques or reforms.
In this context, each of the social arenas above articulate into a comprehensive discursive
or cultural formation, as defined in Chapter I. Recall: a comprehensive discursive formation
is constituted by the articulation of distinct but mutually compatible discourses in a manner
that reinforces similar ways of thinking, talking, and acting throughout diverse social arenas
- in this case adversarial ways of thinking, talking, and acting throughout the economic,
•
political, judicial, mass media, social advocacy, and academic arenas among others. In this
manner, these discourses constitute a larger discursive universe - a constellation of
discourses - within which Western populations are born, develop, and learn that it is normal
and natural to think, talk, and act in largely adversarial ways. These discourses embody
adversarial "truths" about human nature and society that appear to be self-evident within the
social realities they construct. They define human beings in adversarial ways that we then
the Ecological/Environmentalism section. Refer also to the brief discussion of a "consultative
epistemology" - in which diverse perspectives are seen as potentially complementary and inquiry proceeds
in a cooperative manner, through informed dialogue rather than argumentative debate - touched on in
Chapter V. For an insightful and in-depth discussion of this consultative epistemology, refer to Smith,
"The Relativity of Social Construction".
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tend to enact or personify in our roles and behaviours. They also construct social institutions
that organize and regulate our collective practices accordingly. In short, they construct a
general culture of adversarialism - in both its psycho-cultural and socio-structural
dimensions - that appears natural and inevitable to those within it.
The Question ofHuman Nature
Skeptics argue, of course, that human nature is fundamentally selfish and adversarial and
that Western-liberal models of social organization simply reflect our genetic inheritance.
Indeed, this has been the conventional wisdom within many of the social sciences throughout
the twentieth century.83 But the roo~s of these assumptions about human nature run much
deeper.84 As Rose, Lewontin, and Kamin point out:
Philosophically this view of human nature is very old; it goes back to the emergence of bourgeois
society in the seventeenth century and to Hobbes's view of human existence as bellum omnium
contra omnes, a war of all against all, leading to a state of human relations manifesting
competitiveness, mutual fear, and the desire for glory. For Hobbes, it followed that the purpose
of social organization was merely to regulate these inevitable features of the human condition.
And Hobbes's view of the human condition derived from his understanding of human biology; it
was biological inevitability that made humans what they were.85
These assumptions regarding human nature, however, are increasingly being challenged
by scholars from diverse disciplines.86 As anthropologists Howell and Willis state:
83 The more prominent and explicit proponents of this view include, for instance, Lorenz, On Aggression;
Morris, The Naked Ape; Ardrey, The Territorial Imperative; Storr, Human Aggression; Konner, Tangled
Wing; Tiger and Fox, The Imperial Animal; and Eibl-Eibesfeldt, The Biology ofPeace and War. For
insightful critiques of these and similar views, refer to Rose, Lewontin, and Kamin, Not In Our Genes, as
well as Lewontin, Biology as Ideology.
M flRefer, for example, to Kehoe, "Con ict is a Western Worldview", for a discussion of these assumptions in
Western philosophy.
85 Rose, Lewontin, and Kamin, Not In Our Genes, p. 5. Refer also to Ryan, "The Nature of Human Nature",
for a more detailed examination of Hobbes's views on human nature.
86 For an excellent edited collection of essays and articles on this subject, refer to Mansbridge, ed., Beyond
Self-Interest. See also Brocke-Utne, Feminist Perspectives; Ross, Culture ofConflict; Bandura,
(footnote continued on next page)
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The great majority of researchers assert that "aggression" is an integral part of human nature; and
that aggressive impulses and behaviour have somehow to be directed and controlled for human
relations to be sustained over time in a social setting. Scientists present their ideas to the general
public, contributing directly or indirectly to debates in social, legal, and religious domains. Their
views on questions of human nature therefore assume major importance in the moral community
of which they form a part...
We wish to propose an alternative approach, challenging the assumption that aggression is an
innate human drive. It is undeniably the case that in Western society aggression is regarded as
part of human nature. But perhaps this tells us more about Western society than about human
nature. We wish to suggest that we cannot assume an a priori aggressive drive in humans. The
presence of innate sociality, on the other hand, has much evidence in its favour. Humans are a
priori sociable beings; it is their cooperativeness that has enabled them to survive, not their
. . I 87aggressIve Impu ses.
Other prominent anthropologists, including Leakey and Lewin, have echoed these
conclusions regarding the cooperative capacities of the human species:
Throughout our recent evolutionary history, particularly since the rise of a hunting way of life,
there must have been extreme selective pressures in favour of our ability to cooperate as a
group... The degree of selective pressure towards cooperation, group awareness, and
identification was so strong, and the period over which it operated was so extended, that it can
hardly fail to have become embedded to some measure in our genetic makeup.88
Of course, assertions such as these need not deny the existence of conflict and aggression
in human societies. Rather, it is increasingly recognized that human beings have the
developmental potential for both conflict and cooperation and that how we act in this regard
is shaped largely by our cultural environment - as demonstrated by the fact that different
societies vary considerably in their expressions of conflict and cooperation.89
Outside of anthropology, many economists are arriving at parallel conclusions. Rejecting
Aggression; Montagu, ed., Learning Non-Aggression; Kemp, "Nonviolence"; Montagu, The Nature of
Human Aggression; Kohn, Human Nature; and Mark and Ervin, Violence and the Brain.
87 Howell and Willis, Societies at Peace, pp. 1-2.
88 Leakey and Lewin, Origins, p. 209. Refer also to Bateson, "Co-operation", and Carrithers, "Sociality", for
similar assertions.
89 For an excellent statement of this conclusion, refer to Seville, "Statement onViolence" - a joint statement
of twenty social and biological scientists from around the world, gathered during the United Nation's
International Year of Peace to explore, among other things, the relationship between peace, war, and human
nature. Refer also to Ross, Culture ofConflict, and Masters, The Nature ofPolitics.
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the fundamentally self-interested and competitive understanding of "Homo economus" that
has dominated for several centuries, these economists subscribe to an expanded
understanding of human nature that accounts for cooperative, altruistic, and even self-
sacrificing behaviour.90 In fact, a growing body of economic theory and research suggests
that the competitive pursuit of self-interests is often a less effective strategy than mutual
cooperation - even when measured strictly by indicators ofmaterial gain.91 In this context,
game theorists and other economists have demonstrated that cooperative strategies may have
been selected for in human evolution due to the advantages they confer relative to adversarial
strategies. 92 Thus some economists are converging with the anthropologists discussed above
in their conclusions that natural selection may have favoured cooperative traits in human
beings.
In addition, many economists (as well as scholars in other disciplines) have begun
expressing concern about the self-fulfilling or generative nature of assumptions that human
beings are incorrigibly selfish and aggressive. Numerous studies suggest, for instance, that
economists themselves tend to behave in more self-interested ways than non-economists, due
in part to their continual exposure to these assumptions.93 In tum, given the predominant
90 Refer, for example, to Becker, "A Theory of Social Interactions" and "Genetic Fitness"; Collard, Altruism
and Economy; Frank, "Homo Economus"; Hammond, "Charity, Altruism or Cooperative Egoism?";
Hollander, "Voluntary Cooperation"; Margolis, Selfishness, Altruism, and Rationality; Sugden, "On the
Economics of Philanthropy"; Zamagni, ed., The Economics ofAltruism; and Lunati, "On Altruism and
Cooperation" .
Refer, for example, to Akerlof, "Loyalty Filters"; Frank, Passions Within Reason; Hirshleifer, "Threats and
Promises"; Axelrod, The Evolution ofCooperation; and Mansbridge, ed., Beyond Self-Interest.
92 Refer, for example,to Axelrod, The Evolution ofCooperation; Bergstrom and Stark, "How Altruism Can
Prevail"; Becker, "Genetic Fitness"; Samuelson, "Altruism"; Casti, "Cooperation"; and Simon, "Successful
Altruism".
93 For an excellent overview ofthese studies, refer to Frank, Gilovich, and Regan, "Does Studying Economics
Inhibit Cooperation?". Ironically, many of these studies also show that in standard ultimatum bargaining
scenarios, economists tend to be less successful than non-economists because the latter place a higher value
(footnote continued on next page)
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influence of economics within the contemporary public sphere, these traditional economic
assumptions tend to translate into public policies and practices reflecting the view that
"competition is healthy, cooperation is not feasible".94 As Zamagni explains:
Our beliefs about human nature help shape human nature itself, in the sense that what we think
about ourselves and our possibilities determine what we aspire to become. In this precise sense,
the self-interest theory is not morally neutral, contrary to what most economists seem to believe.
There is growing evidence that the self-interest paradigm may be self-fulfilling... subjects come
to perceive self-interest as a normative characterization of rational behaviour and come to act
accordingly. It is here that the effects of the self-interest theory are most disturbing.95
Moreover, similar concerns can be expressed about the self-fulfilling nature of the
assumptions that underlie each of the other arenas - politics, law, media, social advocacy,
and scholarship - discussed earlier in this chapter. By naturalizing conflict, competition, and
other adversarial expressions within their respective spheres, these discourses may well
generate and perpetuate the realities they merely purport to reflect - thus cultivating the
empirical evidence with which they in turn legitimize themselves.96
The Culture ofAdversarialism as a Hegemonic Formation
By confusing a relatively adversarial human culture with human nature itself, it becomes
difficult to recognize, let alone imagine, other cultural possibilities. As a consequence,
on mutualism and cooperation, which tends to be a more successful strategy. Refer, for example, to
Lattimore, "Is It Rational to Be Rational?".
94 Lunati, "On Altruism and Cooperation", p. 69.
95 Zamagni, "The Economics of Altruism", p. xxi. See also Rushton, "Altruism and Society", for a parallel
discussion.
96 Cultivation theory suggests that repeated exposure to a consistent and pervasive set of representations can
incrementally influence human perceptions and behaviour in a collective and cumulative manner. In other
words, cultures are cultivated in part through the "stories" we tend to tell about ourselves. Cultivation
theory also suggests that processes of cultivation can reinforce existing cultural perceptions and behaviours
once established. Despite the obvious difficulty of empirically verifying these claims, cultivation analysis
has yielded impressive support for both of these hypotheses. For an excellent overview of cultivation
theory, methodology, and findings, refer to the edited collection of articles on this theme in Morgan and
Signorielli, "Cultivation Analysis".
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alternative ways of thinking, talking, and acting are marginalized by the common sense
"realism" or "realpolitik" that the culture of adversarialism constructs.97 From the vantage
point provided by this adversarial-realism, non-adversarial alternatives appear naive or
utopian.
In this context, the culture of adversarialism can be seen as a hegemonic cultural
formation. As discussed in Chapter I, hegemonic dominance is achieved when specific
interpretations of reality become the accepted "common sense" within society, even among
groups whose interests are subordinated by them. As demonstrated by the anti-suffragist
women discussed in Chapter I, it is often difficult to step outside of a discursive universe you
have been born and raised in, even when your own interests are subordinated by it.
Moreover, it can be difficult even to recognize that one is living in a historically specific
cultural formation at all because to the extent hegemonic dominance has been effective, that
formation will appear not as a cultural construct but simply as "reality" itself - normal,
natural, and inevitable.
In this context, we have arguably been born into a culture of adversarialism that was not
of our own making, prefigured to some degree by cultural codes that are widely accepted as
common sense. Moreover, these cultural codes may subordinate many of our broadest
collective interests to the narrow interests of privileged groups who benefit most from them.
Of course, in light of the ultimate fluidity of cultural codes, change is always possible. As
97 As Kehoe argues in "Conflict is a Western Worldview", p. 59, "realpolitik, like any image of 'reality,' is
the product ofa particular culture... it stands as itself hegemonic, a discourse that 'disables' its challengers
by... 'portraying parochial categories as if they are universal"'. For parallel discussions, refer also to
Rubinstein, "International Security"; Satha-Anand, "From Violent to Nonviolent Discourse"; and Walker,
"Contemporary Militarism".
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alluded to above, however, change is contingent upon our ability to step outside the culture
of adversarialism (if only in our imaginations at first), in order to admit the possibility of
alternatives.
CHAPTER IV: ALTERNATIVES TO ADVERSARIALISM
Historical Expressions
As the introductory chapter of this dissertation points out, adversarialism has never been
the sole characteristic of any culture, including contemporary Western-liberal cultures.
Strands ofmutualism have also been present in all human cultures - from the earliest human
societies to the present. Indeed, as the discussion in Chapter III notes, many anthropologists
attribute the evolutionary success of our species to these cooperative tendencies and
capacities. They are clearly part of our evolutionary heritage.
With this said, it is important not to romanticize our distant past by constructing false
images of an idyllic era in which human beings lived in peace and harmony, untroubled by
aggression, conflict, and competition. There is no strong evidence to suggest that a golden
age of mutualism and cooperation has ever existed. For instance, though the "partnership
cultures" described by Riane Eisler have a certain romantic appeal, they appear to be a
slightly wishful re-interpretation ofNeolithic history.l Since the original publication of
Eisler's work, other scholars have pointed out a number of unwarranted inferences that Eisler
has made from very sketchy archeological data, as well as a body of contradictory data that
she overlooked.2 In her effort to construct an image of the past that would offer hope for the
future, Eisler may have overstated her thesis.
2
Eisler, Chalice and the Blade.
Refer, for instance, to Biehl, Rethinking Ecofeminist Politics.
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To Eisler's credit, however, she did expose the spurious nature of contrary assumptions
that "primitive" cultures were necessarily hostile and aggressive - the anthropological
version of a Hobbesian worldview. If that is all one is looking for in the archeological data,
then that is what one will tend to find. By re-examining the archeological data from a
feminist perspective, Eisler does find evidence for a degree of peace and cooperation that has
typically been overlooked by other anthropologists. Studies of surviving hunter-gatherer
societies lend additional support to this general conclusion. In an extensive meta-analysis of
such studies, Ross demonstrates that known hunter-gatherer cultures also weave strands of
mutualism and adversarialism together in complex yet diverse ways.3
In addition to these relatively early forms of social organization, strands ofmutualism
and cooperation have also been present in more complex pre-industrial societies. For
instance, many traditional Asian and other non-Western civilizations have placed a strong
value on harmony and interdependence rather than conflict and competitive individualism.
Such cooperative and mutualistic attitudes have in turn supported the development of
sophisticated arts, sciences, and technologies, as well as complex and extensive systems of
public administration. Again, it is important not to romanticize such cultures or overstate
their cooperative and mutualistic dimensions. The same cultures were also frequently
characterized by feudal warfare, the oppression of women, and significant disparities of
wealth and poverty. Thus mutualism and cooperation have coexisted with adversarialism
and oppression in such societies.
In recent Western history, strands of mutualism and cooperation have also clearly been
3 Ross, Culture ofConflict.
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present. In the sphere of private or personal relations, much human interaction has obviously
been cooperative and mutualistic. But even in the public sphere, which is the focus of this
dissertation, strands of mutualism and cooperation can easily be identified. The historical
process of nation building, the emergence of democratic systems of government, and the
establishment of the rule of law within these democratic nations all reflect (in part)
expressions of mutualism and cooperation on historically unprecedented scales. The
emergence of the United Nations system, along with other international institutions in the
latter half of this century, also represent expressions of mutualism and cooperation, now
playing out on a global scale. Despite the current imperfections of these institutions (which
can be attributed to the fact that they have been forged within and subordinated to
competitive systems of national sovereignty and unregulated global capitalism), they have
yielded declarations of principle (e.g., the Universal Declaration of Human Rights), that are
beginning to exert a significant influence on political discourse both within and between
nations.
Intertwined with these broader geo-political accomplishments have been diverse social
movements that all reflect commitments to more mutualistic and cooperative patterns of
social life. Struggles to abolish slavery have been prime examples ofthis, as have various
women's suffrage movements throughout the world. The American civil rights movement
provides another clear example, as do the countless grassroots peace movements that have
emerged over the course of this century.
Expressions of mutualism and cooperation can also be seen in the economic sphere. The
cooperative movement, for example, represents a distinct effort to transcend exploitative
relations between capitalists and workers through the articulation of cooperative models of
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economic ownership. And many practical cooperative experiments have been remarkably
successful in this regard. Of course, cooperative ventures still compete with other ventures
within the larger framework of competitive market relations. Nevertheless, they do represent
a relative shift from the domain of adversarialism and inequality to the domain of
cooperation and equality.
Spanning both the political and economic spheres, various socialist movements have also
been motivated by cooperative ideals and commitments. Though socialism takes many
forms, most socialists have sought to replace the competitive structures of capitalism with
more cooperative or communal alternatives. Of course, some socialist movements have
adopted relatively confrontational strategies for pursuing their goals. Others, however, have
pursued non-adversarial strategies of social change. Fabian Socialists, for instance, have
generally rejected confrontational or revolutionary strategies in favour of gradual reform
within existing institutional structures.4 Regardless of the strategies adopted, virtually all
advocates of socialism maintain that human beings can and must learn how to function
together in fundamentally mutualistic and cooperative ways. Even Marx, while interpreting
history primarily through the lens of class conflict, did not hold that human beings were
incorrigibly selfish or aggressive. Rather, he maintained that antagonism between social
groups had·structural causes, and it would end when those structural causes were eliminated.5
Likewise, modem anarchist movements have derived from generally similar views and
commitments. Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, one of the founding figures of modem anarchism,
4 Refer, for instance, to Cole, Fabian Socialism.
For insightful discussions regarding Marx's view of human nature and social antagonism, refer to
McMurtry, Marx's Worldview, and Fromm, Marx's Concept ofMan.
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advocated a system of "economic mutualism" in which the exchange of goods and services
would occur at cost (Le., without profit) within a sphere ofvoluntary economic association.6
The Russian anarchist Petr Kropotkin wrote a lengthy treatise refuting social Darwinist views
regarding the inevitability of human struggle and conflict and pointing out that human beings
had inherited a genetic capacity to work together toward their common good.7 And though
Kropotkin advocated relatively adversarial strategies for overthrowing existing social
structures, in order to clear the ground for a new cooperative society characterized by free
association, Proudhon and many other anarchists have been committed to relatively peaceful
strategies of change. Whatever the strategies, the ultimate goals have generally been to
replace authoritarian or oppressive state structures with some system of free association and
cooperation. Moreover, as the anarcho-syndicalist movement illustrates, these goals have
often been linked with the socialist goals of creating an alternative to the dominant system of
competitive capitalism.
In summary, adversarialism has never been a monolithic expression within any culture.
Strands of mutualism and cooperation co-existed in the earliest human societies. They have
been present in many complex non-Western civilizations. They were present throughout the
recent history of Western civilization. And as the discussion below illustrates, they are still
present today - even if they are frequently marginalized by the dominant structures of
adversarialism.
6
7
Proudhon, What Is Property?
Kropotkin, Mutual Aid.
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Contemporary Prescriptions
The remainder of this chapter will survey a number of contemporary critiques of
adversarialism and the non-adversarial prescriptions that derive from them. As in the last
chapter, this survey is meant to be illustrative rather than exhaustive. Other critiques and
prescriptions can certainly be found. However, each of the critiques below has been selected
for the theoretically informed insights they offer into the dominant culture of adversarialism.
Feminism
Given the association between adversarialism and masculinity discussed in the beginning
of Chapter III, alternatives to adversarialism have frequently been articulated within feminist
discourses. Of course, feminism embodies diverse currents of thought and practice, and
some of these currents have been quite adversarial. At the same time, however, many
feminists have articulated insightful critiques of adversarialism.8
Feminist critiques of adversarialism take several forms. What they tend to share,
however, is the assertion that models of aggression, competition, and power struggles have
historically served, in various ways, as structures of male domination over women.9 On the
most obvious level, this has occurred through direct physical aggression of men against
women. In many historical periods and cultures, male aggression against women has been
accepted as normal and natural, and given the greater physical strength of many men, these
8
9
The following discussion is not intended to imply that all feminists speak with one voice and from one
perspective. Rather, the specific feminist perspectives outlined below have been included because they
articulate clear critiques of, and alternatives to, the normative adversarialism that dominates much
contemporary discourse.
Refer, for example, to discussions in Hartsock, Feminist Historical Materialism and "Political Change";
Moulton, "Adversary Method"; Brocke-Utne, Feminist Perspectives; McAllister, ed., Reweaving the Web
ofLife; Taslitz, Rape and the Culture ofthe Courtroom; and Warren and Cady, "Feminism and Peace".
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cultural norms have served as obvious structures ofmale domination. Moreover, despite the
recent criminalization of many forms of violence against women in many countries, the
residual influences of these historical norms can still be widely seen throughout the world,
including the West.
In addition to physical aggression against women, many feminists argue that aggression,
competition, and the valorization of power struggles have served as structures of male
domination in more subtle ways as well. Throughout the public sphere, in our economy, our
political institutions, our judicial systems, our educational systems, and so forth, systems of
reward tend to privilege traditionally "masculine" adversarial traits over traditionally
"feminine" traits such as caring and cooperation. 10 In tum, given the historical association of
aggression and competition with masculinity, these systems of reward often serve as systems
of male privilege. II Moreover, this appears to be the case regardless of whether the
association between adversarialism and masculinity is biologically determined, socially
learned, or a combination of the two. On the one hand, if males tend to be biologically more
aggressive and competitive than females, then a system that rewards masculine traits above
feminine traits privileges males based on biological differences. On the other hand, if these
differences tend to be the results of gender socialization, then a system that rewards
10 This statement is not meant to imply any necessary or essential correspondence between male and female
biology on the one hand and "masculine" and "feminine" qualities on the other. Debate over the biological
basis for these associations is far from resolved - and it need not be resolved for the purpose of this
discussion. Rather, the terms "masculine" and "feminine" are used here to denote traditional cultural
associations rather than necessary biological associations - or what some would call gender types as
opposed to sex types.
Of course, whether these associations are biological or cultural, they are not absolute. Nurturing and
cooperation are displayed by men, even as aggression and competition are displayed by women. For a
discussion of these cultural and historical complexities and contradictions, especially regarding expressions
of female militarism, refer to Elshtain, Women and War.
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masculine traits above feminine traits privileges males through differential socialization.
Either way, as long as aggression and competition are rewarded, males are often advantaged
and females are often disadvantaged.
In addition, even when women do engage in traditional power struggles and play by
aggressive and competitive rules, they often do not receive equivalent rewards for equivalent
behaviours. Male expressions of aggression and competition are rewarded in many situations
because they tend to be viewed as natural and appropriate. In contrast, female expressions of
aggression and competition are often not rewarded in the same situations because they tend
to be viewed as unnatural and inappropriate. 12 Double standards such as these further
reinforce the structures of male domination that have been constructed through the
association of aggression, competition, and masculinity within systems of reward throughout
the public sphere.
Furthermore, beyond the relative disadvantages that women have historically experienced
within these reward structures, many feminists also express concern regarding the
domination of masculine qualities (as opposed to male persons) over feminine qualities (as
opposed to female persons) in our societies - regardless of whether these qualities are
displayed by women or men. 13 Simply put, the flip side of a culture that privileges
adversarial power struggles and qualities is a culture that devalues non-adversarial relations
and qualities. Thus, within a culture of adversarialism, the nurturing relations and qualities
that are requisites of effective parenthood, education, and various caring professions tend to
12 Refer, for example, to discussions in Moulton, "Adversary Method", and Lakoff, Language and Woman's
Place.
13 Refer, for example, to discussions in Reardon, Women and Peace, and Brocke-Utne, Feminist Perspectives.
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be devalued across the board. The cooperative and reciprocal relations that are requisites of
mutual accomplishment and collective capacity also tend to be devalued. And finally, the
peaceful relations that are requisites of community and security also tend to be devalued.
Devaluing these relations and qualities, in turn, has dual consequences. On the one hand, as
discussed above, by delegating most of the roles requiring these qualities to women, women
are discriminated against through their association with these devalued roles. On the other
hand, the devaluation of these qualities simultaneously creates a disincentive for men to
develop them, and, as a consequence, the halfof the population that still largely holds the
reins of public affairs brings a deficit of nurturing, caring, and cooperative skills to their
positions of power in society.
In all of these ways, the culture of adversarialism tends to subordinate women to men
within a gender hierarchy while simultaneously inhibiting the development of nurturing and
cooperative capacities in those at the top of that hierarchy. The social implications of both of
these tendencies, in tum, extend throughout both the private and public spheres. Thus we
live in an era in which the nurturing work of stay-at-home parents, whether mothers or
fathers, does not even register in our accounting of economic productivity and social well-
being. 14 We live in an era in which two-income families are becoming the norm while child-
care workers, who are increasingly caring for children during their formative years, are
among the lowest paid workers in society. 15 And we live in an era in which perpetual
14 Refer, for example, to discussions in Folbre, ed., The Economics ofthe Family; Bakker, Unpaid Work;
Blau, The Economics ofWomen, Men, and Work; Gardiner, Gender, Care, and Economics; DeVault,
Feeding the Family; and Beasley, Feminist Economics.
15 Refer, for example, to Heston, Weiner, and Helbum, eds., Silent Crisis; Child Care Human Resources
Steering Committee, Our Child Care Workforce; and Centre for the Child Care Workforce, Worthy Work.
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preparations for war divert scarce resources away from public health, education, and other
investments in social welfare, on a massive and unprecedented scale. 16
However, on the margins of this (arguably male) culture of adversarialism, which
valorizes aggression, competition, and power struggles, many female theorists have
articulated an alternative discourse on social relations and power. 17 This discourse, which
can be traced back several generations, reveals distinctly non-adversarial ways of thinking
and talking about power relations. For instance, in the 1940s, in language foreshadowing the
discussion in Chapter II, Mary Parker Follett articulated a distinction between "coercive" and
"coactive" power, or "power over" and "power with". 18 Follett argued that the usual
understanding of power relations as coercive was limited and problematic. She argued
instead for an expanded understanding - a "conception of power-with, a jointly developed
power, a co-active, not a coercive power" - that could serve as a new normative basis for
social and political relations. 19
This distinction was soon echoed by other female theorists, including Dorothy Emmett in
the 1950s and Hannah Arendt in the 1960s?0 In Arendt's words, "power corresponds to the
human ability not just to act but to act in concert".21 The simplistic conflation of power with
domination, she warned, results "in a kind of blindness" to human social reality.22 "It is only
16 Refer, for instance, to Sivard, Brauer, Lumpe, and Walker, World Military and Social Expenditures.
17 I use the termfemale rather thanfeminist here because the earliest women to articulate an alternative
discourse on power did not tend to self-identify as feminists. However, the gender of these authors was not
incidental to the theories they articulated, and many subsequent feminist authors explicitly drew on their
work, as the discussion below demonstrates.
18 Follett, "Power", pp. 101-16.
19 Ibid., p. 101.
20 Emmet, "The Concept of Power"; Arendt, On Violence.
21 Arendt, On Violence, p. 44.
22 Ibid., p. 43.
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after one ceases to reduce public affairs to the business of dominion", she thus asserted, that
"human affairs will appear, or rather, reappear, in their authentic diversity".23
In the 1970s, this distinction was picked up again by prominent theorists such as Jean
Baker Miller. The word power, Miller wrote, has
acquired certain connotations [that] imply certain modes of behaviour more typical of men than
women. But it may be that these modes are not necessary or essential to [its] meaning. Like all
concepts and actions of a dominant group, "power" may have been distorted and skewed. It has
rested almost solely in the hands of people who have lived with a constant need to maintain an
irrational dominance; and in their hands it has acquired overtones of tyranny. 24
"It is important then", Miller argues, "to look into some of the meanings of power... to
see whether, as women struggle in the economic, political, and other fields, they can redefine
power".25 As she explains:
Women have exerted enormous powers in their traditional role of fostering growth in others, and
they have found that empowering others is a valuable and gratifying activity. Empowering other
people, however, does not fit accepted conceptualizations and definitions of power... Women's
views have [thus] not been taken into account in most studies ofpower.26
Miller, in turn, advocates a broad redefinition of power based on the "capacity to produce
change", which includes activities such as "nurturing" and "empowering others,,?7 "To be
powerful in ways that simultaneously enhance, rather than diminish, the power of others",
she concludes, "is a radical tum - a very different motivation than the concept of power upon
which this world has operated". 28
In the 1980s and 1990s, efforts to redefine power in less masculine ways began to echo
Ibid., pp. 43-44.
24 Miller, Toward a New Psychology ofWomen, p. 115.
Ibid., p. 116.
26 Miller, "Women and Power", p. 1.
27
28
Ibid., pp. 1-2.
Ibid., p. 5.
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throughout an emerging body of feminist literature.29 In a review of "the feminist theory of
power",30 Nancy Hartsock concludes that
theories of power put forward by women rather than men differ systematically from the
understanding of power as domination. While few women have theorized about power, their
theories bear a striking similarity... 31
The common thread ... is the writer's concern to argue against the understanding of power as
dominance or domination; to attempt to point to other meanings of the term more associated with
ability, capacity, and competence; to urge reconsideration of assumptions about power.
Theorizations of power such as these have become widespread in the literature of the
contemporary women's movement. .. 32
Women's stress on power not as domination but as capacity, on power as a capacity of the
community as a whole, suggests that women's experience of connection and relation have
consequences for understandings of power and may hold resources for a more liberatory
d d· 33un erstan mg.
As these authors demonstrate, numerous feminist theorists and activists have drawn
distinctions between (arguably masculine) "power over" and "power against" relations and
(arguably feminine) "power to" or "power with" relations. They have attempted, in other
words, to articulate an alternative discourse on power - new ways of thinking and talking
about human relations which validate corresponding ways of enacting such relations. Unlike
many other power theorists, however, who draw such distinctions in order to dismiss "power
to" conceptions as irrelevant to serious critical inquiry,34 the feminists discussed above have
drawn such distinctions precisely for the purposes of focusing attention on the relevance of
non-adversarial relations of power to critical inquiry.
29 Hence Kramarae and Treichler state in their Feminist Dictionary, p. 351, that the term power has been
"conceptualized by men as assertion and aggression, by women as nurturance".
30 Hartsock's own phrase from Feminist Historical Materialism, p. 224.
Ibid., p. 210.
32 Ibid., p. 224.
Ibid., p. 253.
34 Refer back to discussion in Chapter II.
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Moreover, in their efforts to translate theory into practice, the feminist movement has
made slow but steady progress on a number of fronts. Throughout most Western cultures, at
least, aggression against women, despite its lingering presence, has been dragged out of the
shadows of private life and into the light of public condemnation and criminal prosecution.
Likewise, the role of fathers in the nurturing of children, despite lingering cultural taboos and
ongoing gender disparities in domestic labour, is gradually being recognized and valued in
many segments of the population. The advancement of women in the workplace, despite the
continuing legacies of male chauvinism in many sectors, is slowly bringing the goal of equal
opportunity within reach for the first time in the history of Western civilization. The
emergence of women at the forefront of international efforts for peace and security, despite
the continued elusiveness of these goals in a world still dominated by nationalism and
militarism, has lent tremendous impetus, insight, and commitment to this historical pursuit.35
Similarly, the entrance of women into the formal political arena, despite the partisan electoral
filters they must pass through and the partisan decision-making processes they must work
within, is at least gradually widening the range of interests, values, and perspectives
represented in many public policy-making processes.
In these and many other ways, feminist thought is increasingly expanding the
contemporary social imagination even as feminist practice is increasingly permeating
contemporary social institutions. Much of this thought and practice stands in stark contrast
to the normative adversarialism that has characterized male-dominated Western cultures for
35 Refer to Alonso, Peace as a Women's Issue, and Boulding, Women, for histories of female leadership in the
peace movement. See also Reardon, Women and Peace, and Ruddick, Maternal Thinking, for insightful
discussions of the "politics of peace" that many women are engaged in.
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centuries.36 Of course, this is not to suggest that these feminist projects are complete. Nor is
it to suggest that all feminist thought and practice is non-adversarial. In general, however,
contemporary feminists tend at least to be unified in their rejection of the "power over"
relations that have characterized male-dominated Western cultures throughout Western
history, as identified in the lower left quadrant of Figure 2. Moreover, this is generally the
case whether these relations involve the exercise of power over women or any other social
group.37 In addition, many feminists also extend their critique to include more general
"power against" relations, as identified in both the upper left and lower left quadrants in the
same figure. 38 These feminists are working to cultivate alternative, non-adversarial models
of thought and practice in their homes, their workplaces, and in the broader societies they
inhabit. And although these efforts are still culturally marginalized in many respects, they
provide at least a partial glimpse of, and theoretical basis for, an alternative set of cultural
codes.
Systems Theory
Like feminist theorists, many systems theorists have also articulated a number of
36 Chinn, Peace and Power, contains insightful discussions of several non-adversarial feminist practices.
37 This point is made by many feminists. Refer, for instance, to Warren and Cady, "Feminism and Peace";
Warren, "Power and Promise"; hooks, Feminist Theory and Talking Back; and Wood, Gendered Lives.
38 For instance, theorists such as Mansbridge, Beyond Adversary Democracy, have articulated insightful
critiques of the partisan-adversarial nature of Western political systems. As Frazer notes in "Feminist
Political Theory", p. 58, "like socialists, many feminists have hoped and aimed for genuinely autonomous
collective self-governance, governance by reason. In their case, though, there is an extra reason for
repudiating politics in its traditional sense - that is, its historic association with masculinity. As a social
and political movement, feminism has rejected traditional forms oforganization, especially the party form".
In addition, many female and feminist theorists have also been at the forefront of movements to create
alternatives to the legal adversary system, to move from competitive to cooperative educational models,
and so forth. Refer, for instance, to discussions in Menkel-Meadow, "Transformation of Disputes" and
"Trouble With the Adversary System"; Taslitz, Rape and the Culture ofthe Courtroom; Brocke-Utne,
Feminist Perspectives; and Reardon, ed., Learning Peace.
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alternatives to the culture of adversarialism, derived from the "relational paradigms" that
tend to characterize the study of complex systems. In this context, some feminist scholars
have noted a clear link between systems theory and feminism. As Ellsberg and Melamed
explain:
Connections of all kinds interest women and we grasp them readily. Men find this ability
mysterious and label it "women's intuition". This makes it sound like something other than
thinking, but in fact it is a perfectly respectable intellectual approach called "systems thinking"
when men do it,39
In contrast to the reductionist focus of much contemporary science, systems theory
adopts a holistic or systemic focus that reveals the connections or inter-relations within a
system. When applied to social systems, this focus yields valuable insights into social
relations, including relations of power. Based on these insights, many systems theorists have
articulated alternatives to the normative adversarialism that tends to characterize Western
societies. In order to grasp the rationale for these alternatives, it is helpful to first review a
number of basic premises of systems theory. 40
The fundamental premise of systems theory is that different types of complex systems -
physical, biological, psychological, social, and so forth - exhibit many structural and
functional similarities. Foremost among these are the properties of wholeness and
interdependence. Complex systems are integrated wholes that are more than the mere sum of
their parts. In systems terminology, complex systems are characterized by emergent
properties that do not characterize any of their component parts in isolation. These emergent
properties are made possible by the internal interdependence of a system's parts, which exist
39 Ellsberg and Melamed, "Emperor's New Clothes", p. 88.
40 For overviews of this field refer to Bertalanffy, General Systems Theory; Skyttner, General Systems
Theory: An Introduction; and Englehart, Systems Theory.
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within complex networks of relationships with one another, characterized by mutual
influence and interchange.
In dynamic systems, these emergent properties include the capacity to self-regulate,
change, and adapt by responding to positive and negative feedback. Some change and
adaptation is incremental, linear, and determinate, as in the regulation of heat within a
mammalian body or the gradual course adjustments of a predator pursuing its prey.
Transformative change and evolutionary adaptation, however, tend to be characterized by
sudden, non-linear, and often chaotic adaptations, as in the transformation of a liquid to a
gas, the evolution of new species, or the revolution of a socio-political system. Through
these punctuated and unpredictable changes, evolutionary systems adapt to changing
conditions by developing new subsystems, new relations between existing subsystems, and
new relations between the system and its larger environment or suprasystem.
In this regard, systems theorists assert that various teleological similarities tend to
characterize evolutionary systems: They tend to develop from small scales, minimal
dynamism, and low levels of organizational complexity, to larger scales, greater dynamism,
and increasing levels of organizational complexity. These similarities can be seen in the
growth and development of individual organisms as well as in the evolution of species. They
can also be seen in the psychological development of human minds as well as the socio-
political evolution of social systems.
Finally, given the emergent properties discussed above, dynamic evolutionary systems
are often understood as functional unities. They perform various functions that their
component parts could not perform alone. For instance, a cell can metabolize energy while
its component elements, in isolation, cannot. An organ can perform specialized
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physiological functions that its component cells, in isolation, cannot. A living organism can
reproduce itself while its component organs, in isolation, cannot. And a species can evolve
while individual organisms, in isolation, cannot. Each of these functions is made possible
through increasing levels of system complexity and integration.
In this context, many systems theorists and others also conceptualize human societies as
"functional unities" - at least potentially. Within this tradition offunctionalist social theory,
however, interpretations vary widely regarding the functionality of existing social systems.
On the one hand, many conventional theorists have argued that contemporary Western social,
political, and economic systems are highly functional. 41 In this context, functionalism has
frequently served as a framework of apologetics for Western civilization: Capitalism has
thus been described as the most functional economic system possible, due to its alleged
capacity to maximize the satisfaction of diverse material interests; partisan democracy has
thus been described as the most functional system of governance possible, due to its alleged
capacity to maximize the satisfaction of diverse political interests; and so forth.
In contrast to this conventional functionalism, however, more critical functionalists have
concluded, in essence, that contemporary Western social systems are largely dysfunctional.
While conventional functionalists provide normative justifications for the status quo, critical
functionalists provide normative justifications for social reform. They study the dysfunction
and internal contradictions of existing social systems - the extent to which they are unjust,
inequitable, inadequate, or unsustainable - in order to prescribe more functional alternatives.
41 The writings of Talcott Parsons are among the most prominent examples of such conventional functionalist
thought. Refer, for example, to Parsons, "Power and the Social System". For an excellent overview of
Parsonian functionalism, refer also to Giddens, " 'Power' in the Recent Writings of Talcott Parsons".
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For instance, many critical functionalists have asserted that contemporary systems of mass
media are largely dysfunctional because they do not facilitate the flow of information and
public discussion needed within systems of democratic self-government.42 Others have
aimed their critique even more broadly at the entire system of contemporary capitalist
economics, which appears to be undermining the conditions of its own existence. The
current economic system, they argue, must either perish or adapt, because it is not
sustainable. 43 Still other critical functionalists have concluded that partisan political systems
are dysfunctional as means of democratic government because, in addition to spawning
citizen apathy and withdrawal from public life, political parties are not even effective at
doing what they are supposed to do best, such as interest articulation and aggregation,
linkage and representation, and the efficient organization of government. As Lyons asserts:
There is far more "dysfunction" than "function" in the operation of parties ... there are sufficient
weaknesses in party performance to justify a search for better means to represent citizenry and to
organize government... These weaknesses are evident without even venturing into the important
argument that the competitive party model inhibits the development of a participant culture with
the personal and social enrichment this could mean in a now excessively privatized society. The
competitive party model stands condemned solely through an examination ofthe "strengths"
claimed for it. 44
Systems theory models have been explicitly adopted as a means ofcritiquing media functions by scholars
such as Meadows, "Changing the World Through the Informationsphere", and Parker, Environmental
Communication. Many other media scholars, though not systems theorists, and while often critical of the
Parsonian functionalism alluded to in the previous footnote, implicitly adopt a critical functionalist
perspective, as defmed above. Refer, for instance, to Dahlgren, Television and the Public Sphere; Kellner,
Crisis ofDemocracy; Curran, "Mass Media and Democracy Revisited"; Baker, Advertising and a
Democratic Press; Gitlin, "Bifurcation of American Politics"; and Hackett and Zhao, Sustaining
Democracy.
43 The classic critical systems analysis ofeconomic unsustainability was articulated by the Club of Rome, The
Limits to Growth. For more current analyses in the same vein, refer to Kassiola, Death ofIndustrial
Civilization; Gans, Endogenous Limits; Stuart, "On the Limits to Growth"; Mishan, The Costs ofEconomic
Growth; Jacobs, Green Economy; Douthwaite, Growth Illusion; and Ekins, Green Economics.
44 Lyon, "The Future of Parties", pp. 115-18.
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In this context, other critical functionalists have identified more generalized expressions
of adversarialism as further sources of social dysfunction. For example, in a series of
"heretical reflections on today's values, culture and politics", systems theorist Ervin Laslo
identified a number of internal dysfunctions that characterize contemporary social systems.45
Included among these are idealized norms of aggression, competitive acquisition, and
unregulated competition. In place of these norms, Laslo calls for a reorientation of basic
human relationships from adversarial "negative-sum" and "zero-sum" relations toward
cooperative "positive-sum" relations.46 Using the current international order to illustrate his
point, Laslo explains that
the remarkable feature of international relations in an age of interdependence is that the basic
long-term processes present potentials for positive-sum games. Regrettably, national leaders
intent on gaining short-term advantages for their own countries in an atmosphere of mutual
distrust, if not hostility, are not playing such games. For example, the international balance of
power gives rise to a game which is at best a zero-sum; the gains of one side balance with the
losses of others. This can degenerate into a negative-sum game with the outbreak of large-scale
war... Yet the situation could be transformed into a positive sum game with the establishment of
a system of world security through disarmament and mutually agreed upon peacekeeping. No
nation would risk being damaged or wiped out, and all could spend the major part of the huge
sums which now go to defence and the military on projects of concrete human benefit,47
Echoing Laslo, Boulding has articulated a non-adversarial or "integrative" theory of
power, which he hopes will provide a more functional way ofthinking and talking about
social relations in general in an age ofinterdependence.48 "Integrative power", Boulding
Laszlo, Inner Limits. Laszlo uses the phrase inner limits to describe these internal dysfunctions - a phrase
intended to contrast with the external/environmental "limits to growth" identified in the 1972 study by the
Club of Rome.
46 Laszlo, Inner Limits, pp. 109-15. Negative-sum, zero-sum, and positive-sum relations are mathematical
game-theory terms that refer respectively to relationships in which both players lose, in which the gains of
one player are balanced by the losses of the other, or in which both players gain or win.
47 Laszlo, Inner Limits, p. 112.
48 Boulding, Three Faces ofPower. Kenneth Boulding's work is an interesting case study in marginalization
within the culture ofadversarialism. Through the course of his life, Boulding served as president of six
major scholarly societies that spanned the social sciences. He wrote more than 30 books, published
(footnote continued on next page)
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explains, is "the capacity to build organizations, to create families and groups, to inspire
loyalty, to bind people together, to develop legitimacy".49 According to Boulding, it
embodies cooperation, friendship, collective identity, the growth of a sense of community,
and the ability to create and pursue constructive images of the future together. 50 These
depend, in turn, on even more fundamental human capacities such as reciprocity, respect,
love, and the belief that one's own welfare is increased through an increase in the welfare of
others.51 Drawing on his background in systems theory, economics, and peace research, as
well as his experience as a Quaker, Boulding concludes that functional social and political
systems can only be constructed on the normative basis of these integrative power relations.
Even though he acknowledges the appropriateness of adversarial power relations in some
limited contexts, Boulding argues that contemporary world conditions demand a much wider
recognition of "the great importance of integrative power" in human affairs. 52 His theory of
integrative power thus represents an effort to cultivate a new discourse on power, similar to
the feminist efforts discussed above, by articulating a new vocabulary for thinking and
talking about social relations.
From the perspectives of Laslo, Boulding, and other like-minded theorists, adversarial
relations appear as a historical anachronism in human societies. Militarism, nationalism,
hundreds ofchapters and articles, and was the recipient of 33 honorary degrees and a variety of other
awards. Despite his reputation and accomplishments, however, Boulding's integrative theory ofpower has
had minimal impact on the contemporary theorization of power. Social theorists might argue that
Boulding's theory had little impact because it had little validity. An alternative explanation suggested by
the analysis in this dissertation, however, is that it had little impact because it was not consistent with the
common sense "realism" constructed by the culture ofadversarialism.
49 Boulding, Three Faces ofPower, p. 25.
50 .Ibid., pp. 109, 121-122, 182,211.
Ibid., pp. 110-115.
52 Ibid., p. 250.
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sectarianism, racism, competitive materialism, and other expressions of social dysfunction
reflect a failure to adapt to changing historical conditions - a failure to model social systems
according to the "positive sum" or "integrative" relations needed to promote collective
human interests in an age of increasing interdependence. Moreover, drawing on the
principles of evolutionary system dynamics discussed above, these theorists offer an image
of what the transition to a more functional society might look like: a non-linear and chaotic
or disruptive process characterized by punctuated adaptations to changing conditions. As
Laslo explains, social systems, like other complex dynamic systems,
have definite upper limits of stability which, when reached and transgressed, produce a
breakdown in their internal structure. Order is replaced by chaos, but chaos does not mean
randomness and a total absence of order. Chaos is often (though not in every case) the waystation
to a new form of order, arising through a sudden phase-change known as a "bifurcation". The
new variety of order is often better adapted to the surroundings in which the system finds itself
than the previous variety.53
In the context of the discussion at hand, theorists such as Laslo argue that the culture of
adversarialism is reaching its "upper limits of stability" due to conditions of increasing
population growth, technological development, resource scarcity, and global
interdependency. At the same time, the resultant breakdown of the old adversarial order
offers the possibility of radical new cultural adaptations. However, as Laslo himself points
out, evolutionary dynamics are no guarantee of successful adaptation.
The fact that we can extrapolate historical development on the basis of the new systems sciences
does not mean that the extrapolation has the force of necessity in the real world. This forecast of
the future offers no guarantee of its own realization. The reason is that the evolutionary logic
exhibited in history, the same as the evolutionary logic in the sphere of nature, is based on
probability and not on necessity.... The evolutionary prospect comes "on line" if, but only if, we
transcend our inner limits - the limits that chain us to today's world, with its obsolete modes of
53 Laszlo, Inner Limits, p. 123.
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The new ways of thinking and acting articulated by Laslo, Boulding, and other systems
theorists stand in stark contrast to the codes of adversarialism that dominate Western thought
and action. The new discourse on social relations that they articulate thus rejects "power
over" and "power against" relations, as identified in the left quadrants of Figure 2, as largely
dysfunctional and anachronistic. In their place, they articulate non-adversarial or
"integrative" alternatives. And although this alternative discourse is still culturally
marginalized, it provides a further glimpse of, and theoretical basis for, alternatives to the
codes of adversarialism.
Ecology / Environmentalism
Like many feminists and systems theorists, many ecologists and environmentalists have
also articulated various critiques of adversarialism from which alternative cultural codes can
be derived. These environmental critiques take two related forms. First, the science of
ecology offers many conceptual insights that have been incorporated into an emerging,
largely non-adversarial, ecological worldview. Second, environmental activism has yielded
many grounded political insights regarding the ecological dysfunction of partisan/adversarial
political systems and practices. Each of these sets of insights will be discussed in tum below.
Conceptually, ecology is closely related to the general systems theory discussed above. It
has both drawn from and contributed to systems theory. Accordingly, concepts of holism
and interdependence are also central concepts in ecology. Ecology, however, and the
environmental movement it has spawned, have arguably been much more influential in
54 Ibid., pp. 128-129.
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popularizing these insights than has systems theory. In the last quarter of the twentieth
century, holism and interdependence have become central concepts in an emerging
ecological worldview - an "environmental consciousness" - that is changing not only the
way people think and talk about the natural environment but also the way many people think
and talk about the social environment.
In this context, holism and interdependence are increasingly used as intuitive metaphors
for understanding human societies. The "social ecology" metaphors that derive from these
concepts focus attention on the complex webs of interconnection and mutual influence that
characterize relations betWeen individuals and groups in society. 55 In these complex webs of
interdependence, adversarialism appears as a counterproductive or even destructive social
norm. For instance, complex links are known to exist between oppression, poverty,
population growth, environmental degradation, food scarcity, social conflict, political
instability, and war. Although the exact nature ofthese links is disputed, many observers are
beginning to conclude that through these complex interconnections, the oppression and
impoverishment of any population affects all members of the larger social ecology. This can
be seen, for example, in the close association between poverty and population growth, which
in turn are associated with environmental degradation and food scarcity - conditions that
keep societies in perpetual states of conflict and insecurity. These states of conflict and
insecurity, in turn, result in police and military expenditures that burden all members of
society - rich and poor, oppressors and oppressed - while merely entrenching cycles of
55 The idea of "social ecology" and the application of the principle of holism to human affairs has been
discussed, for instance, in Porritt, Seeing Green; Thompson, ed., Gaia, A Way ofKnowing; Spretnak and
Capra, Green Politics; Seward, "Green Democracy"; and Lemkow, The Wholeness Principle.
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conflict and insecurity without addressing their root causes. The "power over" and "power
against" relations that cause and characterize these cycles thus appear incompatible with a
holistic understanding of social interdependence.
In contrast to these adversarial relations, an ecological worldview tends to emphasize the
fundamental importance of mutualism and symbiosis - two more key ecological concepts.
For even though nature is characterized by a degree of competition, aggression, and
predation, the science of ecology suggests that mutualism and symbiosis are equally if not
more fundamental ecological dynamics. The conditions that sustain planetary life as we
know it are only made possible through the mutualistic production and exchange of oxygen
and carbon dioxide between plants and animals. The pollination of most flowering species is
made possible through mutualistic or symbiotic exchanges with pollinating insects.
Symbiotic relationships permit the exchange of nitrogen and other essential nutrients within
complex networks of soil micro-organisms and terrestrial plant roots that sustain entire
ecosystems. Even digestion in many animals, including humans, is facilitated by the
presence of symbiotic intestinal micro-organisms. As these examples illustrate, mutualism
and symbiosis are fundamental ecological dynamics.
Moreover, where aggression and predation do occur in nature, they tend to characterize
inter-species rather than intra-species relations. Even the aggressive intra-species mating
behaviours that some animals engage in tend to be ritualized displays that seldom result in
actual injury. In contrast, among all ofthe "social" species (from ants and bees to wolves
and primates), humans are unique in the range and extent of the intra-species aggression we
exhibit. Many evolutionary theorists have thus concluded that intra-species aggression
among humans is culturally learned rather than biologically determined; that humans have
134
the cultural capacity for both mutualism and aggression; and that in an age of increasing
interdependence, a shift from a culture of aggression to a culture of mutualism is
imperative.56
Another ecological concept from which social analogies have been drawn is the principle
of ecological diversity. In nature, diversity is generally considered a source of ecological
health and stability. By analogy, the same is arguably true within the social ecology. From
this perspective, culturally learned behaviours and attitudes such as racism, sexism, and
nationalism are antithetical to an ecological worldview because they are intolerant of
diversity. In contrast, rather than viewing difference as a cause for conflict and antagonism,
an ecological worldview suggests that differences should be valued and nourished as a source
of social strength and stability. Diversity, in other words, need not result in adversity.
Moreover, it is not only physical diversity that is valued within an ecological worldview,
but also diversity of perspective. In this context, the science of ecology has also articulated a
non-adversarial epistemology.57 This model derives from early tensions within the discipline,
when two divergent theoretical approaches arose. On the one hand, many ecologists focused
on inter-relations between discrete organisms and populations of organisms and gave
minimal attention to systemic factors such as nutrient cycles or energy flows. On the other
hand, other ecologists focused on nutrient cycles, energy flows, and other system-level, bio-
56 These conclusions are clearly expressed, for instance, in Seville, "Statement on Violence" - a joint
statement signed by twenty prominent biological and social scientists from around the world during the
United Nations International Year of Peace. This statement categorically refutes the assertion that
adversarial behaviours such as war, violence, and aggression are products of our evolutionary heritage and
therefore innate to human nature. While acknowledging the human capacity for these behaviours, the
statement asserts that humans have an equal, if not greater, capacity for cooperation and that this latter
capacity can and must be more systematically cultivated.
57 The following discussion is particularly indebted to Warren and Cheney, "Ecological Feminism and
Ecosystem Ecology".
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physical processes and paid little attention to discrete living organisms. In an effort to
reconcile these tensions, many contemporary ecologists have begun to adopt a framework
that views both of these approaches as complementary rather than oppositional. This
inclusive framework rejects the view that there is only one way to describe ecological
systems and instead acknowledges that ecosystem complexity requires diverse conceptual
frameworks that yield distinct but complementary "observation sets". This more holistic
epistemology allows ecologists to simultaneously talk about autonomous living organisms
and functionally integrated bio-physical systems, even though neither can be reduced to the
other. As Warren and Cheney explain, it
permits meaningful discussion of discrete (and, in varying degrees and modes, autonomous)
individual objects as well as of whole systems... it encourages a network or relational view of
organisms, whether conceived as "knots in a biospherical web of relationships" or as separate
(although not isolated or solitary) discrete individuals, members of species, populations, or
communities. In both cases, ecosystems are networks, either networks of interacting individuals,
populations, and communities or of interacting energy flows and nutrient flows and cycles.58
The science of ecology thus provides an epistemological model for the reconciliation of
"oppositional" viewpoints. As Warren and Cheney again explain, it provides
a framework for viewing historically opposed approaches as complementary. Dualisms fade into
the complexity of multiple vantage points and find complementarity where once there was only
oppositionality... This rejection of oppositional polarities is accomplished not by reducing
population-community to process-functional accounts, or vice versa, or by reducing both to a still
more basic or primitive ontological framework; it is accomplished by providing a unifying
framework for studying and relating to one another various analyses, each with their own
epistemology and context-dependent ontology. As a "unified theory" it is a unity which does not
erase difference.59
The transformation ofopposition into complementarity, through an appreciation of the
Warren and Cheney, "Ecological Feminism and Ecosystem Ecology", p. 253, parenthesis in the original.
This history of competing paradigms in ecology is reminiscent of the early wave/particle debates in
physics, which similarly resulted in the emergence of a complementarity model of human observation.
59 Ibid., p. 252, italics in the original.
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necessity ofmultiple viewpoints, provides yet another non-adversarial model for social
relations. Together with the other conceptual insights discussed above - holism,
interdependence, mutualism, symbiosis, diversity, and so forth - this epistemological
acceptance of multiple perspectives reinforces the non-adversarial nature of the ecological
worldview that has been emerging in recent decades.
In addition to these conceptual insights, several decades of environmental activism have
also yielded a number of grounded political insights. For instance, despite their political
engagement and activism, some environmentalists have concluded that competitive/partisan
political systems are basically dysfunctional as systems of ecological stewardship.60 As
Bak:vis and Nevitte explain:
The standard literature on partisanship argues that high levels of interest, education, participation,
and the like are intercorrelated and collectively increase the likelihood of both acquiring a
partisan identity and strengthening such an identity. The literature on environmentalism, and
more broadly the "new politics" model, suggests something rather different. Not only are
environmentalists disenchanted with the traditional parties, but they also have a pronounced
disinclination to develop loyalties to any parties whatsoever... [in favour of an] a-partisan, even
• • • • 61
anti-partisan onentatlOn.
The reasons for this a-partisan or anti-partisan orientation among many environmentalists
are manifold. On one level, most environmental issues require long-term planning and
commitment. Competitive political systems, however, are generally constrained by short-
term political horizons. In order to gain and maintain power, political entrepreneurs (whether
they are associated with formal parties or not) must generally cater to the immediate interests
of their constituents so that visible results can be realized within relatively frequent election
cycles. Even when long-term political commitments are made out of principle by one
60 Refer, for example, to the discussion in Lyon, "Green Politics".
Bakvis and Nevitte, "Greening", pp. 158-59.
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candidate or party, continuity is often compromised by succeeding candidates or parties who
dismantle or fail to enforce the programs of their predecessors in order to distance themselves
from policies they were previously compelled to oppose (i.e., on the campaign trail or as the
voice of opposition).62 Furthermore, the focus of campaigns and political parties on
constituencies-in-the-present tends to undermine commitment to the interests of future
generations. Prominent among the interests of future generations, of course, is
environmental sustainability. However, in the ongoing contest of gaining and maintaining
political power in the present, candidates and political parties generally cannot afford to
address issues of sustainability - especially when sustainability might require sacrifices from
the present generation. In all of these ways, partisan political systems are not structured for
effective long-term ecological stewardship.
Some environmentalists also argue that adversarial political debate is too reductionist for
effective ecological decision making.63 Environmental issues are generally highly complex
issues with myriad social and ecological dimensions. Adversarial debate, however, has in-
built tendencies toward reductionism. In contrast to the ecological epistemology discussed
above, in which multiple viewpoints are valued and an effort is made to view apparent
oppositions as complementary perspectives, the opposite tends to characterize an adversarial
epistemology. Adversarial debate - especially in the political arena - is generally structured
to frame perspectives in oppositional and irreconcilable terms, thus reducing complex issues
62 Of course, the ability to change course is an important feature of any democratic system. However, the
motives for changing course must be considered. In this context, as the discussion in Chapter V suggests,
non-partisan models of democratic decision making may preserve the capacity to change course without the
partisan motives and posturing that underlies much contemporary decision making.
63 Refer to Blondel, Political Parties, pp. 19-21, for a discussion of"the curse ofoversimplification" that
characterizes partisan politics.
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to one-dimensional positional arguments. This reductionism is reinforced by the emotional
sloganeering required of competing politicians in an age of mass-mediated sound-bite
politics. Simplistic political mantras such as "jobs versus the environment" thus echo
through the public sphere, distorting the complex nature of the issues at hand and
constraining the social imagination. In all of these ways, the reductionism of adversarial
debate within the political arena arguably renders government even more environmentally
dysfunctional.64
Furthermore, many environmentalists reject competitive politics because of its structured
subordination to the capitalist economy.65 As discussed in Chapter III, partisan systems of
government are both modeled after and closely integrated with the competitive free market
economy.66 The expenses and pressures of fund raising and campaign financing, media and
public relations management, as well as lobbying and political action committees, all
subordinate competitive political processes to economic imperatives - with significant
implications for the environment. On the one hand, many established and powerful
industries derive their profits from environmentally destructive practices, and through
campaign financing, lobbying, and media strategies, these industries have tremendous power
to frame the terms of environmental policy debate as well as stifle it before it arises. On the
Similar arguments have also been made about adversariallitigation. For instance, Tidmarsh and Transgrud
state that "in complex litigation, the adversarial process functions poorly, if at all: there are so many parties,
documents, facts, and/or issues that the lawyers, the litigants, and the jury are simply incapable of
performing the tasks which the adversarial process has traditionally assigned to them" (Tidmarsh and
Transgrud, Complex Litigation, p. v). See also Strick, Injustice For All, for a discussion of the
reductionism of the legal adversary system.
65 Refer, for example, to Barry, Rethinking Green Politics.
66 In Western socIeties that pride themselves on the separation of church and state, it is interesting to note that
so little attention is given to the need to separate market and state (Le., to shield public decision making
from the dictates and pressures of powerful economic interests).
67
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other hand, those segments of the population who tend to suffer the most from the effects of
environmental degradation - namely the poor, ethnic minorities, and women (who are
statistically more likely to live and work in areas of increased environmental health risks and
degradation) - are least able to influence political decision making due to their relative
economic disenfranchisement.67 As a result, environmental practices that are seldom
tolerated in the backyards of more affluent segments of the population are commonplace
among populations that are politically and economically marginalized.68 In these and many
other ways, the subordination of the political sphere to the economic sphere renders
competitive political systems even more dysfunctional as a means of environmental
stewardship.
Moreover, the ecological dysfunction of competitive political systems within nations is
compounded by rivalries and antagonisms between nations. As environmentalists have long
pointed out, the transboundary nature of many modem environmental issues (e.g., ozone
depletion, global warming, acid rain, water pollution, the management of migratory species),
signals the need for unprecedented levels of global cooperation and coordination.69
One could argue, of course, that the real problem is the unequal distribution of economic resources, not
adversarial politics. Indeed, in this regard many Marxist analyses suggest that structural economic reforms
are a precondition of the creation of more just, humane, and sustainable systems ofgovernance. However,
as the discussion in Chapter V suggests, the reverse may in fact be the case. Because the redistribution of
economic resources is fundamentally a political process (i.e., it requires a system of governance capable of
regulating capital accumulation and eliminating extreme economic disparities), it is equally plausible to
suggest that the structural transformation of the political sphere is a precondition of meaningful economic
reform. This is precisely the analysis offered by the Baha'i International Community, as discussed in more
detail in Chapter V.
68
"Environmental Racism" and other forms of discriminatory environmental policy and practice are well
documented phenomena. Refer, for instance, to Heiman, Race, Waste and Class; Nordquist,
Environmental Racism; Petrikin, Environmental Justice; and Bullard, ed., Confronting Environmental
Racism.
69 The seminal statement of this thesis was made by the United Nation's World Commission on Environment
and Development in their report Our Common Future.
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Anachronistic models of national sovereignty, however, render the existing international
(dis)order virtually incapable of responding to these new ecological imperatives. Within the
existing international system, sustainability is sacrificed to the pursuit of immediate national
self-interests, as nations aggressively compete with one another by converting long-term
ecological capital into short-term economic gains.70
Beyond these economic rivalries, many environmentalists also point out the ecological
dysfunction of military rivalries between nations. Even in the absence of actual warfare, the
.production and stockpiling of weapons, as well as the training and maintenance of huge
permanent standing armies, exacts a tremendous ecological toll. In addition to diverting
massive amounts ofmaterial and human resources from socially and ecologically productive
endeavors, the military has one of the worst environmental records of any modem industry -
even in times ofpeace.71 In times of war, environmental costs are even higher. From the
defoliation of Vietnam to the burning of oil fields in the Persian Gulf War, ecological
destruction has increasingly become a legitimate military strategy. And many new military
technologies, including landmines, chemical and biological weapons, nuclear weapons, and
even conventional weapons now being manufactured out of radioactive waste material, are
all raising the environmental stakes of war. For the first time in history, humanity has
arguably developed the military capacity to render the planet uninhabitable for many species,
including our own. But even if such an apocalyptic scenario never plays itself out, we are
70 Moreover, in the absence ofeffective mechanisms for international regulation, economic globalization
merely exacerbates these ecologically destructive trends as increasingly powerful multinational
corporations operate on a global scale with almost complete environmental (as well as social) impunity.
71 Refer, for instance, to Dycus, National Defence and the Environment; Richardson, Effects ofWar on the
Environment; Klikonen, Green Security; McKinnon, Tides ofWar; Mirsche, "The Earth as Peace Teacher";
and Westing, ed., Environmental Hazards ofWar.
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already rendering large sections of the planet largely uninhabitable through the local and
regional destruction of countless military experiments, exercises, and confrontations.
To bring the discussion of militarism around full circle, many environmentalists also
point out that while war and preparation for war results in increasingly high levels of
environmental degradation, environmental degradation in tum results in increasingly high
levels of military insecurity and war.72 Even many revisionist defence analysts within the
dominant nationalist military paradigm are beginning to recognize that "environmental
security" is becoming an increasingly important factor in national security.73 Struggles for
clean water, arable land, and many other ecological resources may well become the most
significant sources of international conflict in the twenty-first century. Ironically, the
dysfunction of the international political order, traceable in part to the economic and military
rivalries discussed above, are root causes of this environmental insecurity. Adversarialism
thus begets insecurity which begets further adversarialism, in an ecologically (as well as
socially) dysfunctional spiral.
In the minds of many environmentalists, the inability of contemporary political
institutions to come to terms with the environment thus reflects more than the moral or
intellectual failure of individual politicians. Rather, the adversarial structures of competitive
politics, competitive nationalism, and militarism also playa role.74 This recognition suggests
72 Refer, for instance, to Bennett, ed., Greenwar; DeBardeleben and Hannigan, eds., Environmental Security;
and Klikt>nen, Green Security, and Klikt>nen, ed., Environmental Conflict.
73 Refer, for instance, to Walker, Security; Green, Military Implications ofGlobal Warming; Lowi and Shaw,
Environment and Security; Morris, Security Concerns; Myers, Ultimate Security; and the U.S. Department
of Defence, Defence Performance.
74 This is not to suggest that adversarial political practices are the primary objects of most environmental
critiques. Critiques of consumer culture, economic expansionism, technological/instrumental rationality,
and so forth, tend to be the central concerns of most environmentalists. Moreover, many environmentalists
clearly engage in various forms of adversarial politics, from organizing environmental parties (e.g., the
(footnote continued on next page)
75
142
a need for alternatives to the adversarialism that dominates the contemporary political sphere.
Accordingly, many environmentalists, while working for ecological stewardship, are also
working to cultivate more cooperative models of political practice. In fact, for all of the
reasons discussed above, peace and ecological sustainability are inseparable goals within an
ecological worldview.75 Nowhere is this more clearly demonstrated than in the phrase
"Greenpeace" - a phrase with deep symbolic resonance within the environmental
movement.76 As Jonathon Porritt explains in The Politics ofEcology:
To "see green" is to see all nations and all people, however divided or different they may appear,
as members of one interdependent human family, linked by their responsibility to each other and
to the care and maintenance ofour planet. The politics of ecology teaches us that all our
problems are global. We have only one planet at our disposal; learning to live in harmony with it,
and with all those with whom we share it, is the only item on today's political agenda that has any
l ··fi 77rea slgm lcance.
Finally, the nexus between peace and ecology is also echoed in much ecofeminist
literature. Ecofeminism emerged through a growing recognition that the same masculine
"power over" relations that result in the domination and exploitation of women also result in
the domination and exploitation of nature. In their efforts to articulate alternatives, many
ecofeminists implicitly link ecological concepts such as holism and interdependence with
Greens), to protests, civil disobedience, and even industrial sabotage. On the other hand, many elements of
the ecological worldview sketched above do support critiques ofadversarialism, and such critiques are
beginning to be articulated, both fonnally and infonnally, by environmentalists.
The inseparability of these issues has been explored by many writers. Refer, for instance, to Porritt, Seeing
Green; Milbrath, "Making Connections"; Spretnak and Capra, Green Politics; Shabecoff, New Namefor
Peace; Walker, Peace, Environment, and Development; Koehler, ed., Green Dialogue; Newcombe, Further
Reflections on Peace; Nordland, Ecological and Cooperative Education; Boggs, Shuman, and Sweig,
Conditions ofPeace; and George, Peace and the Ecological Ethic.
76 It is interesting to note that while Greenpeace and many likeminded organizations pursue the twin goals of
peace and environmental sustainability, they still often employ confrontational (albeit generally non-
violent) means in these pursuits. In fact, even among environmental activists who profess the ideals of
peace and hannony in social relations, many still seem unable to transcend adversarial methods in pursuit
of their goals (refer to discussion of social activism in Chapter III).
77 Porritt, Seeing Green, p. xiii.
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feminist concepts such as nurturing and coactive power relations (discussed earlier in this
chapter). In these ways, many ecofeminists use the insights of ecology to reinforce more
general critiques of masculine power relations in contemporary society.78 As Petra Kelly
writes:
Women, though closed out of male dominions of power, experience great power in the daily work
of nurturing others. This is not power over others, but power with others, the kind of shared
power that has to replace patriarchal power.... Throughout history, male-led social movements
have always been mere exchanges of power, while the basic structure of dominant hierarchies has
remained. The liberation of women and men from the bonds of patriarchy is essentially the work
of building a peaceful, just, and ecological society. I often hear people arguing about the world's
many evils and which should be the first confronted. This fragmentary approach is itself part of
the problem, reflecting the linear, hierarchical nature of the patriarchal thinking that fails to grasp
the complexity of living systems. What is needed is a perspective that integrates the many
problems we face and approaches them holistically.79
Ecofeminists, as well as many other environmentalists and ecologists, are thus
articulating alternative models of thought, talk, and practice that stand in stark contrast to the
culture ofadversarialism. These include strategies of education and awareness raising; the
cultivation of new values and attitudes within families, schools, and communities; and the
articulation of new models of social and political practice (e.g., consensus-based decision
making). From conceptual models and metaphors to grounded political insights, ecological
discourse thus contains numerous critiques of, and alternatives to, the "power over" and
"power against" relations identified in the left quadrants in Figure 2. And although this
discourse is still culturally marginalized in many respects, it provides a further glimpse of,
and theoretical basis for, alternatives to the dominant codes of adversarialism.
78 Refer, for example, to the collections of ecofeminist essays assembled by Warren, ed., Ecofeminism and
Warren, Ecological Feminist Philosophies.
79 Kelly, "Women and Power", pp. 114, 18-19.
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Communications Theory
Alternatives to the culture of adversarialism can also be found in the ways we think and
talk about communication itself - in our "discourses on human discourse". Most theories of
interpersonal communication, for instance, suggest that adversarialism is counterproductive
within families, among friends, and between co-workers.80 Especially in long-term
relationships, where a high degree of interdependence exists, people generally cannot afford
to alienate or offend others through the adoption of higWy oppositional or confrontational
modes of communication. As socio-linguist Deborah Tannen comments, "the aggressive
style used so often in public discourse does not serve us well as a means of interpersonal
communication".81
In this context, most people would find it absurd to suggest that interpersonal
communication should be modeled after partisan political debates or legal advocacy contests.
Granted, many people do have relatively adversarial styles of interpersonal communication,82
but unlike the public sphere, adversarialism is generally not idealized in the interpersonal
sphere. Even as adversarial ideals prompt us along a continuum from cooperation to
confrontation in the public sphere, non-adversarial ideals tend to prompt us in the opposite
direction in our interpersonal communication.
Within the public culture of adversarialism, common sense "realism" suggests that this
80 Refer, for example, to Wilmot and Hocker's overview of the literature on interpersonal communication and
conflict in Wilmot and Hocker, Interpersonal Conflict.
Tannen, The Argument Culture, p. 84.
82 In The Argument Culture, pp. 83-84, Tannen attributes at least some of this to the influence that "agonistic"
models of public communication have on interpersonal communication. As Tannen writes: "Citizens pick
up not only the ideas they read and hear but the attitude, the tone, the very wording... Public discourse
creeps into private conversations, private minds... Public discourse provides a model for private talk:
People pick up phrases, ideas, and attitudes from what they hear and repeat them as ifthey were their own
- repeat them because they have become their own".
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incongruity is natural and inevitable. To many people, the cooperative and mutualistic ideals
associated with communication in the private sphere appear impossible, inappropriate, or
even oppressive within the public sphere. The public sphere, according to Western-liberal
common sense, is the sphere of conflicting interests. And conflicting interests, according to
this same common sense, are best negotiated through contest and competition, as discussed
in Chapter III.
On the other hand, two of the most influential philosophers of the century, John Dewey, a
seminal figure in American pragmatism, and Jurgen Habermas, a seminal figure in European
critical theory, both articulated theories of public communication that are models of
relatively "cooperative inquiry" rather than partisan confrontation.83 Broadly speaking, both
authors call for more cooperative, inclusive, and participatory models of collective decision
making in the public sphere. Both also call for the cultivation of communication
competencies throughout society as a foundation for these cooperative and participatory
models. Finally, both envision the transformative impact that these models, and the
competencies they are built on, could have as traditional models of political communication
are replaced by cooperative inquiry and rational collective problem solving.84
In tum, many feminist scholars have articulated models of public communication that are
even more explicitly non-adversarial than the models proposed by Dewey and Habermas.
First, many feminists argue that the traditional distinction between the "private" and "public"
83 This phrase comes from the comparative analysis of Dewey and Habermas in Filson, "Cooperative
Inquiry".
84 For a detailed analysis of the models of cooperative inquiry articulated by both Dewey and Habermas, refer
to Filson, "Cooperative Inquiry"; especially the comparative summary in Chapter 6. For relevant works by
these prolific authors, good starting points would include Dewey, The Public and Its Problems and
Democracy and Education; as well as Habermas, Theory o/Communicative Action and "The Public
Sphere". See also the extensive bibliography on Dewey and Habermas in Filson's work.
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spheres is a male construct that has functioned to exclude women from public life by
defining the public sphere as a domain requiring masculine/adversarial qualities. 85 From this
perspective, the common sense "realism" that rejects the possibility or appropriateness of
non-adversarial norms within the public sphere appears as little more than an oppressive
gender bias.
Moreover, many feminist scholars have also criticized the emphasis on rational
persuasion that underlies virtually all models of public communication, including that of
Habermas. For instance, in a critique of the Western rhetorical tradition from Plato and
Aristotle to the present, Sally Miller Gearhart concludes that public communication has
historically been studied and taught in a manner that is antithetical to feminist theory and
practice. As Gearhart explains, "The assumption is and has been through the centuries that
the concern of rhetoric is persuasion" and that the role of the "speaker/conqueror" is one of
"conquest!conversion".86 Equating this argumentative or conquest model of persuasion with
violence, Gearhart goes on to assert that legal adversaries, partisan politicians, and others
who are skilled in the art of rational persuasion
may congratulate themselves that they are men of reason who have chosen civilized discourse
above fighting. Yet... the difference between a persuasive metaphor and a violent artillery attack
is obscure and certainly one of degree rather than kind. Our rational discourse, presumably such
an improvement over war and barbarism, turns out to be in itself a subtle form of Might Makes
Right. Speech and rhetoric teachers have been training a competent breed of weapons specialists
who are skilled in emotional maneuvers [and] expert in intellectuallogistics.87
85 Refer, for instance, to Fraser, "Rethinking the Public Sphere", and Landes, Women and the Public Sphere.
86 Gearhart, "The Womanization of Rhetoric", pp. 195,201, emphasis in the original. See also Cope-Kasten,
"Domination Rationality", for a parallel discussion.
87 Gearhart, "The Womanization of Rhetoric", p. 197. It is interesting to note that Gandhi also equated some
forms of communication with violence. For discussions ofGandhi's theory of non-violent communication,
which revolves around concepts of non-violent speech, the maintenance of human relationships, openness,
and flexibility, refer to Bode, "Gandhi's Rhetorical Theory" and "Nonviolent Communication".
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Granted, the link between this argumentative model of persuasion and physical violence
is only metaphorical, and few would argue that the distinction between a verbal contest and a
war is unimportant. On the adversarialism~ooperationcontinuum sketched in Figure 2,
rational persuasion is clearly situated much farther to the right than physical violence. At the
same time, however, feminists such as Gearhart point out that the choice between rational
persuasion and physical violence is often a false choice. As an alternative to both, Gearhart
advocates a more dialogical model of communication derived from what she considers a
feminist interest "in atmosphere, in listening, in receiving, in a collective rather than in a
competitive mode".88 Such a model, she suggests, would reflect "the womanization of
rhetoric".89
Following Gearhart's cue, Foss, Foss, and Griffin have articulated a model of
"invitational rhetoric" that they hope will "contribute to the efforts of communication
scholars who are working to develop models for cooperative, non-adversarial, and ethical
communications".90 This "feminist reconstruction" of communication theory and practice is
characterized by the "offering of perspectives" within "conditions of safety, value, and
88 Gearhart, "The Womanization of Rhetoric", p. 201.
89 The conclusions of Gearhart and other feminists need not imply an absolute distinction (either biological or
cultural) between male and female communication styles - a distinction that would obviously be
problematic in light of both everyday experience and research. For a discussion of these problematic
distinctions, refer to Elshtain, Women and War. On the other hand, sociolinguistics and others who have
studied gender differences in communication have found measurable differences in the relative tendencies
of men and women to adopt conflict orientations. As Tannen notes in Gender and Discourse, p. 40,
"research on gender and language has consistently found male speakers to be competitive and more likely
to engage in conflict (for example, by arguing, issuing commands, and taking opposing stands) and females
to be cooperative and more likely to avoid conflict (for example, by agreeing, supporting, and making
suggestions rather than commands)", parenthesis in the original. See also Ong, Fighting For Life, p. 51, as
well as Herring, "Gender and Democracy" and "Men's Language" for similar conclusions.
90 Foss and Griffin, "Beyond Persuasion", p. 15. See also Foss and Foss, Inviting Transformation. For a
parallel discussion by another feminist author, refer to Elshtain, "Feminist Discourse".
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freedom".91 As Foss and Griffin point out, the efforts of public speakers to "demonstrate
superior knowledge, skills, and qualifications ... in order to dominate the perspectives and
knowledge of those in their audiences", is "paternalistic" because it "devalues the lives and
perspectives ofthose others".92 In contrast, Foss and Griffin advocate moving "beyond
persuasion" by adopting an explicitly non-adversarial framework in which all participants
contribute to the thinking about an issue so that everyone involved gains a greater understanding
of the issue in its subtlety, richness, and complexity... an understanding that engenders
appreciation, value, and a sense of equality. . .. Absent are efforts to dominate others because the
goal is the understanding and appreciation of another's perspective rather than the denigration of
it simply because it is different. .. [participants] enter the interaction with a goal not of converting
others to their positions but of sharing what they know, extending one another's ideas, thinking
critically about all the ideas offered, and coming to an understanding of the subject and of one
another. .. they ask questions and make comments designed not to show the stupidity or error of
the perspective presented or to establish themselves as more powerful or expert than the
presenter. Instead, their questions and suggestions are aimed at learning more about the
presenter's ideas, understanding them more thoroughly, nurturing them, and offering additional
ways of thinking about the subject for everyone involved in the interaction. 93
Invitational rhetoric, then, offers a striking alternative to the adversarialism that
characterizes much contemporary public communication. On the
adversarialism+-K:ooperation continuum sketched out in Chapter II, invitational rhetoric lies
even farther to the right than Habermas's "ideal speech situation" which, despite its
conditions of freedom from domination, inhibition, or exclusion, is still a model of rational
persuasion.
Despite these differences, all of these theories share a common shift away from
confrontational debate and toward mutual dialogue. In this context, dialogue and debate are
increasingly understood as contrasting paradigms of public communication. As the
91 Foss, Griffin, and Foss, "Transforming Rhetoric", p. 2.
92 Foss and Griffm, "Beyond Persuasion", p. 3.
93 Ibid., pp.5-6, 8.
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following comparative summary explains:
Dialogue is collaborative: two or more sides work together toward common understanding.
Debate is oppositional: two sides oppose each other and attempt to prove each other wrong.
In dialogue, finding common ground is the goal. In debate, winning is the goal.
In dialogue, one listens to the other side(s) in order to understand, find meaning, and find
agreement. In debate, one listens to the other side in order to findflaws and to counter
arguments.
Dialogue enlarges and possibly changes a participant's point of view. Debate affirms a
participant's point ofview...
Dialogue opens the possibility of reaching a better solution than any of the original solutions.
Debate defends one's original position as the best solution and excludes other solutions.
Dialogue creates an open-minded attitude: an openness to being wrong and an openness to
change. Debate creates a closed-minded attitude: a determination to be right.
,
In dialogue, one submits one's best thinking, knowing that the other people's reflections will help
improve it rather than destroy it. In debate, one submits one's best thinking and defends it
against challenge to show that it is right.
Dialogue calls for temporarily suspending one's beliefs. Debate calls for investing
wholeheartedly in one's beliefs ...
In dialogue, one searches for strengths in the other positions. In debate, one searches for flaws
and weaknesses in the other position.
Dialogue involves a real concern for the other person and seeks not to alienate and offend.
Debate involves a countering ofthe other position withoutfocusing on feelings or relationship
and often belittles or deprecates the other person.
Dialogue assumes that many people have pieces of the answer and that together they can put them
into a workable solution. Debate assumes that there is one right answer and that someone has
it. 94
Closely related to the concept ofdialogue is the concept of deliberation. Although the
two terms are sometimes used interchangeably, they can be distinguished as follows:
Dialogue is generally understood as an informal and often ongoing framework for the
exchange of diverse perspectives and the consideration of diverse values. Moreover, in
contrast to adversarial frameworks such as partisan debate, dialogue is characterized by non-
confrontational relationships between its participants, in which each makes a genuine effort
94 Study Circles Resource Centre, Handbook, p. 15.
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to understand, rather than belittle, the perspectives and values of others, in order to expand
their own understandings and empathies. Thus diverse perspectives are viewed as
complementary rather than oppositional, and mutual understanding and empathy are the
underlying goals. 95
Deliberation, in turn, is often understood as an adaptation ofthe general principles of
dialogue for the more instrumental purpose of arriving at a specific decision or adopting a
specific course of action. In this regard, deliberation tends to be a more formal process
directed at the resolution of a specific problem within a finite time frame. Like dialogue,
however, it is still characterized by an exchange of perspectives and values in the context of
mutually interdependent and cooperative relationships.96
Dialogical and deliberative models thus provide practical alternatives to the
adversarialism that dominates contemporary public communication. Increasingly, calls for
more public dialogue and deliberation (and less adversarial debate) can be heard throughout
the public sphere, even if they are still largely voiced from the margins. In addition to
communications scholars, many educational researchers and theorists are also beginning to
advocate the pedagogical value of dialogue and deliberation.97 Furthermore, a wide range of
non-profit organizations are beginning to support the development of growing networks of
citizens dedicated to learning the skills of dialogue and deliberation through "study circles",
"issue forums", and similar experiments in public life designed to cultivate skills for
95 Refer to discussions in Bohm, On Dialogue, and Amy, "Environmental Mediation".
96 Refer to discussions in Mathews and McAfee, Making Choices Together; Briand, Building Deliberative
Communities and Practical Politics; Bridges, "Deliberation and Decision Making"; Dillon, "The Questions
of Deliberation"; and Genelot, "The Complex World of Deliberation".
97 Refer, for example, to the collection ofessays in Dillon, Deliberation in Education and Society.
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collectively working through contentious issues within non-adversarial frameworks. 98 To
date, over 5,000 study circles, issues forums, and similar experiments have been organized
by educators, community groups, libraries, religious communities, and other non-
governmental organizations throughout the world for this purpose.99
Parallel movements can also be seen among journalists seeking to reform conventional
media practices along more dialogical or deliberative lines. These efforts, which have begun
to coalesce under the name public journalism (or civic journalism), are motivated by a
general sense of dysfunction in the public sphere - attributable at least in part to conventional
journalism. lOo In an effort to improve the quality of public communication, public journalists
seek to cultivate an inclusive and participatory civic culture by addressing the public as
active citizens rather than passive consumers and representing the public sphere as a
deliberative forum rather than an adversarial spectacle. Public journalists seek to expand the
role ofjournalism beyond the traditional reporting of facts to the actual facilitation of public
deliberation. This expanded role involves inviting the public into the process of agenda
setting; sustaining coverage while the public attempts to work through priority issues;
providing relevant background information; soliciting diverse perspectives; probing and
clarifying relevant public values and interests; soliciting diverse options for the resolution of
the issues; and facilitating the evaluation of these options in light of the information
98 Refer, for instance, to the Study Circles Resource Centre's newsletter Focus On Study Circles. See also the
Kettering Foundation's newsletter Connections or its journal The Kettering Review.
99 London, Creating Citizens Through Public Deliberation.
100 Rosen, Getting the Connections Right.
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available, the perspectives gained, and the values/interests needing to be reconciled. 101 None
of this implies, of course, that journalists become public advocates for specific perspectives,
values, or policy options. Rather, the role of public journalists is to facilitate public
deliberation in as neutral a manner as possible - a role that journalists are uniquely
positioned to fill as the defacto media(tors) ofmass communication in contemporary
societies.102
Parallel to these movements toward dialogue and deliberation in journalism are similar
movements in the field of public relations. 103 For instance, public relations scholars Grunig
and Hunt assert that a two-way symmetrical model of public relations is gradually emerging
as the most recent of four successive models of practice in the field.\04 According to these
scholars, the earliest model of public relations was simple publicity-seeking or press agency
in which organizations sought to attract the attention of the masses through sensational
techniques. A more sophisticated public information model later emerged, characterized by
the management and dissemination of supposedly truthful but highly selective information
designed to further an organization's self-interests. Both of these models are one-way
asymmetrical models in that communication between an organization and the public is uni-
101 For discussions of these public journalism principles, refer to Merritt, Public Journalism and Public Life;
Rosen, Merritt, and Austin, Public Journalism Theory and Practice; Charity, Doing Public Journalism; and
Yankelovitch, Coming to Public Judgement.
102 For a discussion of the defacto mediation roles that journalists play in social conflicts, as well as the need
for the media to play more constructive roles in this regard, refer to Rubenstein, Botes, Dukes, and
Stephens, Frameworksfor Interpreting Conflicts. See also the Institute for Conflict Analysis and
Resolution, Interpreting Violent Conflict, as well as Wahrhaftig, "Conflict and the Media" and "Journalism
and Conflict Resolution". All of these discussions, while not formally associated with the public
journalism movement, implicitly support the approach of public journalism.
\03 Refer to discussions in Pearson, "Business Ethics" and "Beyond Ethical "Relativism in Public Relations";
Grunig and Hunt, Managing Public Relations; Grunig, "Symmetrical Presuppositions"; and Kruckeberg
and Stark, Public Relations and Community.
104 Grunig and Hunt, Managing Public Relations.
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directional and unequa1. A third model of public relations emerged when public relations
practitioners began to apply sophisticated research methodologies, borrowed from the social
sciences, in order to collect data about the public that would help them craft more persuasive
public information strategies. Though this two-way asymmetrical model was characterized
by the two-way "flow" of data and information between organizations and the public, the
flow was still unequal in that it served primarily the organization's interests. Finally, Grunig
and Hunt assert that a fourth nascent model is gradually being adopted by progressive
organizations, characterized by two-way symmetrical communication between organizations
and their publics. This involves an organization's full recognition of their mutual
interdependence with the public and a willingness to engage in meaningful dialogue for the
purposes ofmutual understanding and mutual adaptation. Even though this two-way
symmetrical model still exists only at the margins of the profession, public relations
researchers are finding that it is not only a more ethical practice, but it is also more
effective. 105
Finally, efforts to construct a more dialogical or deliberative public sphere can also be
seen in deliberative opinion polls, an innovative research methodology that attempts to
resolve the age-old dilemma of the democratic public sphere: How to create a participatory
democracy within modem populations that are far too large and too busy to assemble
together in a common forum to deliberate together on every public issue? Public journalism
takes a step in this direction by attempting to facilitate ongoing civic dialogue and
deliberation, but by itself it cannot ensure representative public participation. In contrast,
105 Refer to surveys of these fmdings in Grunig and Grunig, "Models of Public Relations" and "Review ofa
Program of Research" as well as Grunig, "Implications of Public Relations".
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traditional opinion polls gather statistically representative samples of public opinion, but
these opinions are formed in the absence of meaningful dialogue and deliberation. There is a
significant difference, however, between spontaneous and poorly informed responses to
strategically and often contentiously worded questions and thoughtful judgements arrived at
through non-adversarial processes of dialogue and deliberation. 106
The deliberative opinion poll attempts to reconcile the values of public deliberation with
the requirements of representative participation by gathering statistically representative
samples of citizens together in one place and measuring the opinions they arrive at after
extended opportunities to deliberate together on a specific issue. 107 As Fishkin describes it:
The idea is simple: Take a national [or regional or local] random sample of the electorate and
transport these people... to a single place. Immerse the sample in the issues, with carefully
balanced briefing materials, with intensive discussions in small groups, and with the chance to
question competing experts and politicians. At the end of several days of working through the
issues face to face, poll the participants in detail. The resulting survey offers a representative
sample of the considered judgements of the public - the views the entire country [or region or
locality] would come to if it had the same experience of behaving more like ideal citizens
immersed in the issues for an extended period. l08
Of course, such a poll does not actually measure existing public opinion. But this is not
its purpose. On the contrary, as Fishkin explains:
A deliberative opinion poll is not meant to describe or predict public opinion. Rather, it
prescribes. It has a recommending force: these are the conclusions that people would come to,
were they better informed on the issues and had the opportunity and motivation to examine those
issues seriously. It allows a microcosm of the country to make recommendations to us all after it
has had the chance to think through the issues. 109
106 Refer, for example, to the discussion ofthese problems in Yankelovitch, Coming to Public Judgement.
107 Refer to Fishkin, Democracy and Deliberation, and Voice ofthe People, for detailed discussions of the
theory and practice of deliberative opinion polls, including analyses of actual applications of the
methodology on national scales in both Britain and the United States.
108 Fishkin, Voice ofthe People, p. 162.
109 Ibid., p. 162.
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Moreover, these recommendations can be arrived at through an essentially non-
partisan/non-adversarial process of collective deliberation - a process more akin to
"invitational rhetoric" than partisan persuasion and debate. Deliberative opinion polls, like
their counterparts in each of the other examples discussed above, thus embody potential
alternatives to the culture of adversarialism that dominates the public sphere. In addition,
these alternatives are potentially mutually reinforcing. For instance, if the ideals of public
journalism began to replace traditional journalistic practices in an effort to facilitate civic
dialogue and deliberation, and if public journalists began to turn to deliberative as opposed to
traditional opinion polling as a means of sampling public opinion in a representative manner,
and if other organized interest groups began to adopt two-way symmetrical approaches to
public relations, one might see the emergence of much more functional, inclusive, and non-
adversarial patterns of communication in the public sphere.
Of course, this scenario admittedly appears quite utopian from the vantage-point of the
culture of adversarialism. Each of the alternatives discussed above are little more than
marginal ideals at the moment, and their realization would require many other corresponding
adjustments in the political economy of the public sphere.110 They do, however, provide
alternative ways of thinking and talking about public communication. They define human
beings in terms of their capacities for collective inquiry and intersubjective agreement. They
define human knowledge in a relative or perspectival manner. Finally, they suggest the need
for social practices and institutional arrangements that are consistent with these alternative
views of human nature. In sum, they provide another glimpse of, and theoretical basis for,
110 The ideals of public journalism, for instance, are highly constrained within the advertising-supported media
that dominate the public sphere in many Western countries.
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alternatives to the codes of adversarialism.
Alternative Dispute Resolution
Of all the non-adversarial models surveyed in this chapter, alternative dispute resolution
has arguably emerged as the most visible and successful alternative within the culture of
adversarialism to date. In response to the increasing financial costs of the legal adversary
system, the high emotional costs and mutual frustrations experienced by both plaintiffs and
defendants within it, the increasing backlogs of court cases, and even the disillusionment of
many lawyers and judges, alternative dispute resolution is gaining increasing support in
many Western countries - including the support ofa former Chief Justice of the United
States Supreme Court and other judicial leaders. III
While alternative dispute resolution is a very broad term that encompasses the entire
spectrum between direct negotiation and imposed third-party arbitration, the paradigmatic
form of alternative dispute resolution is mediation. Indeed, hybridized forms of mediation
span the full spectrum of alternative dispute resolution, from "med-neg" (mediated
negotiations) to "med-arb" (mediation linked to arbitration in the case of an impasse), and
from interpersonal mediation to multi-year, multi-stakeholder, public dispute resolution
processes.
As an alternative to the legal adversary system, mediation is thus characterized by a range
ofapproaches. Most mediators, however, approach mediation as a non-adversarial method
for maximizing the satisfaction and reducing the costs (financial and emotional) in
III Refer, for example, to Galanter, "Judicial Mediation".
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contentious disputes. The role of the mediator is generally to help the parties reframe
conflicts as collective problems and then facilitate collaborative problem-solving among the
parties. This entails establishing a tone and an environment that minimizes hostility and
maximizes cooperation; establishing ground rules that foster constructive exchanges;
assisting the parties to probe and clarify underlying interests (the needs, desires, values, fears,
and concerns that underlie their conflicting positions); and assisting the parties in their efforts
to generate and evaluate integrative "win-win" solutions that maximize the satisfaction of
each party's underlying interests. 112
This problem-solving or interest-based model of dispute resolution, which is at the heart
ofmost contemporary mediation, thus represents a clear alternative to adversariallitigation -
a significant shift from the left to the right on the adversarial~ooperative continuum
sketched in Figure 2. In addition, interest-based mediation has proven to be more than a
naIve or utopian alternative. Compared to adversarial processes, mediation has proven to be
a more practical and effective means of satisfying interests and reducing costs in many types
of conflicts. 113
Beyond these pragmatic, problem-solving goals, however, some mediators also see
112 For overviews of the general principles and practices of mediation and alternative dispute resolution, refer
to discussions in Amy, The Politics ofEnvironmental Mediation; Bush and Folger, Promise ofMediation;
Cormick, "Environmental Mediation"; Donohue, Allen, and Burrell, "Communication Strategies in
Mediation"; Littlejohn, Shailor, and Pearce, "The Deep Structure of Reality in Mediation"; Fisher and
Brown, Getting Together; and Fisher, Dry, and Patton, Getting to Yes.
113 Refer, for example, to Pearson, "Evaluation of Alternatives"; Kelly, "Mediated and Adversarial Divorce
Resolution"; Lieberman and Henry, "Lessons"; Dry, Brett, and Goldberg, Getting Disputes Resolved;
Crowfoot and Wondolleck, Environmental Disputes; Susskind, "Mediating Public Disputes"; Susskind and
Cruikshank, Breaking the Impasse; Kolb and Rubin, "Mediation"; Rubin and Zartman, "Asymmetrical
Negotiations"; and Bingham, Resolving Environmental Disputes.
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mediation as a means of transforming the culture of adversarialism itself. 114 In this
transformative approach to mediation, mediators see conflicts not simply as practical
problems to be solved, but as opportunities for the development ofmore mature social or
"relational" capacities among disputants. These capacities include, among others, the ability
to view the world from the perspectives of others; the ability to experience real empathy with
others; the ability to consider the moral consequences of one's choices; and the ability to
transcend narrow self-interests and identities through a recognition of wider collective
interests and a common human identity.lls
This transformative approach to mediation therefore rejects a limited focus on interest
satisfaction as too limiting. From this perspective, even interest-based mediation is little
more than a reworking of the same liberal individualism that underlies the legal adversary
system. As two of transformative mediation's most prominent advocates explain:
The Individualist worldview gives an impoverished account of the human world and its potential.
Most important, Individualism's categorical description of persons as radically separate beings
fails to account for many important aspects of human life in which connection to others is the
primary quality of experience; and its focus on self-satisfaction as a value is demonstrably
inadequate as a basis for moral theory.ll6
In contrast, the transformative approach to mediation is derived from a "relational
worldview", which defines human beings in fundamentally non-adversarial terms.
The Relational framework, like the Individualist, views the world as made up of persons with
individuated consciousness and with diverse needs and desires; but it also sees these diverse
beings as possessing an inherent form of consciousness that connects them to each other.
Specifically, every human being has two inherent human capabilities. The first is the capacity for
the full range of human experience - pain and pleasure, joy and sorrow, clarity and confusion,
and so forth. The second is the capacity for realizing that every other person has the same kinds
ll4 Refer, for example, to Folger and Bush, "Orientations to Conflict"; and Menkel-Meadow, "The Many Ways
of Mediation".
115 flFolger and Bush, "Orientations to Con ict".
ll6 Ibid., p. 19.
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of experiential capacities as oneself. It is this inherent and uniquely human capacity for relating
to the experience of others that constitutes the structure - a structure of human consciousness-
that connects every individual human being to every other, at least potentially.... The Relational
worldview therefore sees the world as containing both the plurality of individual selves and the
(potential) unity made up of the network of their relationships. I17
This relational worldview, in turn, suggests that while the satisfaction of mutual interests
can be an important side-benefit of mediation, the ultimate goal should be greater.
The highest value that emerges from this vision of the human world is not the satisfaction of
individual desires, but the development of the higher potential of both the individual and the
world itself through activating the human capacity for awareness of and concern for both self and
other.... instead of regarding others as things to be used for one's own ends. 118
In this context, while the problem-solving or interest-based approach to mediation seeks
to create non-adversarial structures of dispute resolution, the transformative approach seeks
to cultivate a non-adversarial culture by transforming the conceptual basis for disputes in the
minds of disputants.
Of course, these pragmatic and transformational goals need not be understood in
mutually exclusive terms. Mediation can satisfy mutual interests in many types of disputes
while simultaneously cultivating new relational capacities among disputants. Participating in
a mediated problem-solving processes can, in and of itself, be an educational experience that
transforms a disputant's understanding of conflict, I 19 Moreover, given that dispute resolution
skills and concepts are increasingly working their way into educational curricula from
kindergartens to universities, the goals of cultural transformation are being widely promoted
in many classrooms even as the pragmatic goals of interest-based problem solving are being
117 Ibid., p. 19-20, italics and parentheses in the original.
118 Ibid., p. 20, italics in the original.
119 For a discussion of the mutual compatibility of these goals, refer to Menkel-Meadow, "The Many Ways of
Mediation", pp. 239-41.
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more narrowly pursued in the shadows of the courts.
Whether in the classroom or in the shadows of the courts, and whether motivated by
interest-based problem-solving or social transformation, mediation and related forms of
dispute resolution illustrate clear alternatives within the culture of adversarialism. They
provide alternative ways of thinking and talking about conflicts. They define human beings
in terms of their abilities to resolve conflicts collaboratively, as well as develop relational
capacities that will minimize the cost and occurrence of future conflicts. Also, they prescribe
social structures and practices that are consistent with these alternative views of human
nature. Alternative dispute resolution is thus gradually expanding the contemporary social
imagination even as it gradually permeates social practice. Although these practices are still
culturally marginalized in many respects, they provide yet another glimpse of, and theoretical
basis for, alternatives to the dominant codes of adversarialism.
Lack of Integration
As this survey demonstrates, alternatives to the culture of adversarialism have been
articulated by a wide range of contemporary theorists, professionals, activists, and others.
Some of these alternatives are still little more than intuitive ideals. Others have been
developed into sophisticated theoretical frameworks. Still others have been applied as
relatively successful models of social practice. All of these alternatives, however, shift our
understanding of human relations from the left to the right on the
adversarialism~ooperationcontinuum sketched in Figure 2. At the same time, all ofthese
alternatives have been relatively isolated from each other within the larger culture of
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adversarialism. Though they all provide separate glimpses ofnon-adversarial practices, it is
difficult to view and experience them together as a comprehensive alternative. They have
not yet been successfully integrated into a larger, internally consistent and mutually
reinforcing cultural formation.
Because of this, the practical efficacy ofmany of these alternatives remains difficult to
evaluate. Although they may intuitively appeal to many people, they tend to appear naIve or
utopian to many others. After all, from the vantage point of the culture of adversarialism,
human nature often appears to be naturally and inevitably adversarial. Given these
widespread assumptions about human nature, non-adversarial models of social practice tend
to appear impractical at best and susceptible to manipulation and abuse at worst.
Accordingly, the culture of adversarialism cultivates widespread cynicism regarding non-
adversarial models of social practice which in tum constrains the successful application of
these alternatives.
Consider, for instance, recent experience with alternative dispute resolution in the sphere
of public policy and planning. Public consultations designed as alternative dispute resolution
processes have become popular exercises in recent decades. These exercises, however, have
left many participants frustrated and disillusioned because they often tum out to be little
more than elaborate public relations strategies designed to sell policy and planning decisions
that are already foregone conclusions - constrained or determined in advance by the political
economy of partisan governance. Moreover, even when such processes are relatively
authentic, their outcomes are often circumscribed by pre-existing legal and regulatory
frameworks that were themselves shaped by the same partisan systems. Embedding non-
adversarial dispute resolution processes within adversarial structures of governance can
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thereby render them dysfunctional.
In addition to the structural problems these processes face within the larger culture of
adversarialism, they can also be undermined by the psycho-cultural dispositions of those who
participate in them. Having been raised within a culture of adversarialism, where the
aggressive pursuit of self-interests are normalized and even idealized, it should come as little
surprise that many people find it difficult to engage others with different interests in a non-
adversarial manner. Embedding non-adversarial dispute resolution processes within a
psycho-cultural climate of adversarialism can render these processes even more
dysfunctional.
In order to evaluate the practical efficacy of non-adversarial models across a wide range
of human affairs, it is therefore necessary to evaluate their application within an integrated or
comprehensive cultural formation, characterized by structures of consciousness and
structures of social organization that reinforce rather than undermine non-adversarial ways of
thinking, talking, and acting throughout the public sphere.
CHAPTER V: AN INTEGRATED ALTERNATIVE
One example of an integrated alternative to the culture of adversarialism is the Baha'i
International Community. As a contemporary phenomenon with a coherent, traceable, and
well-documented history, the Baha'i International Community has an integrated body of
thought, text, and practice that lends itself to analysis as a comprehensive discursive or
cultural formation, as defined in Chapter 1. Within this unique cultural universe, its members
grow, develop, and internalize a coherent set of cultural norms. Moreover, in both its
psycho-cultural and socio-structural dimensions, it is consistently non-adversarial. In the
following pages, the culture of the Baha'i International Community will therefore be
analyzed as an integrated alternative to the dominant culture of adversarialism.
Case Study: The Baha'i International Community
Rationalefor Studying the Baha'i Community
The Baha'i International Community is a unique contemporary phenomenon. It is a
steadily growing voluntary association of people from more than 2,100 different ethnic
backgrounds, representing all nations and socio-economic classes on earth. With a current
membership of more than five million, it constitutes a microcosm ofthe planet's diverse
human population. As an organized community, it has locally elected governing councils in
more than 15,000 localities worldwide, nationally elected governing councils in more than
170 independent nations and territories, and a single internationally elected governing
164
council that coordinates its activities on a global scale. By all of these measures, it is likely
the most diverse yet highly organized community ofpeople on the planet today.!
Held together by a commitment to the fundamental equality and interdependence of all
people, regardless of gender, ethnicity, nationality, or religious background, the Baha'i
International Community has been quietly labouring for more than 150 years in its efforts to
construct a system of unified, just, and sustainable social practice. Its members believe that
this system will one day demonstrate its efficacy to the rest of the world as a model of social
organization for the age of global interdependence that we are entering.2
In this regard, the Baha'i International Community is just beginning to emerge from
relative obscurity on the world scene - becoming increasingly well known for its work in
such areas as human rights, the advancement of women, education and literacy,
environmental preservation, and sustainable development. 3 This work includes more than
1,700 grassroots projects to date that focus not on the delivery of services but rather on the
development of capacities within people themselves. 4 In addition to these projects, the
Baha'i International Community also works collaboratively with many other non-
governmental organizations, including Advocates for African Food Security, the World Wide
Fund for Nature, the Centre for Our Common Future, and the Education for All Network, to
name but a few.
2
4
For these and other related figures on the size and growth of the Baha'i International Community, refer to
statistics published by the Baha'i World Centre, Baha'i World 1996-97. For corroborating sources outside
of the Baha'i Community, refer to statistics published in the Encyclopedia Britannica.
Refer, for example, to discussions of this theme by Shoghi Effendi in World Order.
For an excellent overview ofthe community's historical emergence from obscurity, refer to Collins, "In the
Eyes ofthe World". See also Hatcher and Martin, Baha'i Faith.
Descriptions and statistics on these projects can be found at http://www.bahai.org/bworld, under a link
entitled Baha'i Development Projects. A Global Process ofLearning.
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Another factor that has contributed to the Baha'i International Community's emergence
from obscurity is its extensive involvement with the United Nations system, which it has
been working with since the inception of the United Nations in 1948. Since that time, the
Baha'i International Community has emerged as one of the most prominent non-
governmental organizations within the United Nations system. It has been accredited with
consultative status in the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) as well as
in the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF). It has working relationships with a range
of other United Nations agencies such as the UN Environment Program (UNEP), the Centre
for Human Settlements, the Centre for Human Rights, the Centre for Social Development
and Humanitarian Affairs, the Department ofDisarmament Affairs, the Peace Studies Unit,
and the UN Regional Commissions. In addition, it is continually increasing its contact with
specialized United Nations agencies such as the World Food Council (WFC), the World
Health Organization (WHO), the UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO), and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). Finally, it has assumed
active roles as both planner and participant in major international events such as the 1992
Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, the
1995 World Summit for Social Development in Copenhagen, and the 1995 Fourth World
Conference on Women in Beijing.5
As a result of its rising presence on the international stage, the Baha'i International
Community has also become the object of increasing scholarly attention in recent decades.
In 1975, an international Association for Baha'i Studies was formally established to study the
For a concise history and overview ofthe Baha'i International Community's active involvement with the
United Nations, refer to the BIC United Nations Office, "Cooperation with the United Nations".
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theory and practice of the Baha'i community. Since that time, the Association has spawned a
network of twenty-six national affiliates, with specialized interest groups in the areas of
agriculture, the arts, conflict resolution, business and economics, education, environment,
health, intercultural issues, science and technology, philosophy of science, religious studies,
and women's studies. The Association holds annual scholarly conferences on various
continents and publishes a quarterly refereed journal entitled The Journal ofBahiz'i Studies,
as well as occasional scholarly monographs.
Outside of the activities of the Association for Baha'i Studies, more than eighty theses
and doctoral dissertations had been written (in English alone), on various aspects of the
Baha'i International Community by 1985.6 Although updated figures are not readily
available, this number appears to have grown steadily since that date, as citation analysis
reveals a continuous increase in the overall number of scholarly books and academic journal
articles examining various aspects of the Baha'i International Community in recent decades.?
Finally, as a further indication of the Baha'i International Community's relevance to
contemporary scholarship, the University of Maryland established a Baha'i Peace Chair in
1992 to bring a Baha'i perspective to the formal study of peace and world order issues.
Similarly, the University of Jerusalem established a Baha'i Studies Chair in 1999 for the
formal study of the Baha'i International Community itself.
As all of these examples indicate, the Baha'i International Community has emerged as a
6
?
Refer to Collins, Bibliography, pp. 303-10, for an annotated bibliography of these theses and dissertations.
It is especially interesting to note that included in this bibliography is the dissertation of sociologist Peter L.
Berger (of Berger and Luckman, The Social Construction ofReality - cited in Chapter I as one of this
century's foremost exponents of social constructionist theory). Berger's Sociological Interpretation ofthe
BaM'f Movement was written as his Ph.D. dissertation at the New School of Social Research in New York
in 1954.
Fazel and Danesh, "Citation Analysis".
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global movement worthy of both public and scholarly attention. Moreover, given its
commitment to non-adversarial models of social practice, it is particularly relevant to the
study at hand. Through an analysis of the theory and practice of the Baha'i International
Community, valuable perspective can be gained on the culture of adversarialism.
A Note on Methodology
The following analysis draws from a range of primary texts, written or commissioned by
the central authors and institutions of the Baha'i International Community. These include
the writings of Mirza Husayn-'Ali (known more commonly by the name Baha'u'llah), the
writings of 'Abbas Effendi ('Abdu'l-Baha) and Shoghi Effendi, as well as documents written
or commissioned by the international governing council of the Baha'i International
Community, the Universal House of Justice.8
Ofthe documents commissioned by the Universal House of Justice, many have been
gathered from archives of statements made by the Baha'i International Community to various
United Nations conferences and agencies. Perhaps more than any other Baha'i texts, these
8 Baha'u'llah was the original author and "architect" of the Baha'i International Community. From 1853, at
the age of 36, until his death in 1892, he was imprisoned by the Persian and Ottoman empires for his
leadership of a "heretical" movement dedicated to the construction ofa new social order based on
principles ofjustice, unity, and interdependence, as well as the elimination of prejudice and discrimination
based on gender, religion, nationality, ethnicity, socio-economic background, and so forth. Through the
course of his forty-year imprisonment and exile, he wrote extensively, including a prolific correspondence
with a steadily growing community of supporters throughout the Middle East. In these writings, he
articulated the basic principles and organizational structure of the Baha'i community. Before his death, he
appointed his eldest son, 'Abdu'l-Baha, to succeed him in his efforts to build and strengthen the nascent
Baha'i community. 'Abdu'l-Baha continued these efforts while remaining a prisoner until 1908. After his
release from prison, he carried on this work until his own death in 1921, at which time he appointed Shoghi
Effendi to succeed him. Under the efforts of'Abdu'I-Baha and Shoghi Effendi, the nascent Baha'i
community grew into a diverse, global, and well-organized movement. Ten years after Shoghi Effendi's
death in 1953, the Baha'i community had grown to the point that it could elect its first international
governing council, the Universal House of Justice, which now directs and coordinates the work ofthe
community worldwide. For an excellent scholarly history ofthe lives and accomplishments ofBaha'u'llah,
'Abdu'l-Baha, and Shoghi Effendi, as well as the historical development ofthe Baha'i International
Community itself, refer to Hatcher and Martin, Bahci'[ Faith.
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statements provide clear and concise summaries of the key Baha'i concepts that will be
discussed below. Given the availability of these clear and concise summary statements, I
frequently quote them directly in order to avoid imposing a layer of my own vocabulary on
the Baha'i discourse that I am examining. Of course, this has not been necessary when I
discuss the more concrete, technical aspects of Baha'i practice. But in my discussions of
relatively abstract concepts, such as those that constitute the "organic worldview" that
Baha'is hold, I have resorted to fairly extensive quotations in order to preserve the actual
language of Baha'i discourse as much as possible.
In addition, for simplicity and clarity, throughout my discussion I have taken the liberty
of referring to Baha'is collectively, as though they speak with a single voice. In part, this is a
stylistic choice intended to make the discussion more readable. However, it also reflects the
consensus that exists among Baha'is regarding their core principles and practices. Because
the Baha'i International Community is a voluntary association of individuals who have been
drawn together by a common commitment to a well articulated set of concepts, principles,
and practices, these concepts, principles, and practices are not in dispute within the
community. Moreover, there are institutional structures in place within the community for
resolving questions of interpretation and application while maintaining unity of purpose and
understanding. Consequently, there are no factions, parties, or competing interpretative
frameworks within the community.
In this context, though it is inevitably hazardous to generalize about internally disputed
discourses such as liberalism, humanism, Marxism, post-modernism, and so forth (because
their proponents clearly do not all speak with a single voice), such generalizations are
relatively safe in the case of Baha'i discourse. With that said, however, any analysis ofthe
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sort that follows inevitably involves some interpretation due to the processes of selection,
emphasis, phrasing, and so forth that goes into all writing. In this regard, an effort has been
made to maximize the intersubjective validity of my analysis by soliciting feedback from a
diverse panel of Baha'is who have agreed to comment on it. The panel was composed of
Baha'is who have both extensive familiarity with Baha'i texts and years of service within
local and national Baha'i communities, including experience as elected members of various
Baha'i institutions. By "triangulating" my interpretation ofBaha'i thought and practice with
theirs, I am confident that the intersubjective validity of the analysis has been maximized,
and with regard to the core concepts I discuss, it is thus safe to refer to Baha'is collectively as
though they speak with a unified voice.
Analysis
In the following analysis, I begin by discussing the overall organic worldview that
informs the non-adversarial prescriptions and practices of the Baha'i International
Community. Next, I examine a number of these prescriptions and practices, incl~ding Baha'i
models of collective decision making, Baha'i institutional structures, and Baha'i strategies
for pursuing social change. 1also explicate the assumptions about human nature that
underlie each of these elements of Baha'i normative theory. Finally, I conclude the chapter
by evaluating the efficacy of these prescriptions and practices by discussing the actual
experience of the Baha'i International Community.
Organic Worldview
Members of the Baha'i International Community share a common worldview that could
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appropriately be described as "organic". Baha'is speak of the organic interdependence of the
human species, the organic nature of the relationship between human beings and their
environment, and the organic processes of growth and adaptation that characterize
humanity's collective evolution. Within this organic worldview, Baha'is conceive ofpower
not simply in terms of contests and the struggle for domination but also in terms of unity and
the need for coordination. Based on these views, Baha'is are committed to learning and
erecting non-adversarial social practices and institutional structures. Before examining these
structures and practices, however, the organic metaphors that inform them need to be
clarified and distinguished from other organic conceptions of society.
Historically, organic conceptions of society have occasionally been invoked by privileged
and self-interested groups or classes as a means of imposing "harmony" on the populations
they have governed. Organic metaphors have thus been used to stifle diversity, suppress
human rights, and maintain a false (and often fragile) consensus regarding the necessity of
the status quo.9
In contrast to this largely hollow and imposed organicism, however, Baha'is invoke
organic metaphors as a means of promoting diversity, preserving human rights, and pursuing
social change. In this context, Baha'is believe that one of the root causes of social injustice
and inequity is actually humanity's inability to recognize its organic interdependence and
pattern its collective life accordingly. In the absence of this recognition, Baha'is point out,
oppressive and exploitative social relations are perceived as normal, natural, and inevitable
because conflict, rather than cooperation, is assumed to be the defining characteristic of
9 For examples of the oppressive use oforganic metaphors, refer to Nader, "Harmony Models"; Jouvenel, On
Power; Schweitzer, "Harmony Ideology"; and Rose, The Politics ofHarmony.
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human existence. 10
In advocating the organic unity and interdependence of the human race, Baha'is thus call
into question some of the twentieth century's most deeply entrenched assumptions. The most
obvious of these, they suggest,
is the conviction that unity is a distant, almost unattainable ideal to be addressed only after a host
of political conflicts have been somehow resolved, material needs somehow satisfied, and
injustices somehow corrected. The opposite, [Baha'is believe], is the case. The primary disease
that afflicts society and generates the ills that cripple it. .. is the disunity of a human race that is
distinguished by its capacity for collaboration and whose progress to date has depended on the
extent to which unified action has, at various times and in various societies, been achieved. To
cling to the notion that conflict is an intrinsic feature of human nature, rather than a complex of
learned habits and attitudes, is to impose on a new century an error which, more than any other
single factor, has tragically handicapped humanity's past. I I
Accordingly, Baha'is believe that fundamental changes in the way human beings relate to
one another are both necessary and inevitable. 12 In particular, they assert that old ways of
exercising power and authority, rooted in these entrenched assumptions about human nature,
must give way to understandings of these concepts. 13 Throughout history, they point out,
power has been largely interpreted as advantage enjoyed by persons or groups. Often, indeed, it
has been expressed simply in terms of means to be used against others. This interpretation of
power has become an inherent feature of the culture of division and conflict... In general, power
has been an attribute of individuals, factions, peoples, classes, and nations. It has been an
attribute especially associated with men rather than women. Its chief effect has been to confer on
its beneficiaries the ability to acquire, to surpass, to dominate, to resist, to win. 14
In contrast to these traditional, competitive expressions of power - which Baha'is believe
10 For a more detailed discussion of this theme, refer to the Universal House of Justice, The Promise ofWorld
Peace.
BIC Haifa Office, "Who is Writing the Future?".
12 BIC United Nations Office, "Women and the Peace Process".
BIC United Nations Office, "Sustainable Communities Statement". In a related statement, the Baha'i
International Community maintains that traditional notions of power and authority "stand in urgent need of
redefinition" (BIC Haifa Office, "Prosperity of Humankind", pp., 16-18).
14 BIC Haifa Office, "Prosperity of Humankind", pp., 16-18.
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"have lost their credibility as means of solving difficult problems" 15 - Baha'is assert that
ever-increasing levels of interdependence within and between societies are compelling us to
learn and exercise the powers of collective decision making and collective action, born out of
a recognition of our organic unity as a species. 16
From the perspective articulated above, Baha'is interpret contemporary world conditions
(from humanity's unprecedented reproductive and technological success as a species to the
increasing levels of social interdependence this has generated to the increasingly complex
and interrelated social and environmental problems that have in turn arisen) as mounting
evolutionary pressures that are compelling us toward "an organic change in the structure of
present-day society".17
Baha'is thus believe that inherited social structures and practices, which evolved under
very different historical conditions, are maladaptive in the face of contemporary conditions.
The question, according to Baha'is, is whether humanity will adapt new social structures and
practices out of a forward-looking response to these mounting evolutionary pressures or
whether humanity will adapt only in response to ever-more catastrophic events "precipitated
by humanity's stubborn clinging to old patterns of behaviour". 18
In this regard, Baha'is suggest that if we are to adopt a forward-looking approach to the
challenges that increasingly face us,
we must begin by appreciating the magnitude of change required to bring about thought and
actions more appropriate to life-enhancing virtues and practices. The "world problematique"
demands a radical transformation in the hearts and minds ofmankind. We appear to be frozen in
15 BIC United Nations Office, "Women and the Peace Process".
16 BIC United Nations Office, "Sustainable Communities Statement".
17 Shoghi Effendi, World Order, p. 43.
18 Universal House of Justice, The Promise ofWorld Peace, p. 1.
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our present patterns of perception, employing old models and concepts. Such patterns have
existed for centuries and are rooted in the concepts of nation states, national sovereignty, conflict
and combat, winning and losing.19
Accordingly, Baha'is suggest that "the bedrock of a strategy that can engage the world's
population in assuming responsibility for its collective destiny must be the consciousness of
the oneness ofhumankind".20 This deceptively simple concept, they explain,
presents fundamental challenges to the way that most of the institutions of contemporary society
carry out their functions. Whether in the form of the adversarial structure of civil government, the
advocacy principle informing most of civil law, a glorification of the struggle between classes
and other social groups, or the competitive spirit dominating so much of modem life, conflict is
accepted as the mainspring of human interaction.21
"Only through the dawning consciousness that they constitute a single people", Baha'is
continue, "will the inhabitants of the planet be enabled to turn away from the patterns of
conflict that have dominated social organization in the past and begin to learn the ways of
collaboration and conciliation".22 Moreover, the social and environmental costs of clinging
to these inherited patterns of conflict, they assert, will only continue to mount.
"Interdependence among the peoples and nations of the world", they point out,
will only increase in the years ahead. The peoples and nations of the planet are being drawn
together as they become more and more dependent upon one another... This growing
interdependence and the intensifying interaction among diverse peoples pose fundamental
challenges to old ways of thinking and acting. How we, as individuals and communities, respond
to these challenges will, to a large degree, determine whether our communities become nurturing,
cohesive and progressive, or inhospitable, divided and unsustainable.23
In advocating recognition of the organic unity and interdependence of the human species,
however, Baha'is emphatically caution against any notion of unity that results in a stifling of
19 BIC United Nations Office, "Disarmament and Development".
20 BIC Haifa Office, "Prosperity of Humankind", p. 2.
Ibid., p. 2.
22 Ibid., p. 3.
23 BIC United Nations Office, "Sustainable Communities Concept Paper".
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diversity. The Baha'i concept of unity should therefore not be confused with a prescription
for uniformity. Rather, it is a prescription for "unity in diversity".24 Moreover, Baha'is view
diversity not simply as something to be tolerated but as an essential collective resource to be
cultivated and valued. "Much like the role played by the gene pool in the biological life of
humankind and its environment", they explain,
the immense wealth of cultural diversity achieved over thousands of years is vital to the social
and economic development of the human race ... It represents a heritage that must be permitted to
bear its fruit in a global civilization... protected from suffocation by the materialistic influences
currently holding sway [and] free of manipulation for partisan political ends.25
In addition, Baha'is also caution against any notion of organic unity that results in the
suppression of basic human rights, as alluded to above. In contrast to the oppressive
organicism that has traditionally been invoked in order to maintain power over others, the
Baha'i concept of unity implies that society must become the collective trustee of basic
human rights. "Each member of the human race is born into the world as a trust of the
whole", they state, and implied in such a trusteeship are a range ofcollective
responsibilities.26 These include responsibilities to ensure, for instance,
the security of the family and the home, the ownership of property, and the right to privacy... the
provision of employment, mental and physical health care, social security, fair wages, rest and
recreation, and a host of other reasonable expectations on the part of the individual members of
society... [including] also the right of every person to expect that those cultural conditions
essential to his or her identity enjoy the protection of national and internationallaw.27
In the Baha'i view, therefore, this concept of trusteeship constitutes the moral foundation
of the human rights that an increasingly interdependent humanity has struggled to articulate
24 Ibid.
25 BIe Haifa Office, "Prosperity of Hurnankind", p. 10.
26 Ibid., p. 10.
27 Ibid., p. 10.
175
in recent generations.28 To Baha'is, the concept implies a reciprocal relationship between
human societies and the individuals that constitute them. Within this relationship,
individuals have a duty to sustain and enrich society with diverse and creative contributions,
while society, in turn, has a responsibility to preserve and promote those conditions within
which individuals can do this. Thus, rather than viewing diversity and individuality as
threats to the social body, Baha'is view them as sources of collective health and well-being.
Elaborating on this point, Baha'is draw an analogy between human society and the
individual human body. Acknowledging, of course, that "human society is composed not of
a mass of merely differentiated cells but of associations of individuals, each one ofwhom is
endowed with intelligence and will" they maintain that
nevertheless, the modes of operation that characterize [our] biological nature illustrate
fundamental principles of existence. Chief among these is that of unity in diversity.
Paradoxically, it is precisely the wholeness and complexity of the order constituting the human
body - and the perfect integration into it of the body's cells - that permit the full realization of
the distinctive capacities inherent in each of these component elements. No cell lives apart from
the body, whether in contributing to its functioning or in deriving its share from the well-being of
the whole ... What is true of the life of the individual has its parallels in human society... That
human consciousness necessarily operates through an infinite diversity of individual minds and
motivations detracts in no way from its essential unity. Indeed, it is precisely an inhering diversity
that distinguishes unity from homogeneity or uniformity.29
According to Baha'is, however, such a reciprocal relationship, within which diversity is
nurtured and human rights are preserved, can only be established through recognition of the
unity and interdependence of all people. In this regard, moreover, Baha'is believe that this
organic conception of society is a prerequisite for transcending the traditional, competitive
expressions ofpower that have characterized many social relations throughout history and
28 For a more detailed discussion of this theme, refer to the HIC United Nations Office, "Turning Point for All
Nations", p. 4.
29 BIC Haifa Office, "Prosperity of Humankind", p. 2.
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which underlie many human rights abuses. Pointing to traditions of violence against women,
for example, BaM.' is explain that
violence against women is a yardstick by which one can measure the violation of all human
rights. It can be used to gauge the degree to which a society is governed by aggressivity,
dominated by competition and ruled by force... [because] a society patterned on dominance
inevitably gives rise to such distortions of power as violence against women.30
In this regard, Baha'is also maintain that those who inflict violence on women are
themselves among the casualties of traditional, competitive conceptions ofpower.31
When unbridled competition, aggression, and tyranny destroy the fabric of society, everyone
suffers ... Violence against women is a grave symptom ofthis larger disorder. .. Our challenge is
to search out new strategies and adopt fresh models that will encourage a healthier, more
cooperative society at alllevels.32
In this regard, however, Baha'is acknowledge that the transformation of consciousness
they are advocating will inevitably be a difficult and gradual process. 33 Although they admit
that incremental advances may be made in the immediate years ahead, Baha'is believe that
fundamental change will ultimately require the cultivation of new attitudes and values across
successive generations. Thus they suggest that
efforts should be concentrated on reaching children and youth, who are still in the process of
forming the values that will shape their lives. Instilling in our children respect for themselves and
others, recognition of the oneness of humanity, appreciation of unity in diversity, and a sense of
citizenship in a world community will be the best guarantee of improved protection of human
rights in the years to come... As we educate our children to accept diversity as part of the human
condition and to extend respect and full human rights to the entire human family, civilization will
benefit from an unimaginable wealth of contributions... In that respect, human rights education
could be considered basic education for life in the modern world.34
Of course, Baha'is also recognize that there are currently many constraints on the
30 RIC United Nations Office, "Ending Violence Against Women".
Ibid.
Ibid.
RIC United Nations Office, "UN Decade on Human Rights Education".
34 Ibid.
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transformation of consciousness that they are calling for. "Doubts, misconceptions,
prejudices, suspicions and narrow self-interest", they acknowledge, continue to "beset
nations and peoples in their relations one to another".35 Indeed, they point out,
so much have aggression and conflict come to characterize our social, economic and religious
systems, that many have succumbed to the view that such behaviour is intrinsic to human nature
and therefore ineradicable. With the entrenchment of this view, a paralyzing contradiction has
developed in human affairs. On the one hand, people of all nations proclaim not only their
readiness but their longing for peace and harmony, for an end to the harrowing apprehensions
tormenting their daily lives. On the other, uncritical assent is given to the proposition that human
beings are incorrigibly selfish and aggressive and thus incapable of erecting a social system at
once progressive and peaceful, dynamic and harmonious, a system giving free play to individual
creativity and initiative but based on cooperation and reciprocity. 36
This paralysis of will, Baha'is insist, must be carefully examined and resolutely dealt
with.37 In order to overcome it, Baha'is suggest that we "need a vision, an image of the
future, which can harness our energies and engage our dedication and sacrifice".38 To supply
this vision, Baha'is invoke another organic analogy so simple that it can readily be grasped
by literate and illiterate minds alike, including children and youth in their all-important
formative years. Comparing humankind's collective evolution to the development of the
individual, they suggest that humanity is passing through natural stages of development as it
grows toward maturity: "The human race", they suggest, "as a distinct, organic unit, has
passed through evolutionary stages analogous to the stages of infancy and childhood in the
lives of its individual members, and is now in the culminating period of its turbulent
adolescence approaching its long-awaited coming of age".39 From this perspective, they
interpret "the turmoil, discontinuity and agitation of recent times" as
35 Universal House ofJustice, The Promise ofWorld Peace, pp. 2-3.
36 Ibid., pp. 2-3.
37 Ibid., p. 6.
38 HIe United Nations Office, "Disarmament and Development".
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characteristic of an immature stage of growth. In terms of global development we must see
ourselves moving, as a species, into a new age, preparing for bigger tasks, assuming wider
loyalties, adorting a more universal purpose and direction, and cultivating collaboration and
cooperation.4
Baha'is thus regard "the current world confusion and the calamitous condition of human
affairs as a natural phase in an organic process leading ultimately and irresistibly to the
unification of the human race in a single social order whose boundaries are those of the
planet".41 In this context, they assert that
present-day conceptions of what is natural and appropriate in relationships - among human
beings themselves, between human beings and nature, between the individual and society, and
between the members of society and its institutions - reflect levels of understanding arrived at by
the human race during earlier and less mature stages in its development. If humanity is indeed
coming of age, if all the inhabitants of the planet constitute a single people, ifjustice is to be the
ruling principle of social organization - then existing conceptions that were born out of ignorance
of these emerging realities have to be recast.42
Foremost among these, Baha'is suggest, are the competitive and aggressive models of
power and authority alluded to above. "Habits and attitudes related to the use of power",
they point out,
which emerged during the long ages of humanity's infancy and adolescence, have reached the
outer limits of their effectiveness. Today, in an era most of whose pressing problems are global
in nature, persistence in the idea that power means advantage for various segments of the human
family is profoundly mistaken in theory and of no practical service to the social and economic
development of the planet. .. The human race is being urged by the requirements of its own
maturation to free itself from its inherited understanding and use of power.43
"To choose such a course", Baha'is in turn maintain, "is not to deny humanity's past but
to understand it".44 Thus, in an open statement addressed to the peoples of the world, they
39 BIC United Nations Office, "Turning Point for All Nations", p. 4.
40 BIC United Nations Office, "Disarmament and Development".
BIC United Nations Office, "Turning Point for All Nations", p. 4.
42 BIC Haifa Office, "Prosperity of Humankind", p. 10.
Ibid., pp. 16-18.
44 Universal House of Justice, The Promise ofWorld Peace, pp. 2-3.
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suggest that
a candid acknowledgement that prejudice, war and exploitation have been the expression of
immature stages in a vast historical process and that the human race is today experiencing the
unavoidable tumult which marks its collective coming of age is not a reason for despair but a
prerequisite to undertaking the stupendous enterprise of building a peaceful world. That such an
enterprise is possible, that the necessary constructive forces do exist, that unifying social
structures can be erected, is the theme we urge you to examine. 45
In summary, then, Baha'is share a clearly articulated organic worldview that is, for them,
a source of hope and inspiration regarding the long-term prospects of building a more
unified, just, and sustainable social order. Within this worldview, Baha'is speak of the
organic interdependence of the human species, the organic nature of the relationship between
human beings and their environment, and the organic processes of growth and adaptation that
characterize humanity's collective evolution. However, in contrast to organic conceptions of
society that have historically been invoked as a means of stifling diversity, suppressing
human rights, and maintaining the status quo, Baha'is invoke organic metaphors as a means
of promoting diversity, preserving human rights, and pursuing social change. Moreover, in
contrast to traditional, competitive conceptions of power, Baha'is conceive of power in terms
of unity, collective action, and the need for coordination. Accordingly, Baha'is advocate
non-adversarial social structures and practices that they believe are the means through which
unity and coordination can be achieved.46
Ibid., p. 2-3.
46 At the same time, Baha'is recognize that force can be necessary in upholding just laws, protecting
populations from military aggression, and confronting tyranny and oppression. In this sense, Baha'is are
not pacifists. This point is explicitly made by the Universal House of Justice, as quoted in Hornby, ed.,
Lights afGuidance, p. 437. Nor are they blind to the widespread injustices within both past and present
societies, as the discussion above demonstrates. What they advocate, however, is the transformation of
social structures and practices in a manner that they believe will collectively enable people to more
effectively address the root causes of injustice, conflict, and war.
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Collective Decision Making
Given the organic worldview discussed above, with its prescriptions for unity and
coordination in the face of increasingly complex social challenges, Baha'is assert that more
mature methods of collective decision making are now imperative. The interdependent
problems now facing humanity, they maintain, are impossible to address without "a
magnitude of cooperation and coordination at all levels that far surpasses anything in
humanity's collective experience".47
Toward this end, Baha'is advocate a more inclusive model of collective decision making
that involves all segments of society in the conceptualization, design, implementation, and
evaluation of the policies and programs that affect them.48 In addition, Baha'is believe that
such a model must also transcend the adversarial posturing and partisanship, and the patterns
of negotiation and compromise, that have become virtually synonymous with democratic
decision making in this age. 49 Thus they explain that
debate, propaganda, the adversarial method, the entire apparatus of partisanship that have long
been such familiar features of collective action are all fundamentally harmful to its purpose: that
is, arriving at a consensus [regarding] the wisest choice of action among the options open at any
• 50gIven moment.
In making these assertions, however, Baha'is insist that they do not mean to belittle
existing democratic systems. "Indeed", they clarify, contemporary democracies "are to be
recognized as the fruit of a vast period of social evolution, representing an advanced stage in
47 RIC United Nations Office, "Sustainable Development".
48 BIC United Nations Office, "Valuing Spirituality in Development", p. 12.
49 BIC Haifa Office, "Prosperity of Humankind", p. 11.
50 Ibid., p. 11.
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the development of social organization". 51 They make these observations, they explain, "not
to indulge in criticism of any system, but rather to open up new lines of thought, to
encourage a reexamination of the bases of modem society".52 Elaborating on this theme,
Baha'is again compare humanity's collective social evolution to the maturation of an
individual.
In a period of history dominated by the surging energy, the rebellious spirit and frenetic activity
of adolescence, it is difficult to grasp the distinguishing elements of [a] mature society... The
models of the old world order blur vision of that which must be perceived; for these models were,
in many instances, conceived in rebellion and retain the characteristics of the revolutions peculiar
to an adolescent, albeit necessary, period in the evolution of human society.53
In contrast to the systems they believe were born out of these earlier stages in our
collective social development, Baha'is advocate a non-adversarial model of collective
decision making that they refer to simply as consultation - a model which they believe is
"central to the task ofreconceptualizing the system of human relationships" alluded to
above.54
Currently practiced in Baha'i communities worldwide, Baha'is have found this
fundamentally non-adversarial model to be adaptable to any culture.55 They have also found
it to be useful in virtually any arena where group decision-making and cooperation is
required. 56 Accordingly, while the method is formally used for guiding the affairs of Baha'i
communities on the local, national, and international levels, it is also used both formally and
51 Universal House of Justice, Individual Rights and Freedoms, p. 6.
52 Ibid., p. 11.
53 Ibid., pp. 10-11.
54 HIC Haifa Office, "Prosperity of Humankind", p. 11.
55 HIC United Nations Office, "Equality in Political Participation".
56 mc United Nations Office, "Statement on Consultation".
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informally in Baha'i-initiated social and economic development projects, in Baha'i-operated
schools, in Baha'i-owned businesses, and in the day-to-day decision making of Baha'i
families. 57 Moreover, inasmuch as the press serves as a forum for collective dialogue and
deliberation, Baha'is are even striving to apply many of the principles and objectives of
consultation to the operation of the press within the Baha'i community.58
Consultation seeks to build consensus in a manner that unites various constituencies
instead of dividing them.59 This is accomplished through a commitment to various
consultative principles that encourage participants to transcend the struggle for power that is
so common in traditional decision-making systems. 60 Among these principles is the principle
of valuing diversity alluded to above. Rather than view diversity as a source of conflict and
an obstacle to collective decision making, Baha'is regard human diversity as an asset in
decision making processes.61 Accordingly, participants in consultation seek to inform
themselves by soliciting and considering the perspectives, concerns, interests, and expertise
of all segments of the community. Moreover, by valuing diversity and actively soliciting
traditionally excluded views, Baha'is maintain that the consultative process also engenders
trust between diverse segments of the community, which is a prerequisite of any efforts to
translate collective decisions into collective actions.62
Closely related to the principle of valuing diversity is the principle of detachment from
57 Ibid.
58 Universal House of Justice, Individual Rights and Freedoms, pp. 16-18.
59 BIC United Nations Office, "Statement on Consultation".
60 Ibid.
BIC United Nations Office, "Equality in Political Participation".
62 Ibid.
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one's personal views. In Baha'i consultation, individual participants strive to transcend their
respective points ofview.63 And though this principle may sound paradoxical at first, it
reflects an underlying epistemology with very practical implications. In this regard, Baha'is
accept that human comprehension is finite and limited relative to the infinite complexity of
the world around us and that human beings therefore cannot perceive or know reality
directly, comprehensively, in its raw form or essence. Moreover, they implicitly
acknowledge that a person's views are shaped and circumscribed by their experience,
education, social position, historical context, and so forth. Given the limited and
circumscribed nature of our views, Baha'is in turn accept that our access to truth is not
absolute but re1ative.64 Thus, while consultative groups strive to solicit the widest possible
diversity of views on a given subject, the individuals who offer those views strive to do so in
a spirit of detachment - confident that their views will be considered by the group, yet aware
of the limitations of those same views.65
63
64
65
BIC Haifa Office, "Prosperity of Humankind", p. 11.
Effendi, World Order, p. 58.
The belief that we can know reality directly is rooted in the empiricist philosophies of the European
Enlightenment. The most extreme expression of these philosophies, often referred to as positivism, asserts
that the methods of empirical science allow human beings to objectively or "positively" reveal and know
the underlying essence of reality. Underlying this assertion is an assumption that the (scientifically trained)
mind can serve as a transparent lens on reality. This assumption, however, has been widely challenged in
the twentieth century by philosophers who point out that human knowledge is always mediated by a
framework of language, thought, and experience that shapes our perceptions of the world - and thus the
human mind can never have direct access to reality. Taken to an extreme, these insights have in tum led
some postmodern and poststructuralist philosophers to suggest that we have no access at all to whatever
reality, if any, might exist outside of human discourse - an epistemological position known as relativism.
From this opposite extreme, human knowledge is viewed entirely as a social construction. Baha'is
subscribe to neither of these extreme theories of knowledge or epistemologies. Rather, they assume that
there is a real world out there, independent of human thought, and at least partially comprehensible. They
also recognize that human efforts to comprehend reality are limited and shaped by language, thought,
experience, and so forth. From these basic premises, Baha'is derive what could be called a "consultative
epistemology" - which can be applied both to collective decision making and scholarly inquiry - in which
diverse perspectives are seen as potentially complementary and inquiry proceeds in a cooperative manner,
through informed dialogue rather than argumentative debate. For an insightful discussion of this
consultative epistemology, refer to Smith, "The Relativity of Social Construction". In brief, Smith
(footnote continued on next page)
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In this context, Baha'is view diverse perspectives as complementary rather than
oppositional- each potentially illuminating a different facet of a complex, multi-faceted
reality. Moreover, diverse perspectives and ideas are understood by Baha'is as insights that,
once offered, become collective resources to be used by the entire decision making group. In
Baha'i consultation, they explain, "when an idea is put forth it becomes at once the property
of the group".66 Acknowledging that this notion sounds simple, they suggest that
it is perhaps the most profound principle of consultation. For in this rule, all ideas cease to be the
property of any individual, sub-group, or constituency. When followed, this principle encourages
those ideas that spring forth from a sincere desire to serve, as 0J?posed to ideas that emanate from
a desire for personal aggrandizement or constituency-building. 7
Ofcourse, Baha'is recognize that the detachment prescribed above does not always come
easily - even to those who are committed to it in theory. "Consultation", they explain, "is no
easy skill to learn".68 But commitment to the process, they suggest, results not only in more
effective collective decision making but also in the maturation of individual participants as
well as whole communities.69 Baha'is thus view consultation as a learning process, and they
believe that the skills and attitudes developed through consultation are as important as the
specific decisions arrived at
In this regard, another closely related principle of Baha'i consultation is that of exercising
demonstrates that the tension between extreme positivism and extreme relativism is reconciled in Baha'i
consultation by an implicit understanding that the social construction of knowledge is itself a relative
phenomenon. On one hand, some aspects of reality are more tangible than others. On the other hand, when
we examine any given aspect of reality, some conceptual frameworks are more revealing than others.
Human comprehension is thus constrained simultaneously by the relative tangibility or intangibility of the
phenomena we are examining, as well as the relative adequacy of the conceptual framework we are using
to examine it. Based on this implicit understanding, Baha'is adopt a consultative approach to reality, in
which diverse interpretative frameworks are sought out due to the complementary insight they can offer.
66 BIC United Nations Office, "Statement on Consultation".
67 Ibid.
68 Universal House of Justice, Wellspring afGuidance, pp. 96-97.
69 BIC United Nations Office, "Equality in Political Participation".
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care and moderation in one's manner of expression. "Freedom of speech", Baha'is assert,
"must necessarily be disciplined by a profound appreciation of both the positive and negative
dimensions of freedom, on the one hand, and of speech, on the other".70 Speech is a powerful
phenomenon, they explain, which calls for an acute exercise ofjudgment.71 Pointing to the
phenomenal characteristics of speech, Baha'is suggest that
content, volume, style, tact, wisdom, and timeliness are among the critical factors in determining
the effects of speech... Consequently, [we] need ever to be conscious of the significance of this
activity which so distinguishes human beings from other forms of life [and] exercise it
judiciously.72
"Efforts at such discipline", Baha'is believe, "will give birth to an etiquette of expression
worthy of the approaching maturity of the human race". 73 Accordingly, Baha'is maintain
that freedom of expression need not be interpreted as a license for extreme and divisive
speech. Ridicule, insult, ultimatums, and other offensive, demeaning, and conflict-inducing
modes of expression - which have become the norm for much of what passes as public
communication today - have no place in Baha'i consultation.74 Rather, Baha'is recognize
that mutual insight and understanding, which are prerequisites of meaningful collective
decision making, emerge most readily in an atmosphere of courtesy, respect, care, and
moderation. Moreover, Baha'is assert that only in such an atmosphere can participants
confidently apply the principle referred to above, that ideas belong not to the individual to
whom they occur during the discussion but to the group as a whole, to take up, discard, or
70 Universal House of Justice, Individual Rights and Freedoms, pp. 12-13.
Ibid., pp.12-13.
72 Ibid., pp. 16-17.
73 Ibid.,pp.16-17.
74 For more detailed discussions of this theme, refer to the Universal House of Justice, Individual Rights and
Freedoms; and the BIC United Nations Office, "Statement on Consultation".
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revise as seems to best serve the goal pursued.75 For Baha'is believe that only within an
atmosphere ofmutual respect, support, and encouragement, rather than aggression and
intimidation, can clarity of thought prevail and the perspectives of all people be heard -
especially those who lack self-confidence and self-assertiveness due to their historical
exclusion from decision-making processes.
These prescriptions regarding etiquette of expression, on the other hand, do not imply the
need to gloss over conflicts by demanding that participants bury their differences and speak
to each other in artificially polite civil tones. On the contrary, they imply finding and
facilitating modes of expression that allow conflicting perceptions and interests to be
critically examined, but in an atmosphere of tolerance and a spirit ofmutual commitment
within which problems become soluble challenges.76
Moreover, these prescriptions also do not imply cold, rationalistic modes of expression in
which emotion has no place.77 On the contrary, Baha'is acknowledge that emotion is
fundamental to human experience and perception, and efforts to foster collective action and
mutual understanding cannot ignore it. Thus Baha'is recognize, on the one hand, that
emotions can uplift, inspire, and motivate people to pursue meaningful social change.78 On
the other hand, while Baha'is point out that the process of consultation in not intended to be a
form of group therapy, they recognize that even painful emotions convey dimensions of
human experience that must sometimes be acknowledged if mutual understanding and
75 BIC Haifa Office, "Prosperity of Humankind", p. II.
76 Universal House of Justice, " May 1994 Letter".
77 Refer, for example, to statements made by Shoghi Effendi, quoted in the Universal House of Justice, ed.,
Community Functioning, p. 12.
78 Refer, for example, to discussions of this theme by 'Abdu'I-Baha in Selections, pp. 38, 81, as well as the
Universal House of Justice in Community Functioning and Consultation.
81
187
empathy are to prevail.79 In this regard, however, Baha'is believe that the emotional
dimension of people's experience can be conveyed without the offensive and defensive
posturing and extreme expressions we have grown so accustomed to associating with public
expression.80 Indeed, resisting the tendency toward such posturing appears to be the only
way to raise self-awareness in others of the consequences of their actions and hence foster
within them the actual will to reform. Thus, while Baha'is do not advocate a consultative
process that is cold and emotionless, they do strive to avoid the adversarial clash of emotions
that typically generates conflict and alienation.81
Furthermore, Baha'is do not interpret the above prescriptions regarding expression as a
license to dismiss any person or group as coarse, uneducated, or irrational. In this regard, the
right to self-expression is a fundamental principle of Baha'i community life.82 Thus the
mature etiquette of expression alluded to above is not viewed by Baha'is as a prerequisite for
participating in consultation. Rather, Baha'is view consultation as a process within which
people can collectively learn and refine more constructive modes of expression.83 Moreover,
within this atmosphere of collective learning, Baha'is caution that any given individual is
responsible only for monitoring and refining his or her own mode of expression and that
79 Universal House of Justice, ed., Community Functioning, pp. 10-13.
80 Refer, for example, to discussions of this theme by the Universal House of Justice, Ibid. See also the
Universal House of Justice, quoted in Hornby, ed., Lights o/Guidance, p. 180; as well as Abdu'l-Baha,
quoted in the Universal House of Justice, ed., Consultation, pp. 9-10.
Universal House of Justice, ed., Community Functioning, p. 13.
82 Refer, for example, to Shoghi Effendi, quoted in Hornby, ed., Lights o/Guidance, p. 177, as well as the
Universal House of Justice, Individual Rights and Freedoms, p. 12.
83 Refer, for example, to discussions of this theme in the Universal House of justice, ed., Community
Functioning.
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individuals should not take it upon themselves to monitor, correct, or censure others.84 In this
respect, Baha'is strive neither to offend others nor to be offended by others.85
Yet another fundamental principle of consultation is the requirement that the context of
decision making itself be raised to the level of principle as distinct from political
pragmatism.86 To Baha'is, this means that reference to agreed-upon principles must take
precedence over sectarian interests in decision-making processes.87 Thus Baha'is maintain
that "leaders of governments and all in authority would be well served in their efforts to
respond to the dangers facing the world community if they would first seek to identify the
principles involved and then be guided by them".88 "Only discourse at the level of
principle", they assert, "has the power to invoke a moral commitment, which will, in tum,
make possible the discovery of enduring solutions to the many challenges confronting a
rapidly integrating human society".89
Within the Baha'i community, one example of such a principle is the principle of
collective trusteeship alluded to above, which forms the basis of a Baha'i approach to human
rights. Other principles that Baha'is strive to apply in their decision-making processes
include the equality of men and women, the elimination of extremes of wealth and poverty,
and the sustainable stewardship of the natural environment,90 All collective decision making
84 Refer, for example, to discussions of this theme by Shoghi Effendi, quoted in Hornby, ed., Lights of
Guidance, p. 92.
85 Refer, for example, to the Universal House of Justice, quoted in Hornby, ed., Lights ofGuidance, p. 180.
86 Universal House of Justice, The Promise ofWorld Peace, pp. 8-9.
87 BIC United Nations Office, "Building a Just World Order".
88 BIC United Nations Office, "Earth Charter / Rio De Jeneiro Declaration".
89 Ibid.
90 For discussions of these and many other fundamental Baha'i principles, refer to 'Abdu'l-Baha, Selections.
Refer also to the Universal House of Justice, The Promise ofWorld Peace; the BIC United Nations Office,
"Statement on Nature"; and the BIC Haifa Office, "Prosperity of Humankind".
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within the Baha'i community is thus guided by these and similar principles. Moreover,
underlying all of these principles, according to Baha'is, is the more general principle of
justice. At the group level, they explain,
a concern for justice is the indispensable compass in collective decision-making, because it is the
only means by which unity of thought and action can be achieved. Far from encouraging the
punitive spirit that has often masqueraded under its name in past ages, justice is the practical
expression of awareness that, in the achievement of human progress, the interests of the
individual and those of society are inextricably linked. To the extent that justice becomes a
guiding concern of human interaction, a consultative climate is encouraged that permits options to
be examined dispassionately and appropriate courses of action selected. In such a climate the
perennial tendencies toward manipulation and partisanship are far less likely to deflect the
decision-making process... In this context, justice is a thread that must be woven into the
consideration of every interaction, whether in the family, the neighborhood, or at the global
leve1.91
Within this overarching commitment to justice, Baha'is thus employ ethical principles as
mutually agreed-upon criteria that guide their efforts to formulate, compare, and evaluate
potential decisions. Such an approach, according to Baha'is, creates a dynamic that is very
different from traditional partisan negotiation and compromise. In short, they believe it shifts
the process of collective decision making toward a new centre, maneuvering it out of the
quagmire of competing interest claims and into the court of ethical principle - where the
broader goals of social justice are more likely to prevail.
Guided in this way by deliberate, conscious, and systematic attention to ethical principle,
Baha'is strive toward consensus in consultation but settle for a majority vote when consensus
cannot be reached.92 After a decision has been made, however, Baha'is strive to implement it
in a unified manner, regardless of the individual opinions they may each have held before
91 BIC United Nations Office, "Turning Point for All Nations", pp. 12-13.
92 BIC United Nations Office, "Statement on Consultation".
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they entered into consultation and regardless of whether they voted with the majority.93
Elaborating on this important principle of consultation, Baha'is explain that
once a decision is made, it is incumbent on the entire group to act on it with unity - regardless of
how many supported the measure ... In this sense, there can be no "minority" report or "position
of the opposition" in consultation. Rather, Baha'is believe that if a decision is a wrong one, it will
become evident in its implementation - but only if the decision-making group and, indeed, the
community at large, support it wholeheartedly. This commitment to unity ensures that if a
decision or a project fails, the problem lies in the idea itself, and not in lack of support from the
community or the obstinate actions of opponents.94
Under such circumstances, Baha'is suggest, an earlier decision can readily be
reconsidered if experience exposes any shortcomings.95 Indeed, in this sense, the ongoing
monitoring, evaluation, and refinement or abandonment of previous decisions is understood
as an extension ofthe consultative process. Baha'is believe that this longitudinal process,
however, willonly be as effective as the degree of unity achieved in the implementation of
the original decision. For partisan opposition not only makes it more difficult to evaluate
whether the problem was with the decision or with the fact that its implementation was
sabotaged, it also undermines the atmosphere ofmutual respect and common purpose within
which it is easier to change or refine previous decisions. In this regard, Baha'is believe that
consultation is undermined by "the culture of protest" that is another widely prevailing
feature of contemporary society.96
In summary, then, consultation is a non-adversarial model of collective decision making
within which participants strive to transcend the struggle for power that characterizes
traditional partisan decision making. It derives from an underlying epistemology rooted in
93 BIC Haifa Office, "Prosperity of Humankind", p. 11.
94 BIC United Nations Office, "Statement on Consultation".
95 BIC Haifa Office, "Prosperity of Humankind", p. 11.
96 Ibid., p. 11.
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cooperative inquiry rather than argumentative persuasion. Toward this end, participants
regard diversity as an asset and seek to inform themselves by soliciting and considering the
perspectives, concerns, interests, and expertise of all segments of the community. Within the
process of consultation, participants strive to transcend the limitations of their own
perspectives, strive to express themselves with care and moderation, strive to raise the
context of decision making to the level ofprinciple, and strive for consensus but settle for a
majority when necessary. In tum, participants also strive to implement decisions in a unified
manner in order to create conditions within which decisions can be effectively monitored,
evaluated, and revised if necessary.
Institutional Structures
Although Baha'is believe that more mature methods of collective decision making are
needed to deal with the increasingly complex and interdependent problems facing humanity,
they acknowledge that such methods will not be sufficient by themselves. New methods of
decision making, they believe, need to be employed within new institutional models that will
allow them to bear fruit. The challenge, Baha'is assert, is "to reshape fundamentally all the
institutions of society [based on] a radical rethinking of most of the concepts and
assumptions currently governing social and economic life".97
In the economic arena, for instance, Baha'is point to the problems inherent in "a market
system that all too clearly is aggravating the plight of the majority of mankind, while
enabling small sections to live in a condition of affluence scarcely dreamed of by our
97 Ibid., p. 18.
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forebears".98 This system, they explain, is responsible for "the social and economic ills that
blight every region of our world in the closing years of the twentieth century", including the
"inordinate disparity between rich and poor, a source of acute suffering [that] keeps the
world in a state of instability, virtually on the brink ofwar".99
In this regard, Baha'is call for a fundamental restructuring of contemporary economies.
"Central to the task ofreconceptualizing the organization of human affairs", they assert,
is arriving at a proper understanding of the role of economics. The failure to place economics into
the broader context of humanity's social and spiritual existence has led to a corrosive materialism
in the world's more economically advantaged regions, and persistent conditions of deprivation
among the masses of the world's peoples. Economics should serve people's needs; societies
should not be expected to reformulate themselves to fit economic models. The ultimate function
of economic systems should be to equip the peoples and institutions of the world with the means
to achieve the real purpose of development: that is, the cultivation of the limitless potentialities
latent in human consciousness.100
Humanity, they therefore assert, "must develop new economic models shaped by insights
that arise from a sympathetic understanding of shared experience, from viewing human
beings in relation one to another".101 Among other things, Baha'is believe that such insights
must include a long-overdue recognition of the interdependence of capital and labour. 102 In
light of these and similar insights, they insist that
priorities must be reassessed. Resources must be directed away from those agencies and
programs that are damaging to the individual, societies and the environment, and directed toward
those most germane to furthering a dynamic, just and thriving social order. 103
Such a basic reassessment of economic priorities, of course, is unlikely within
98 Universal House of Justice, The Promise ofWorld Peace, pp. 4-5.
99 Ibid., pp. 4-5, 7.
100 BIC United Nations Office, "Valuing Spirituality in Development", p. 8.
lOt Ibid., p. 8.
102 Universal House ofJustice, The Promise ofWorld Peace, p. 10.
103 IBIC United Nations Office, "Va uing Spirituality in Development", p. 8.
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contemporary political systems that tend to subordinate decision making to the logic and
pressures of capital accumulation. Accordingly, Baha'is believe that fundamental political
reform is a prerequisite of meaningful economic reform. Thus it is toward the transformation
of inherited political structures that Baha'is direct much of their attention.
In this regard, Baha'is point to electoral reform as one of several urgent priorities. 104
However, in contrast to proposals that seek simply to refine partisan elections through
campaign finance reforms, the imposition of term limits, the introduction of proportional
systems of representation, and so forth, Baha'is reject the entire theory of partisanship that
informs all of these proposals as well as the systems they seek to reform. "The ideology of
partisanship", they state, "despite impressive contributions to human progress in the past,
today finds itself mired in the cynicism, apathy, and corruption to which it has given rise". 105
In this regard, they assert that democracy "does not need and is not well served by the
political theatre of nominations, candidature, electioneering, and solicitation". 106
In contrast to these traditional competitive practices, Baha'is elect their own governing
councils through a process that is entirely free of nominations, campaigning, or
partisanship.107 Locally, Baha'i councils are made up of nine members who are elected from
the entire membership of a given Baha'i community. All adults are eligible to vote as well as
to be voted for so that everyone is both a voter and a candidate. In this sense, the right to
vote is coupled with the responsibility to serve if voted for. This responsibility, moreover,
104 Ble Haifa Office, "Prosperity of Humankind", pp., 16-18.
105 Ibid., pp. 16-18.
106 Ibid., pp. 16-18.
107 For detailed discussions ofall elements ofthe electoral model outlined below, refer to the Universal House
of Justice, ed., Baha'i Elections.
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generally entails significant sacrifices of one's time, energy, and personal aspirations.
As a matter of principle, no one calls attention to themselves or solicits votes in any way
in Baha'i elections. In fact, Baha'is interpret the solicitation of votes as a lack of fitness to
serve. Accordingly, Baha'is also avoid discussing with one another who they will (or did)
vote for in order to avoid any semblance of nomination or canvassing. Voting occurs by
secret ballot, with individuals guided only by the promptings of their own consciences. With
true freedom of choice, Baha'is thus vote for those nine community members they feel best
combine the qualities of selflessness, recognized ability, and mature experience. 108 In
selecting these nine names, each Baha'i also makes a conscious effort to maximize the
diversity of the elected council. I09
Once the votes are tallied, those community members with the nine highest vote counts
serve on the governing councils (i.e., election is by plurality vote). And, in keeping with the
community's commitment to diversity, in the case of a tie between a person representing the
majority and another representing the minority in any given community, Baha'i electoral
procedure automatically confers the position to the minority.110
Councils elected in this manner then function as trustees of the community, collectively
making decisions on its behalf through the process of consultation outlined above.
Furthermore, decision-making authority resides only in the collective will of the council, and
the individual members who have been elected to it accrue no individual authority, power, or
108 For discussions regarding these and other qualities Baha'is consider in deciding who to vote for, refer to
Shoghi Effendi, quoted in the Universal House of Justice, ed., Baha'i Elections, pp. 3-4.
109 Refer, for example, to discussions of this theme by Shoghi Effendi, as quoted in the Universal House of
Justice, ed., Baha'i Elections, p. 4.
110 Universal House of Justice, ed., Baha'i Elections, p. 4.
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privilege within the community.
In their capacities as collective trustees, these councils are guided by a number of explicit
principles, including obligations "to win the confidence, respect, and genuine support of
those whose actions they seek to govern; to consult openly and to the fullest extent possible
with all whose interests are affected by decisions being arrived at; [and] to assess in an
objective manner both the real needs and the aspirations of the communities they serve".111
These principled obligations are carried out through a number ofmechanisms, including the
frequent solicitation from other community members of insi~ht, advice, or expertise
pertaining to specific decisions that come before the council, as well as regularly scheduled
public consultations in which a council listens to and familiarizes itself with the perspectives,
recommendations, needs, concerns, and grievances of community members. 112
However, unlike most contemporary democratic systems, in which decision makers (who
are essentially political entrepreneurs) must continually negotiate the competing demands of
constituents, campaign contributors, lobbyists and activists (in order to build or retain
political capital), BaM:i councils are shielded from competitive pressures to influence
decisions from outside the sphere of formally elected authority. This is accomplished in a
number of ways. First, as discussed above, those who are elected to these councils do not
seek election, and they have no vested interests in reelection (i.e., they are not political
entrepreneurs seeking to build or retain political capital). Second, elected members are
expected to decide matters according only to the promptings of their own consciences (one of
III BIC Haifa Office, "Prosperity of Humankind", pp., 16-18.
112 Refer to discussions of these themes in the Universal House of Justice, ed., Consultation and Bahtl'i
Meetings.
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the primary qualities for which they were elected), and not according to the dictates or
pressures of competing interest groupS.1I3 And finally, elected members are also expected to
weigh all of their decisions not simply in terms of the immediate interests of their respective
communities but in terms of the long-term welfare of all of humanity - even if this means
forgoing immediate local benefits out ofconcern for the welfare of distant peoples or future
generations. I 14 Thus, while elected BaM'i councils actively strive to familiarize themselves
with the conditions and concerns of their communities, and invite all community members
into the process of proposing, refining, implementing, evaluating, and revising the programs
and policies that affect them, there is no place for competing constituents, campaign
contributors, lobbyists, and activists (in the sense of people taking actions designed to
pressure the council's decisions) - all of which are antithetical to the purposes and principles
of the BaM'i community and its electoral system.
In all of these ways, the Baha'i electoral system embodies neither a contest nor the
pursuit of power. Because no one seeks election, there is no concept of "winning". At the
same time, however, it remains eminently democratic. I15 Moreover, in contrast to partisan
electoral systems, the process is unifying rather than divisive.
The electoral model outlined above thus provides a striking contrast to the partisan
systems that have become the norm in contemporary democracies. Moreover, this non-
113 Refer, for example, to discussions of this theme by Shoghi Effendi in World Order, p. 153. Refer also to
Shoghi Effendi as quoted in Hornby, ed., Lights o/Guidance, p. 18.
114 Refer, for instance, to discussions of these themes in the BIe United Nations Office, "Prosperity (Oral
Statement)" and "Statement on Nature".
115 In this regard, a United Nations study that was commissioned for the newly independent country of
Namibia suggested that Namibians "examine the electoral provisions within BaM'is communities
worldwide" which, the study concluded, were "certainly more democratic than what goes on in most state
elections" (United Nations Institute for Namibia, Comparative Electoral Systems, pp., 6-7).
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partisan model is grounded in the practical experience of the Baha'i International
Community, which has used it for more than three-quarters of a century to annually elect its
local governing councils - of which there are currently more than 15,000 worldwide. In
addition, a two-stage version of the same process is used to annually elect the Baha'i
community's national governing councils - of which there are currently more than 170
worldwide (several of which embody communities larger than some small nation states). In
this two-stage process, local communities elect delegates who in turn elect their respective
national councils. 116 Finally, a three-stage version ofthe same model is used every five years
to elect the international governing council of the entire worldwide Baha'i community.
Within this three-stage process, the community members that have been elected to the
national councils through the two-stage process described above in tum serve as delegates
who elect the international body.117
Based on their extensive experience with this electoral model, Baha'is are confident that
it could be adapted, over time, to all democratic societies. Indeed, Baha'is maintain that until
contemporary societies adopt essentially non-competitive and non-partisanmethods for
electing those upon whom they confer decision-making authority, they will be unable to
effectively address the increasingly complex problems facing them. 118
On a closely related note, Baha'is also believe that until the nations of the world design
and elect international institutions that can integrate, coordinate, and regulate their collective
actions - as is the case within the Baha'i community - humanity will be unable to effectively
116 For detailed discussions of the process through which these national councils are elected, refer to the
Universal House of Justice, ed., National Convention.
117 Shoghi Effendi, Baha'i Administration, p. 84. Refer also to the Universal House of Justice, Constitution.
118 BIC Haifa Office, "Prosperity of Humankind", p. 8.
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address the many global problems that it now faces. This predicament, Baha'is believe,
lends a new urgency to the need for global coordination. 119 Toward this end, Baha'is believe
that an integration process - comparable to the integrative processes that led to the
emergence of organized nation states - is now also taking place at the global level. 120 Twice
in this century, they point out, humanity has attempted to bring about a new international
order. l2l Baha'is explain, however, that both of these attempts have been largely
unsuccessful because they both "sought to address the emergent recognition of global
interdependence while nevertheless preserving intact a system which put the sovereignty of
the state above all else".122 What is needed, Baha'is assert is, a genuine universal framework
that transcends these anachronistic notions of national sovereignty.123 World unity, they
explain,
is the goal towards which a harassed humanity is striving. Nation-building has come to an end.
The anarchy inherent in state sovereignty is moving towards a climax. A world, growing to
maturity, must abandon this fetish, recognize the oneness and wholeness of human relationships,
and establish once for all the machinery that can best incarnate this fundamental principle of its
life. 124
In this context, Baha'is advocate a system of international federalism, or a world
commonwealth, that "would place the interest of the whole ahead of the interest of any
individual nation".125 Such a system, they assert, must include some form of a world
119 BIC United Nations Office, "Turning Point for All Nations", pp. 1-2.
120 BIC United Nations Office, "Prevention of Discrimination".
121 BIC United Nations Office, "Turning Point for All Nations", p. 2.
122 Ibid., p. 2.
123 Universal House of Justice, The Promise ofWorld Peace, p. 6.
124 Effendi, World Order, p. 202.
125 BIC United Nations Office, "Turning Point for All Nations", p. 6.
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legislature, a world tribunal, and a world executive, elected by the people of all countries. 126
Within this system, certain forms of national sovereignty would be ceded, including the right
to maintain armaments for the purposes of war. In this regard, Baha'is have advocated, for
well over a century, a system of collective security in which all nations would contribute to
an international force designed to deter aggression while at the same time relieving nations of
the oppressive burden of escalating military expenditures. 127
At the same time, however, Baha'is acknowledge that "extraordinary care must be taken
in designing the architecture of the international order so that it does not over time
degenerate into any form of despotism, of oligarchy, or of demagogy".128 Toward this end,
Baha'is suggest that the collective decision-making and electoral models outlined above
would go a long way toward reducing such a threat. By structuring governance not as a
contest for power but as a call to service and sacrifice; by electing individuals solely on their
demonstrated integrity, capacity to work with others, and commitment to the collective
welfare; by scheduling frequent elections so that the membership of a governing council can
easily be replaced should the need arise; and by ensuring that decision making is carried out
through a principled approach that regards diversity as a resource and human rights as a
collective trust, Baha'is believe that many historical tendencies toward political corruption
could be structurally reduced if not eliminated.
In addition, moreover, Baha'is also advocate constitutional requirements that would
devolve decision making to the lowest level possible - as is the case within the Baha'i
IU fFor more detailed discussions 0 this theme, refer to the Universal House of Justice, The Promise ofWorld
Peace, pp. 9-12. Refer also to Shoghi Effendi, World Order.
127 Universal House of Justice, The Promise ofWorld Peace, p. 10.
128 BIe United Nations Office, "Turning Point for All Nations", p. 6.
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administrative order itself. Such a system, Baha'is maintain, can promote and stimulate local
decision making and grassroots initiatives, while simultaneously providing a mechanism of
authority that makes coordination and regulation possible, where needed, on a global scale. 129
Elaborating on this theme, Baha'is assert that
it needs to be explicitly and forcefully stated that any new structures for global governance must,
as a matter of both principle and practicality, ensure that the responsibility for decision-making
remains at appropriate levels ... Striking the right balance may not always be easy. On the one
hand, genuine development and real progress can be achieved only by people themselves, acting
individually and collectively, in response to the specific concerns and needs oftheir time and
place... On the other hand, the international order clearly requires a degree of global direction
and coordination... Therefore, in accordance with the principles of decentralization outlined
above, international institutions should be given the authority to act only on issues of
international concern where states cannot act on their own or to intervene for the preservation of
the rights of peoples and member states. All other matters should be relegated to national and
local institutions. 130
Furthermore, Baha'is also acknowledge the need to protect cultural identities in the face
of global political integration. In this regard, they point out that
loyalty to a large entity does not necessarily conflict with loyalty to a small entity. We live and
work in many social units and institutional environments, often nested one within the other, that
are complementary and often mutually supportive. Love of one's country does not preclude love
of family or community, rather, it enlarges the circle of relationships. 131
Thus Baha'is suggest that the existing foundations of society need to be broadened in a
way which does not conflict with any legitimate allegiances. "Diversity of ethnical origins,
of climate, ofhistory, of language and tradition, of thought and habit that differentiate the
peoples and nations of the world", they insist, "are not to be ignored or suppressed, but a
wider loyalty, a larger aspiration is called upon".132 Such a loyalty, they maintain, must be to
129 Ibid., p. 5.
130 Ibid., p. 5.
131 mc United Nations Office, "UN Decade on Human Rights Education".
132 mc United Nations Office, "Prevention of Discrimination".
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the human race as a whole, deriving from a recognition of the interdependence of our entire
species, as discussed above.
In this regard, BaM.' is believe that recognition of the interdependence of all people, and
the expanded loyalty that this recognition fosters, is already beginning to provide the
foundation for an emerging culture of human rights that, in itself, is becoming an
increasingly powerful check on abuses and misuses of power at all levels. At the same time,
however, they acknowledge that humanity still has a long way to go in this regard. But from
the evolutionary perspective that Baha'is maintain, humanity's progress to date is only half
the picture. Equally important is the trajectory we appear to be following.
In this context, Baha'is again view all of the above prescriptions - recognition of the
interdependence of the entire human race, the adoption of non-adversarial consultative
methods, the adoption of non-partisan electoral systems, and the construction of an integrated
system of global governance - as long-term projects that will only be achieved across the
span of generations. Nevertheless, Baha'is insist that humanity can no longer postpone its
commitment to such projects. Thus they point out that
with the physical unification of the planet in this century and acknowledgement of the
interdependence of all who live on it, the history of humanity as one people is now beginning...
endowed with the wealth ofall the genetic and cultural diversity that has evolved through past
ages, the earth's inhabitants are now challenged to draw on their collective inheritance to take up,
consciously and systematically, the responsibility for the design of their future. 133
In summary, then, Baha'is advocate nothing less than the structural transformation of the
political sphere. Toward this end, they prescribe the adoption of a non-partisan electoral
model in which all citizens are eligible both to vote. and to be voted for and are responsible to
serve if elected. Within this model, there is no nomination or campaigning and voting occurs
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by secret ballot, with voters guided only by the promptings of their own consciences.
Through plurality vote, societies would thus confer authority on elected councils that would
make decisions through the process of consultation described earlier. Shielded from the
pressures of lobbyists, these councils would nevertheless be obliged to familiarize themselves
with the conditions and concerns of their communities and seek community members' advice
in formulating the programs and policies that would affect them. Such councils, Baha'is
believe, need to be established locally, nationally, and internationally within an integrated
system that devolves decision making to the lowest level possible, while simultaneously
providing a mechanism of authority that facilitates global coordination and regulation where
needed. On all levels, these councils would be re-elected on frequent cycles so that societies
could easily replace their membership if they failed to fulfil their obligations in a responsible
manner.
Strategies for Pursuing Social Change
Assuming the structural prescriptions outlined above are desirable (a contestable
assumption, of course), viable strategies would still be needed for realizing them. Toward
this end, the Baha'i International Community is also pursuing systematic strategies of social
change. Moreover, like all of the prescriptions and practices that Baha'is advocate, these
strategies are again non-adversarial.
To connect this discussion to the discussion in Chapter I, strategies of social reform tend
to focus on either psycho-cultural or socio-structural change. 134 On one end of the
133 BIC Haifa Office, "Prosperity of Humankind", p. 1.
134 The following discussion is particularly indebted to Arbab, "The Process of Social Transformation".
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continuum, many people view the development or transformation of individual
consciousness as the path to meaningful social change. Sometimes this is understood in
terms of critical awareness raising, sometimes is it understood in terms of the Inculcation of
moral virtues, sometimes it is understood in terms of religious conversion, and sometimes it
is understood in terms of basic mental skills training (i.e., literacy, job skills, etc.). In all
such cases, the common assumption is that broad social change can be brought about through
the aggregation of changes within individual minds.
On the other end of the continuum, many people view the reform or transformation of
basic social structures as the path to meaningful social change. This may be understood in
terms of economic structures (e.g., reforming relations of production), political structures
(e.g., electoral reform), or other collective social structures (media policy reform), but the
common assumption is that individuals are shaped by their social environments, and
therefore meaningful social change can only occur through changes in the way their social
environments are structured.
In this context, Baha'is believe that individual psycho-cultural development and
collective socio-structural reforms are both necessary, but that neither one is sufficient by
itself. Rather, they advocate a twofold process of change involving both.135 "Because the
relationship between the individual and society is a reciprocal one", they explain, "the
transformation now required must occur simultaneously within human consciousness and the
structure of social institutions".136 In order to pursue change on both of these levels, Baha'is
therefore pursue two distinct but closely related strategies.
135 BIC Haifa Office, "Prosperity of Humankind", p. 3.
136 Ibid.
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On the individual level, Baha'is pursue social change primarily through educational
processes. "Education", they maintain, "is indisputably the most effective way to shape the
values, attitudes, behaviours and skills which will make it possible to function effectively in
an integrated world society".13? In this regard, out of 1700 social and economic development
projects Baha'is are currently engaged in, more than 750 are educational projects. 138 These
projects include, for example, the delivery of informal literacy programs within largely
illiterate populations, the organization of primary and secondary schools in areas lacking
basic educational infrastructure, and the founding of decentralized rural universities designed
to assist rural people develop locally needed skills and capacities.
In addition, however, Baha'is also conceive of education in terms of individual moral
development. A focus on moral development is thus an essential feature within the pattern of
Baha'i family and community life. In this regard, Baha'is seek to cultivate basic values and
virtues such as trustworthiness, generosity, and compassion, which are common to all of the
world's moral philosophies and religious traditions. 139 They also focus on basic concepts
such as human oneness, freedom from prejudice, appreciation of diversity, and world
citizenship, which they believe have also become moral imperatives in this age.
137 BIC United Nations Office, "Education, Media, and Arts".
138 Updated statistics in this regard can be found at http://www.bahaLorgibworld, under a link entitled Baha'i
Development Projects, A Global Process ofLearning.
139 On this note, Baha'is acknowledge that "the concept of promoting specific morals or values may be
controversial, especially in this age of humanistic relativism. Nevertheless, we fIrmly believe there exists a
common set of values that have been obscured from recognition by those who exaggerate minor differences
in religious or cultural practice for political purposes. These foundation virtues, taught by all spiritual
communities, constitute a basic framework for moral development" (BIC United Nations Office, "Turning
Point for All Nations", pp. 20-21). Thus Baha'is suggest that "universal spiritual principles which lie at the
heart of religion - tolerance, compassion, love, justice, humility, sacrifice, trustworthiness, dedication to
the well-being of others, and unity - are the foundations of progressive civilization". "At the same time",
however, they acknowledge that "the perversion of religion has been a primary cause of social
disintegration, intolerance, hatred, sexism, poverty, oppression and warfare down through the ages. Indeed,
(footnote continued on next page)
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Complementing these strategies of individual education and moral development, Baha.'is
are simultaneously pursuing collective strategies of socio-structural transformation. The
entire administrative order described above, with its non-adversarial decision making
methods, its non-partisan electoral model, and its globally coordinated institutional structure,
is not merely a theoretical construct for Baha'is. Rather, Baha'is have been actively building
this administrative order for more than three-quarters of a century as part of a systematic
strategy of structural transformation.
In this context, Baha'is believe that their administrative order provides them with an
institutional framework within which they can further develop the skills, capacities, and
attitudes that they believe are needed to manage processes of social change in an increasingly
interdependent and complex world. 140 Baha'is thus acknowledge that they do not start out
with the consultative and organizational skills that their own administrative order requires of
them. Rather, they view participation in Baha'i administration as the means by which they
learn and refine those skills. In this regard, Baha'is view their administrative order as an
institutional structure that facilitates training in non-adversarial decision making and non-
partisan organizing.
While serving as a training ground for the skills described above, the Baha'i
many oftoday's seemingly intractable problems ... can be traced to the corruption and misuse of religious
authority" (BIC United Nations Office, "Religion in Social Development").
140 Refer, for example, to the discussion of this theme in the BIC United Nations Office, "Building a Just
World Order".
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administrative order simultaneously channels the efforts of the community into concrete
social and economic development projects. In this sense, Baha'is are not merely learning
consultative and organizational skills as an abstract intellectual exercise, to be applied in a
distant future. On the contrary, these skills are being applied in the present to practical
grassroots initiatives. 141 Moreover, as the size and scope of the Baha'i International
Community continues to grow, so, too, do the size and scope of these initiatives.
Finally, by erecting their administrative order, Baha'is are also striving to create a visible
model that they believe will eventually demonstrate its efficacy to the rest of the world and
thus provide a pattern for the future administration of human affairs - a pattern that is
fundamentally democratic yet entirely non-partisan. 142 Baha'is acknowledge, of course, that
their administrative order is still only at an embryonic stage in its long-term, organic
development. 143 As it gradually matures, however, they are confident that it will attract the
attention of societies that are becoming increasingly frustrated by their inability to address
the apparently intractable problems they are facing. Indeed, as the Baha'i International
Community has recently begun to emerge from its former obscurity on the world scene, an
increasing number of outside observers have already begun to recognize it as a model worthy
of attention. 144
In all of these ways, Baha'is are pursuing both psycho-cultural and socio-structural
transformation as twin strategies of social change. Moreover, these twin strategies are
141 For an excellent discussion of the Baha'i approach to social and economic development, refer to Vick,
Social and Economic Development.
142 Universal House of Justice, The Promise ofWorld Peace, p. 13.
143 Refer, for example, to discussions of this theme by Shoghi Effendi in World Order, pp. 23,185,95.
144 For an excellent overview of the Baha'i International Community's historical emergence from obscurity in
this regard, refer to Collins, "In the Eyes of the World".
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closely interwoven within the fabric of Baha.'i community life. For instance, at the same
time that Baha.'i electoral processes are being implemented, which select for individuals who
demonstrate integrity and commitment to the collective welfare, efforts are being made to
cultivate these same moral dispositions within the community, through processes of
individual education and development - especially among successive generations of children
and youth. Conversely, while Baha'is believe that selflessness and detachment are measures
of moral development, training in these qualities is achieved, in part, through service within
Baha'i administrative structures. Thus individual development is a foundation of Baha'i
administration, even as Baha'i administration is a training ground for individual
development.
Baha'is are therefore pursuing an iterative strategy that unfolds gradually through the
complex interplay ofpersonal and collective growth. Moreover, given the evolutionary
perspective that Baha'is hold, Baha'is have a long-term commitment to this process.
Describing the strategic development of their administrative order, Baha'is thus explain that
an evolutionary mindset implies the ability to envision an institution over a long time frame,
perceiving its inherent potential for development, identifying the fundamental principles
governing its growth [and] formulating high-impact strategies for short-term implementation.145
Through strategic planning and long-term commitment, each new generation of Baha'is
thus builds upon the collective insight, experience, and moral development of its
predecessors. At the same time, the overall Baha'i strategy for pursuing social change is non-
adversarial. Baha'is are not working against any class or group of people in their efforts to
construct a global administrative order. Nor are they organizing in opposition to any existing
145 BIC United Nations Office, "Turning Point for All Nations", p. 7.
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governments, policies, or programs. In fact, they are explicitly committed to non-
involvement in partisan politics of any kind. 146 Rather, Baha'is believe that the adversarial
structures and practices born out of humanity's collective adolescence are gradually decaying
through the force of their own obsolescence. Thus they explain that
if long-cherished ideals and time-honoured institutions, if certain social assumptions and religious
formulae have ceased to promote the welfare of the generality of mankind, if they no longer
minister to the needs of a continually evolving humanity, let them be swept away and relegated to
the limbo of obsolescent and forgotten doctrines. Why should these, in a world subject to the
immutable law of change and decay, be exempt from the deterioration that must needs overtake
h ... ?147every uman mstltutlOn.
In this context, Baha'is perceive simultaneous processes of disintegration and integration
playing out within the social and political structures of our age. 148 On the one hand, they see
inherited structures becoming mired in corruption and ineptitude and proving themselves
incapable of addressing the pressing challenges of this age, while the populations they
purport to serve are in turn withdrawing their participation and support as they retreat in
frustration and cynicism. On the other hand, they see an upsurge of constructive activity
occurring in the shadows of these decaying structures, characterized by fresh approaches and
creative experiments and driven by ever-widening networks of diverse, dedicated, and
forward-looking people.
In prioritizing their own strategic efforts, Baha'is believe that the process of
disintegration described above needs no additional assistance, as inherited structures appear
to be disintegrating through the force of their own obsolescence. To participate in these
146 For an excellent compilation of primary Baha'i texts on this subject, refer to Khan, ed., Political Non-
Involvement.
147 Shoghi Effendi, World Order, p. 42.
148 BIe United Nations Office, "Turning Point for All Nations", p. 1.
209
deconstructive processes merely draws energy and resources away from more constructive
strategies. Baha'is therefore turn their full attention to the construction of viable alternatives,
which they associate with the process of integration.149 And from a Baha'i perspective, the
structures and practices of the administrative order they are building represent a vital
strategic contribution to this integrative process.
In summary, then, the Baha'i International Community is pursuing a two-fold strategy of
individual development and structural transformation. Both dimensions of this strategy are
non-adversarial. The first involves ongoing programs of education and moral development.
The second involves the systematic construction of a visible and attractive alternative to
partisan systems of collective decision making and political organization. Furthermore,
Baha'is are pursuing both of these strategies in an iterative manner, with each one reinforcing
the other as they simultaneously unfold across successive generations within a steadily
expanding community.
Assumptions about Human Nature
The prescriptions and strategies outlined above thus constitute key constructs within the
normative social theory articulated by the Baha'i International Community. All social
theories, however, rest on underlying assumptions about human nature, and they cannot be
properly evaluated without examining those underlying assumptions. Many of the theories
underlying the culture of adversarialism, for instance, are predicated on assumptions that
human nature is fundamentally selfish and aggressive. Based on these assumptions,
149 For an excellent compilation of primary Baha'i texts on this subject, refer again to Khan, ed., Political Non-
Involvement.
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contemporary Western governments, economies, legal systems, and so forth have largely
been organized as contests between self-interested individuals or groups.
Though Baha'is acknowledge the human potential for selfishness and aggression, they
also believe that human beings also have innate capacities for cooperation and mutualism. In
this context, Baha'is conceive of human nature through the metaphors ofa "lower" nature
and a "higher" nature, or a "material" nature and a "spiritual" nature. 150 For Baha'is, the
former refers to the aggregate expression of selfish and aggressive instincts and behaviours.
It is the equivalent, in other words, of the self-maximizing political and economic being at
the core of most contemporary Western social theory. This lower nature, moreover, is a
central category of Baha'i thought. Baha'is interpret the oppression and exploitation of other
human beings as both individual and collective expressions of these attitudes and behaviours.
And Baha'is are by no means blind to the pervasiveness of these expressions in our collective
past and present. In fact, recognition ofthese expressions is largely what motivates Baha'is
to make the ongoing commitments of time and energy required by the strategies of social
change they are pursuing.
On the other hand, the concept of a higher or spiritual nature is an equally central
category of Baha'i thought. 151 As Baha'is explain:
150 Refer, for example, to the discussion of this theme in 'Abdu'l-Baha, Paris Talks, p. 60.
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"For the vast majority of the world's population", Baha'is point out, "the idea that human nature has a
spiritual dimension... is a truth requiring no demonstration. It is a perception ofreality that can be
discovered in the earliest records of civilization and that has been cultivated for several millennia by every
one of the great religious traditions of humanity's past. Its enduring achievements in law, the [me arts, and
the civilizing of human intercourse are what give substance and meaning to history. In one form or another
its promptings are a daily influence in the lives of most people on earth and, as events around the world
today dramatically show, the longings it awakens are both inextinguishable and incalculably potent. .. It
would seem obvious, therefore, that efforts of any kind to promote human progress must seek to tap
capacities so universal and so immensely creative". me Haifa Office, "Prosperity of Humankind", pp. 12-
15.
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The spiritual dimension of human nature can be understood, in practical terms, as the source of
qualities that transcend narrow self-interest. Such qualities include love, compassion,
forbearance, trustworthiness, courage, humility, cooperation and willingness to sacrifice for the
common good - qualities of an enlightened citizenry, able to construct a unified world
civilization. 152
Moreover, Baha'is do not simply conceive of this capacity in individual terms. Rather,
they also believe it has collective expressions. 153 Baha'is thus interpret accomplishments
such as the abolition of slavery or the achievement of universal suffrage not simply as shifts
in the balance of power between historically competing interest groups, but also as collective
expressions of the capacity of historically dominant groups to subordinate their narrow and
immediate self-interests to the broader long-term interests of the entire population.
In this regard, Baha'is point to the important role that the cultural environment plays in
the realization of these mutualistic capacities. Granted, Baha'is believe that individual will
and effort also playa role in this regard. But they simultaneously believe that mutualism,
like adversarialism, can either be nourished or suppressed through the structures of thought,
value, social practice, and so forth that constitute our cultural environment. 154 Though our
genetic inheritance endows us with the capacity for both selfish and cooperative behaviours,
Baha'is believe that our cultural environment plays a large part in determining the degree to
which either of these traits gains ascendancy in human affairs. Furthermore, because Baha'is
believe that human cultures evolve organically, either adapting or perishing in the face of
changing conditions and pressures, they believe that the regulation of selfish and aggressive
152 BIC United Nations Office, "Sustainable Development".
153 Refer, for instance, to Shoghi Effendi, World Order, pp., 43, 114,63,66-67. See also Shoghi Effendi as
quoted in Hornby, ed., Lights ofGuidance, p. 115.
154 For discussions of these themes, refer to 'Abdu'I-Baha, Some Answered Questions, p. 214, and
Promulgation, pp. 330, 440. See also Shoghi Effendi, quoted in the BIC United Nations Office, "Valuing
Spirituality in Development".
212
impulses, along with the cultivation of mutualism and cooperation, has some evolutionary
force behind it. 155 As human societies grow in size and complexity, and as the welfare of
every individual becomes bound up in the welfare of ever-expanding social groups, Baha'is
believe that human beings face increasing pressure to expand their sphere of cooperative and
mutualistic relations.
In this context, Baha'is do not necessarily view early human societies as more selfish and
aggressive than complex modem societies. Baha'is simply point out that, due to the
relatively simple social structures that characterized early human societies and due to their
relative isolation from other social groups, their spheres of mutualism and cooperation were
relatively limited. Accordingly, as societies have grown in size and complexity, their
members have had to develop an expanded sense of identity and inclusion, along with
expanded structures of social integration, however imperfect these have been. 156
Most importantly, however, even though all forms of social organization to date have
drawn boundaries between internal members and external others, such distinctions are no
longer possible, Baha'is believe, in an age of increasing global interdependence. Clans,
tribes, city-states, and nations could develop relatively mutualistic and cooperative internal
relations while still relating to other clans, tribes, city-states, or nations in relatively
competitive or adversarial ways. In a globally interdependent community, however, there is
no "other". This marks a qualitative transformation of the evolutionary pressures facing
humanity. From a Baha'i standpoint, this is what necessitates "a magnitude of cooperation
155 Refer, for example, to discussions of this theme in the Universal House of Justice, The Promise ofWorld
Peace.
156 Refer again to the discussion of this general theme in Universal House of Justice, The Promise ofWorld
Peace.
213
and coordination at all levels that far surpasses anything in humanity's collective
experience"157 - "an organic change in the structure of present-day society... such as the
world has not yet experienced".158
All of this, of course, rests on the underlying assumption that human beings actually have
the capacity for such mutualism and cooperation. And even though many critics remain
skeptical of this assumption, Baha'is (and many others) see evidence of this capacity in the
social tendencies of our species itself, as demonstrated by the broad trajectory ofhuman
history toward increasingly large, complex, and interdependent social groups; and in our
ability to reflect on and learn from both the successes and failures of these experiences with
expanding social integration. They also see evidence of this capacity in the example of
countless individuals, past and present, who have defied the view that human nature is
inevitably selfish and aggressive by leading lives characterized by self-sacrifice, compassion,
and generosity. Finally, Baha'is also see evidence of this capacity in the experience of their
own community. "Its very existence", they point out, "challenges prevailing theories about
human nature and the prospects for creating peaceful patterns of life". 159
Finally, although Baha'is employ the metaphors of a lower (or material) nature and
higher (or spiritual) nature in support of the prospects for a more peaceful and cooperative
social existence, they condemn the manner in which similar distinctions have historically
been employed for oppressive purposes. For instance, in some patriarchal societies, such
distinctions have been used to subordinate women based on misogynistic claims that women
157 HIC United Nations Office, "Sustainable Development".
158 Shoghi Effendi, World Order, p. 43.
159 HIC United Nations Office, "Humanity's Future".
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have an inherently lower or more material nature while men have an inherently higher or
more spiritual nature. 160 Such claims are incompatible with Baha'i belief, which is based on
clearly articulated principles of gender equality and the complete refutation of such spurious
claims. 161
On a closely related note, some puritanical and ascetic traditions have employed such
distinctions to suggest the fundamental "impurity" or corruptness of the human body along
with the essential "sinfulness" of all earthly or bodily pleasures. Indeed, traditions of clerical
celibacy and monasticism spring largely from the coupling of misogynistic attitudes with
such beliefs (i.e., the female body has been viewed as the primary source of earthly
temptation and bodily pleasure, from which men must separate themselves in order to
develop spiritually). In some cultures, such beliefs have also spawned traditions of self-
flagellation and other practices involving the mortification of flesh. Again, such beliefs and
practices are antithetical to the Baha'i understanding of human nature and the human body.
The Baha'i distinction between a lower and higher nature is not made to denigrate the human
body as corrupt or impure. Rather, Baha'is view the human body as the positive vehicle for
the development of the human mind. 162 As such, it is to be treated with care, dignity, and
respect. 163 In addition, Baha'is believe that sensory pleasures of the body are to be enjoyed
within the limits of moderation and the constraints imposed by consideration for the welfare
160 Refer, for example, to discussions of this legacy in Noble, A World Without Women.
161 For an overview of primary Baha'i texts addressing the equality of men and women, as well as an overview
ofBaM'i efforts to promote this equality in practice, refer to Khan and Khan, Advancement ofWomen.
162 BIC Haifa Office, "Prosperity of Humankind", p. 7.
163 Refer, for instance, to Shoghi Effendi, quoted in Hornby, ed., Lights ofGuidance, pp. 94, 98, 201.
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of others. 164
In summary, ~hen, Baha'is conceive ofhuman nature in terms of both a lower nature and
a higher nature, not as a means of denigrating the human body, nor as a means of denigrating
women, but rather as a means of envisioning the possibility of a more mutua1istic and
cooperative social order. Moreover, though Baha'is recognize the role that individual effort
plays in the realization of these cooperative and mutualistic capacities, they maintain that our
cultural environment plays an equally important role. They further believe that the
cultivation of mutualistic and cooperative behaviours is compelled by evolutionary forces, as
adversarial structures and practices prove increasingly maladaptive in the face ofever-
expanding levels of social interdependence.
The Experience ofthe Baha'( Community
Of course, assumptions about human nature, as well as the social prescriptions that derive
from them, ultimately cannot be evaluated in the abstract. Their real-world application must
also be assessed. Fortunately, the experience of the Baha'i International Community
provides an opportunity for such assessment. In this regard, the Baha'i International
Community can be understood as a social experiment that is testing the assumptions about
human nature and social organization outlined above. Granted, this experiment is scheduled
to span many generations and its ultimate outcome cannot yet be determined. However,
many initial observations can be made based on the experience of the Baha'i community to
date. Toward this end, I offer the following initial assessment, based on more than a decade
of personal participation within the Baha'i International Community. This includes
164 Ibid., p. 345.
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ethnographic observations within numerous individual communities throughout four
countries on three continents. It also includes participation on several elected BaM.'i
councils as well as participation in a range of Baha'i-initiated social and economic
development projects. Finally, it includes eighteen months of volunteer work at the Baha'i
World Centre in Haifa, Israel.
Based on personal observations within the Baha'i International Community, Baha'is
appear to vary significantly in their grasp of different Baha'i principles and practices as well
as in their personal commitments of time and energy to the work ofthe community. They
also appear to struggle with varying degrees of success in their efforts to transcend inherited
cultural values, beliefs, and habits. On the whole, however, Baha'i discourse appears to be a
powerful source of individual motivation - spurring people to remarkable levels of
dedication and self-sacrifice. Countless Baha'is I have met and worked with have left deep
impressions on me in this regard. Also noteworthy are the tens of thousands of Baha'is
around the world who, at the bidding of their communities, sacrifice substantial amounts of
time and energy by serving on elected Baha'i councils. And as the work of the Baha'i
community continues to grow - particularly on the national and international levels - this
increasingly means leaving behind one's career, one's home, and possibly even one's
country, to labour, often for years, in a relatively anonymous and entirely unsolicited position
of elected service.
In addition to serving in elected positions, thousands of Baha'is have also voluntarily left
lives of relative material comfort in order to participate in Baha'i projects and initiatives
around the world. Moreover, hundreds of thousands of Baha'is around the world, even when
they cannot participate directly in such initiatives, voluntarily contribute some portion of
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their income to support the work of the Baha'i International Community, without personal
recognition or material gain. In this context, the experience of the community reads as a
history of individual self-sacrifice, belying the notion that human nature is incorrigibly
selfish. In fact, since the inception ofthe Baha'i community, more than 20,000 of its
members have made the ultimate self-sacrifice by giving up their lives rather than giving up
their dedication to Baha'i ideals in the face of violent persecution. 165 In all of these ways,
even though the Baha'i International Community is still in the formative stages of its
development, its experience to date suggests that individuals are indeed capable of
transcending narrow self-interests and turning their attention instead to the common good.
The experience of the Baha'i community also points to the efficacy ofnon-adversarial
social structures and practices. Of course, at this formative stage in the development of the
Baha'i International Community, individual Baha'i communities struggle with varying
degrees of success in their efforts to learn and apply non-adversarial practices ofcollective
decision making along with the non-adversarial structures of power and authority that
accompany them. In this regard, individual communities differ significantly in their capacity
to coordinate and sustain collective actions. On the one hand, many nascent communities
have difficulty organizing simple monthly meetings, let alone annual elections. On the other
hand, more mature communities are beginning to gain public attention and respect for their
well-organized and socially progressive accomplishments, examples of which are discussed
165 For an account of the history of Baha'f persecution and self-sacrifice in Iran, refer to Sears, A Cry From the
Heart. Since the writing of that history, Baha'fs have continued to be executed, imprisoned, and denied
basic human rights in Iran for their beliefs. For a first-hand account ofthese contemporary persecutions,
including the imprisonment and execution ofBaha'f women and girls, refer to Roohizadegan, Olya's Story.
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below. 166
Even at this formative stage in the development of the BaM.'i International Community,
the structures and practices of Baha'i administration are also beginning to stand in contrast to
the divisive, partisan models of democracy that are taken for granted in many parts of the
world. For example, while working in Haifa, Israel, during the 1988 International Baha'i
Convention, I observed more than 1000 delegates from around the world gather to elect the
Baha'i community's international governing body. The election left a deep impression on
me. The delegates represented a microcosm of the human race, including indigenous peoples
from every continent, many of whom had never before left their homeland and some of
whom were not even literate. In addition to the electoral process described above, the
atmosphere of the convention was particularly striking. In contrast to the speech making, the
sloganeering, and the jockeying for power and attention that characterize many partisan
electoral conventions, the Baha'i convention proceeded in an atmosphere of dignity,
reverence, and composure. With no solicitations, nominations, or campaigning, all of the
delegates carried out their task in a spirit of service and humility. In order to avoid even the
semblance of any desire for re-election, the previously elected membership of the Universal
House of Justice made no public appearance throughout the entire period of the convention
leading up to the casting of ballots. After the results of the election were announced, there
were no victory speeches or celebrations. Following this electoral process, all of the
assembled delegates consulted together for several days, in an atmosphere ofmutual
encouragement and respect, about the affairs of the entire global community. Throughout
166 Refer also to Collins, "In the Eyes of the World", for an overview ofthe public attention that the Baha'i
International Community has been gaining in recent years.
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these consultations, they voiced their recommendations and concerns in a manner that was
frank and candid, yet without partisan posturing or self-promotion. Outside of these formal
consultations, the delegates mingled informally in a display of mutual interest and affection
that transcended all differences of race, class, gender, and so forth.
Of course, the International BaM.'i Convention represents a relatively mature expression
of the Baha'i administrative principles. Even on the local level, however, these principles
have proven effective for coordinating the affairs of diverse communities and channeling
their energies into numerous projects of social development and reform. Moreover, because
Baha'i administration is non-partisan and non-competitive, it tends to draw in a wide range
of people who would otherwise never choose or be able to participate in (partisan)
governance and decision making. In this regard, hundreds of thousands of people from every
part of the planet have been learning skills that enable them to organize, make collective
decisions, and pursue collective actions.
These skills are most visibly expressed, for instance, in the grassroots emergence of
Baha'i social and economic development initiatives. Unlike many international
"development" agencies, in which projects tend to be conceived and designed from above
and imposed on populations who are understood merely as the recipients of outside aid or
assistance, Baha'i development projects are generally initiated and sustained by local or
regional communities who, through collective consultation, identify their own development
priorities and conceive their own strategies to address them. 167 At the same time, because the
167 Refer to Vick, Social and Economic Development; for an overview ofBaha'i development theory and
practice. For detailed descriptions ofcontemporary Baha'i development projects, refer to One Country, an
online publication of the Baha'i International Community, which can be viewed at
http://www.onecountry.org.
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Baha'i International Community is an integrated global community with a structure that
facilitates networking, communication, and a process of c9llective learning, initiatives that
prove their efficacy in one community are often adapted by other communities according to
their own particular needs and circumstances.
For instance, Baha'is have recognized for over a century that promoting the equality of
women is one ofthe keys to lasting social and economic development. (Indeed, Baha'is
believe as a matter of principle that should the resources not be available to educate all
children in a given family or community, then the education of girls should be given
precedence, as this will have the most significant and lasting impact on the progress and
well-being of families and entire communities. 168) In keeping with this principle, Baha'i
communities around the world have long been engaged in projects to uplift the status of
women. 169 Moreover, they have recently begun collaborating with other like-minded groups
and agencies toward this end. For example, with support from the United Nations
Development Fund for Women, Baha'is have used traditional media, such as village theatre,
song, and dance, to explore themes such as the importance of educating girls, the importance
of consultation between husband and wife, and the value of full partnership in child-rearing,
money management, and domestic labour. 170 To date, Baha'is have initiated similar projects
in dozens of villages in at least five countries on three continents.
What is particularly noteworthy about all of these projects is that they build on locally
168 Refer, for example, to discussions of this principle in Khan and Khan, Advancement a/Women, and Boyles,
"Full Partnership".
169 dvFor an overview of these commitments, refer again to Khan and Khan, A ancement ofWomen, and
Boyles, "Full Partnership".
170 For an overview ofthese traditional media initiatives, refer to documents posted at http://www.bic-
un.bahai.org/94-0605.htm and http://www.bic-un.bahaLorg/95-0826g.htm.
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developed institutional capacities (i.e., elected Baha'i councils), and they involve the
participation of both women and men. After participants analyze the challenges facing them
through the process of Baha'i consultation, supplemented by various diagnostic and data
collection tools, the results are shared with the entire community through traditional media
that are familiar and non-threatening. The focus, moreover, is on developing skills and
changing attitudes rather than providing material goods and services. Toward these ends,
there has been impressive evidence of success in both anecdotal and statistical terms: In
villages where these projects have been undertaken, men have begun to share in the burden
of domestic labour, husbands and wives are beginning to consult together about family
finances and other decisions, women are gaining greater participation in community decision
making, and girls and women are gaining increased access to education and literacy training
- all of this through a process that involves rather than alienates men.I?1
At the same time, a focus on specific projects such as this can obscure the broader
accomplishments ofthe Baha'i International Community. To the extent that meaningful
development involves the development of skills, attitudes, and capacities rather than the mere
delivery of goods or services, the entire experience of the Baha'i International Community
can be viewed as an integrated global development project, within which more than five
million people are currently developing such skills, attitudes, and capacities. Within this
larger project, individual Baha'i communities typically move, at varying rates, through a
predictable sequence of developmental stages. In my experience, nascent Baha'i
communities tend to struggle simply to organize regular meetings and informally consult
171 For anecdotal as well as statistical evidence of the success of these initiatives, refer again to
http://www.bic-un.bahaLorg/95-0826g.htm. Refer also to Boyles, "Full Partnership", pp. 259-63.
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together about the simplest community affairs. Once they have a large enough membership
to form an elected council, they typically struggle to master Baha'i electoral procedures,
along with the more formal requirements of consultation required of such elected councils.
After gaining experience with these basic skills, Baha'i councils usually turn their attention
toward building bonds of unity and fellowship within the community, as well as developing
the skills they need to regularly consult with the entire membership of their communities.
Once this stage of development is achieved, Baha'i communities generally turn their
attention to the development of basic educational programs within the community, within
which children as well as adults can deepen their grasp of Baha'i concepts and practices.
Then, after mastering these basic functions, Baha'i communities typically turn their attention
to the social and economic needs of the larger societies they live within.
To date, Baha'i communities that have reached this last stage of development have
initiated a wide range of these more visible social and economic development projects
throughout the world. These projects include, for instance, the establishment of tutorial
schools and literacy programs in communities that lack these basic services; the creation of
micro-credit cooperatives in communities with few financial resources; the development of
indigenous community radio within populations that have traditionally had no access to
means of mass communication; and the founding of decentralized rural universities in
regions that are poorly served by urbanized approaches to higher education. These initiatives
spring from locally or regionally identified needs and priorities and draw on locally or
regionally available resources - most notably the human resources that have been gradually
cultivated over generations within steadily growing Baha'i communities. Thus, while
outside observers might only recognize these more visible initiatives as "development
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projects", the entire process of community building that leads up to them and makes them
possible must also be understood as development. Indeed, many outside development
"experts" are gradually beginning to recognize that this long-term process of community
building is a prerequisite of sustainable social and economic development.
Moreover, given that the ultimate objective of the Baha'i International Community is the
establishment of a new social order based on the principles of unity and interdependence, the
ultimate measure of Baha'i development strategies might well be the extent to which the
community as a whole has come to embody these specific principles. On this measure, I
would suggest that the Baha'i International Community has become a visible model of
success. Despite the many growing pains that it continues to experience at this formative
stage in its development, the unity it has already achieved is arguably its most distinguishing
accomplishment. On the local level, for instance, this unity is formally expressed by
collective practices that draw out diversity and regard it as a resource for collective problem
solving. Less formally, this unity is also demonstrated by the cultivation of countless
friendships, inter-marriages, and collaborative relationships among people of diverse
backgrounds within local Baha'i communities.
On the global level, the principle of unity is expressed through the inclusive, integrated,
and coordinated structure of the Baha'i International Community, as well as the spirit that
animates it. This spirit was visibly expressed, for instance, at the Second Baha'i World
Congress in New York City in 1992. At this event, more than 30,000 Baha'is from around
the world gathered to reflect on a century of accomplishment as well as prepare for the
challenges facing them in the years ahead. Embodying the full diversity of the Baha'i
International Community, the congress was a testimony to the potential unity of the entire
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human race. It reflected a century of community organizing and development within an
entirely non-adversarial framework. Moreover, this non-adversarial framework has been one
of the primary reasons that the unity of the BaM.' i International Community has survived
intact without the factions or divisions that have overtaken virtually every other social
movement in history.
Finally, the experience ofthe Baha'i International Community also offers a glimpse of
the effectiveness of non-adversarial strategies and commitments even under conditions of
direct oppression and gross human rights violations. In this regard, the experience of the
Baha'i community in Iran is particularly noteworthy. Since its inception in the mid-
eighteenth century, the Iranian Baha'i community has faced successive waves of persecution.
Efforts to eradicate the nascent community shortly after its conception resulted in the deaths
of thousands ofIranian Baha'is, as well as the lifelong imprisonment and exile of its founder.
Since then, violent persecutions have continued to flare on and off, with their most recent
eruption following the Islamic Revolution in 1979, whose leaders once again declared their
intention to eradicate the community.172
Despite a century and a half of such persecution, Iranian Baha'is have made remarkable
progress. For instance, in a deeply patriarchal culture that treated women as chattel or mere
reproductive vessels, held them virtually as domestic prisoners, and deemed them unworthy
of education, Baha'is were the first to cast aside the veil, declare the full equality of men and
women, and begin translating this principle into practice. Among other things, Baha'is
established the first schools for girls in Iran. These schools were open not only to Baha'is
172 M rt' B h'''' I" •a m, a a llVllnOrzty.
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but to people of all backgrounds. Indeed, they trained the first generation of professional
women ever in Iran, and their influence has been felt throughout the entire society.173
Within the Baha'i community itself, the advancement of women was especially
pronounced. In contrast to prevailing cultural norms, women were not segregated from men
in Baha'i community functions. By working side by side with men on elected Baha'i
institutions and committees, they gained valuable skills as well as an invaluable sense of
dignity and self-worth within the Baha'i community. By 1974, Baha'i women under the age
of 40 had also achieved 100 percent literacy, in comparison to the national average of only
15 percent. 174 In tum, these commitments to the advancement of women propelled the social
and economic development of the entire Iranian Baha'i community - another dynamic that
many "development" experts are only now beginning to recognize.
Another example of the accomplishments of the Iranian Baha'is can be seen in their
specific response to the renewed persecutions following the 1979 Islamic Revolution.
Following the revolution, Iranian authorities launched a full-scale assault on the Baha'i
community. Baha'is were publicly beaten, their businesses confiscated or destroyed, their
homes plundered or burned, and many of their elected leaders tortured and executed. Baha'i
marriages were declared a form of prostitution punishable by death. Baha'i children were
expelled from school. A "Law ofRetaliation" was also passed exempting all crimes against
Baha'is from any punishment under the law. 175
With no legal recourse available inside Iran and no legal avenue available to leave Iran
173 Boyles, "Full Partnership".
174 Ibid.
175 Martin, Baha'i Minority.
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(Baha'is were denied passports), the Iranian Baha'i community could do little more than
document the atrocities committed against it and communicate the details to Baha'i
communities in other countries, who in turn began a globally coordinated campaign to
educate governments, media, and other leaders of thought around the world about their
plight. Within Iran, Baha'is also created informal networks of shelter and support as well as
informal home schools for their children. Eventually, they created a nation-wide "open
university", held quietly in living rooms and basements, and operated through a combined
system of volunteer teachers and correspondence coursework, in order that an entire
generation of Baha'i youth not be deprived of higher education. Meanwhile, as the Baha'is
inside Iran found creative ways to survive and advance themselves, the international
campaign to educate governments and other leaders gradually began to yield results.
Resolutions were passed in parliaments and congresses around the world, as well as in the
United Nations, condemning these gross human rights violations and exerting pressure on
Iran to cease its persecution of Baha'is. In response to these pressures, the most blatant
human rights violations began to gradually diminish, and though Iranian Baha'is still live a
precarious existence, the threat to the community's existence appears to now be effectively
behind them and the execution of Baha'is appears to have nearly stopped. 176
Beyond their mere survival, however, this latest wave of persecution has had a
galvanizing effect on Baha'is in Iran as well as throughout the world. Inside Iran, the
experience has deepened the commitment of many Baha'is. In addition, their non-violent
responses have cultivated sympathy and admiration within more moderate and progressive
176 Ibid.
227
segments of Iranian society, which, Baha'is confidently believe, represent the future ofthat
society. Outside Iran, the global external affairs campaign that was prompted by these
persecutions has led to two equally significant developments. First, it forged new capacities
for coordinated global action that represents a significant new stage ofmaturation for the
Baha'i International Community. These capacities are now being applied to new global
campaigns for human rights, the advancement of women, literacy, development, and so forth.
Second, it led to emergence of the Baha'i International Community from relative obscurity
on the international stage, where its history, commitments, and accomplishment are now
garnering widespread attention. In its emergence from obscurity, it has attracted the
sympathy and support of people throughout the world who are becoming increasingly
familiar with and attracted to its underlying principles and practices.
In all of these ways, the Baha'i community's non-adversarial response to persecution and
oppression illustrates an effective alternative to violence and opposition. Granted, over 200
lives were lost following the most recent wave of persecution in Iran. But these numbers
might have been significantly higher if the Baha'is had responded with violence or illegal
protests against a regime that was ready to seize on any excuse to legitimate its persecutions.
Instead, the Baha'i response catalyzed the development of new internal capacities as well as
widespread external recognition - at a rate that most Baha'is could scarcely have imagined
before the persecutions began. Furthermore, by staying the course, Baha'is have gained
valuable insights into the efficacy of their own non-adversarial strategies of social change.
In summary, the Baha'i International Community can be understood as a social
experiment that is testing the assumptions about human nature, social organization, and
social change outlined earlier in this chapter. Although the ultimate outcome of this
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experiment cannot yet be determined, some tentative conclusions can be offered based on the
experience of the community to date. First, although individual Baha'is struggle with
varying degrees of success in their efforts to subordinate their immediate self-interests to the
long-term welfare of the entire social body, the history ofthe Baha'i community is, by and
large, a history of individual self-sacrifice and dedication to collective interests. In and of
itself, this history presents a significant challenge to the assumption that human nature is
incorrigibly selfish and aggressive. In addition, although individual Baha'i communities
struggle with varying degrees of success in their efforts to collectively learn and apply non-
adversarial practices of collective decision making, along with the non-adversarial structures
of power and authority that accompany them, the Baha'i community as a whole has made
substantial progress toward these ends. Even at this formative stage in its development, the
structures and practices of Baha'i administration already stand in contrast to the divisive,
partisan models that have become synonymous with democracy throughout most of the
world. Moreover, these non-adversarial structures and practices have proven highly effective
in coordinating the affairs of a diverse global community and channeling its energies into
numerous projects ofsocial development and reform. Finally, by pursing non-adversarial
strategies of social change, Baha'is are demonstrating the efficacy of alternatives to violence
and opposition - even under conditions of direct persecution and oppression. In the face of
gross human rights violations, the pursuit of non-adversarial strategies has lent a significant
impulse to both the internal development as well as the external recognition of the Baha'i
International Community.
CONCLUSION: BEYOND THE CODES OF ADVERSARIALISM
This dissertation began with a theory of culture.- an explanation of what culture is and
how it both shapes and is shaped by those who live within it. Chapter I drew on a range of
intellectual traditions, from anthropology and sociology to semiotics and contemporary
cultural studies, to articulate this theory. The chapter began with a conceptual definition of
the term culture itself, and a discussion regarding the complex relationship between human
nature and culture. A distinction was then drawn between psycho-cultural dimensions of
culture (i.e., culturally contingent structures of the human mind), as well as socia-structural
dimensions of culture (i.e., culturally contingent structures of social organization) in order to
draw attention to these two distinct but interrelated aspects of culture. In tum, a theory of
cultural change and adaptation was articulated, with the concept of cultural codes as its
central metaphor. Finally, the chapter concluded with a discussion of the concept of
hegemony, which serves as a useful device for understanding the way that dominant cultural
codes can come to serve the narrow interests of privileged segments of society who owe their
ascendancy in human affairs to them.
In Chapter II, I began critiquing the culture ofadversarialism by analyzing the way that
relations of power are understood and enacted within it. Toward this end, I illustrated that
power is generally theorized as something that is exercised over or against others in the
pursuit of mutually exclusive gains. I then pointed out that this limited understanding of
power illuminates some relations of power while it obscures others. Most notably, it
obscures the mutualistic or cooperative exercise of power - exercising power with others in
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the pursuit of collective gains. In this context, I suggested that a narrow descriptive or
explanatory theory of power tends to translate into a narrow prescriptive or normative theory
of power. The result is what I referred to as normative adversarialism - the prescription of
adversarial methods as normal and necessary social practices.
In Chapter III, I illustrated that normative adversarialism is relatively ubiquitous
throughout Western culture - albeit in "rational" and non-violent forms. I supported this
assertion by surveying the way human relations are understood and enacted throughout the
public sphere. In this regard, I demonstrated that normative adversarialism underlies the
conflict and competition most people take for granted in our economic system; the partisan
structures and practices taken for granted in our political system; the adversarial contests
taken for granted in our legal system; the polarized conflicts and violence taken for granted
in our mass media content; the oppositional strategies taken for granted by many social
activists; and even the disputational models taken for granted by many academics.
Moreover, I showed that all of these models appear to serve the interests of more powerful
social groups at the expense of less powerful ones. In addition, I showed that all these
models are mutually reinforcing. They simultaneously shape and reflect the ways we think,
talk, and act throughout the public sphere as they naturalize a general culture of
adversarialism that does not serve all interests equally. In this regard, I suggested that
normative adversarialism has all the characteristics of an effective hegemonic construct, as
defined in Chapter I. In other words, normative adversarialism can be understood as a
cultivated set of "common sense" assumptions and beliefs that serve the narrow interests of
privileged segments of society who owe their ascendancy in human affairs to them.
In order to further illustrate the hegemony ofadversarialism, I examined a number of
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marginalized alternatives in Chapter IV. First, I acknowledged that many cultures, past and
present, have embodied mutualistic expressions and aspirations. In this regard, I pointed out
that human history embodies ongoing historical tensions between adversarialism and
mutualism. Recognizing this, I turned my attention to various contemporary expressions of
the latter. Various streams of feminism, systems theory, ecology, communication theory, and
alternative dispute resolution were surveyed as examples. Each was chosen for the unique
critical perspective it offers on normative adversarialism, and the glimpse it provides of non-
adversarial alternatives. At the same time, because these alternatives are relatively isolated
from one another within the dominant culture of adversarialism, I suggested that their
practical efficacy remains difficult to evaluate. Within a culture that contradicts and
undermines them from virtually every direction, these marginalized alternatives tend to
appear naIve and idealistic - an outcome that is entirely consistent with the theory of
hegemony introduced in Chapter I.
In order to further evaluate non-adversarial models of social practice, I suggested that it is
helpful to view their application within a culture or community that consistently reinforces
rather than undermines them. I attempted to do this in Chapter V through a case study of the
Baha'i International Community - an emerging global movement that integrates a wide range
of non-adversarial structures and practices into a unified cultural system. I began by
discussing the overall organic worldview that informs these structures and practices. Next, I
examined a number of these prescriptions and practices in some detail, including Baha'i
models of collective decision making, Baha'i institutional structures, and Baha'i strategies
for pursuing social change. In tum, I examined the assumptions about human nature that
underlie each of these elements of Baha'i normative theory. And finally, I concluded the
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chapter by offering a brief assessment of the actual experience of the Baha'i community to
date.
Five Theoretical Propositions
While the preceding analysis is complex and wide-ranging, it can be distilled into a set of
five succinct theoretical propositions, which can be summarized as follows:
(1) Human beings have the potential for adversarial as well as mutualistic behaviour.
(2) The degree to which we realize either ofthese potentials is largely afunction ofthe
cultures we are raised within, and the tension between adversarialism and mutualism has
been resolved differently in different cultural contexts.
(3) Contemporary Western-liberal cultures are dominated by the codes of "normative
adversarialism" - the prescription ofadversarial methods as normal and necessary social
practice throughout the public sphere.
(4) Though adversarialism is a relative phenomenon, and though adversarial practices
are not essentially problematic in all circumstances, their relatively ubiquitous and
indiscriminate expression throughout the contemporary public sphere does not serve the
broadest public interest; as a dominant cultural expression, "the codes ofadversarialism "
can therefore be understood as socially oppressive and culturally maladaptive.
(5) The historical persistence ofthese socially oppressive and culturally maladaptive
codes can be explained by the theory ofhegemony,· that is, the codes ofadversarialism
primarily serve the interests ofprivileged segments ofsociety who owe their ascendancy in
human affairs to them and who now occupy social positions from which they continue to
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cultivate these codes (whether consciously and intentionally or not), as a form ofcultural
common sense.
These theoretical propositions have significant practical implications, especially in the
area of social reform. First, they point to an entire range of social structures and practices
that might be important targets of reform but that have hitherto been overlooked due to their
naturalization within the culture of adversarialism. In fact, these propositions suggest that
the structures and practices of racism, sexism, nationalism, competitive materialism, and so
forth, which have all been targets of social reform throughout this century, may all be related
expressions of a common underlying construct - adversarialism - that finds expression in
virtually every arena of contemporary public life.
In addition, these propositions also raise significant questions about strategies of social
reform. For ifadversarialism primarily serves the interests of those privileged groups who
owe their ascendancy in human affairs to it, then adversarial strategies of social reform may
ultimately constrain the long-term pursuit of social justice. This is not to say that gains have
never been made through adversarial strategies. Rather, it is to suggest that adversarial
strategies may have reached the limits ofthe effectiveness. In this context, partisan-political
organizing, litigation, strikes, protests, and other adversarial strategies may win limited
battles while simultaneously prolonging the perpetuation of existing social relations by
legitimating the underlying codes of adversarialism that privilege more powerful social
groups throughout the public sphere. Furthermore, by channeling social reform energy into
arenas that favour more powerful social groups by design (e.g., partisan political institutions,
the courts, the commercial media), these strategies may be diverting energy from more
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constructive alternatives. Thus the political economy of adversarialism may leave social
reformers at a perpetual disadvantage.
Consider, in this regard, the metaphor of a game. When a game is structured according to
adversarial rules, as a contest of power, then more powerful players tend to prevail.
Accordingly, when less powerful players agree to engage in power struggles against more
powerful ones, they are agreeing to play by rules that promote their own defeat. After all,
contests of power are won by those with the most power.
In this context, adversarial strategies of social reform are analogous to playing by the
rules of the game above. These adversarial rules primarily serve the interests of dominant
social groups. This insight raises a number of questions for social reformers: How can one
pursue social reform without partisan organizing, litigation, strikes, protests, and other
adversarial strategies? What alternative strategies of social reform are available? And aren't
adversarial struggles the only means by which real social reform has ever been achieved?
In response to the first two of these questions, a wide range of non-adversarial strategies
have been discussed throughout this dissertation. These include strategies of education and
awareness raising, the cultivation of new values and attitudes, and the building of new
models of social and political practice, such as those discussed in Chapters IV and V. In the
broadest sense, however, the alternative is to opt out of the existing rules of the game and
start playing by a new set of non-adversarial rules. Ultimately, the only thing perpetuating
the old adversarial game is the fact that the majority of people subscribe to its rules. If an
alternative game begins to yield recognizable results (e.g., justice, equity, social
emancipation), then it will begin to attract increasing numbers of people to it (e.g., the
majority of people whose interests are not well served by the old game). In tum, if enough
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people stop playing by the old rules and start playing by new ones, the old game will come to
an end through attrition as fewer and fewer people subscribe to its rules. This would not
require competing within the old game in order to "win". Nor would it require attacking
those who profit most from the old rules. Rather, it would require an ability to see that the
old game has no intrinsic or necessary existence; an ability to recognize it as a cultural
construct that will only be perpetuated as long as people agree to abide by its rules; and an
ability to begin experimenting with or looking for a new set of rules.
On this last point, increasing numbers of people are beginning to experiment with or look
for new rules. Each of the examples discussed in Chapters IV and V illustrate this. Of the
examples in Chapter IV, alternative dispute resolution has perhaps had the most visible
success to date - and it provides an excellent illustration of the strategy referred to
immediately above. Alternative dispute resolution represents the emergence of a new game,
governed by non-adversarial rules, that has literally risen in the shadows of an adversarial
legal system that is alienating increasing numbers of people (including many lawyers and
judges). But its success is not being won by "taking on" the legal adversary system. Rather,
more and more people are simply opting out ofthe old game and opting into the new one
because they recognize that their interests are better served in the new one.
Similarly, feminist scholars Foss and Griffin propose that their model of invitational
rhetoric (discussed in Chapter IV) offers a strategy of opting out of the existing argument
game in order to model a more attractive alternative. In their own words:
Although invitational rhetoric is not designed to create a specific change, such as the
transformation of systems of oppression into ones that value and nurture individuals, it may
produce such an outcome... simply because it models an alternative... and thus shows how an
alternative looks and works. Invitational rhetoric may thus transform an oppressive system
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precisely because it does not engage the system on its own terms.)
Likewise, many other examples of this non-adversarial strategy can also be found, from
the localized experiments in cooperative economics alluded to in the beginning of Chapter IV
to the global experiment with alternative models of governance and collective decision
making discussed in Chapter V.
Moreover, examples such as these suggest an answer to the third question posed above:
Aren't adversarial struggles the only means by which real social reform has ever been
achieved? These examples demonstrate that non-adversarial strategies of social reform do
indeed exist. In fact, they suggest that non-adversarial strategies of opting out and building
more attractive alternatives may have played a role in many movements toward social justice
and equity throughout history. The problem is that these strategies are often not recognized
as strategies of social reform at all. We seldom read about them in history books because
they often lack elements of conventional narrative drama. We seldom hear about them in the
commercial media because they lack the extremism and confrontation needed to make them
"newsworthy". Likewise, we do not even tend to read about them in the writings of reform-
minded scholars because they do not conform to the adversarial models of power and social
change that many ofthem employ.
Thus constructive social reform efforts that are carried out quietly by countless people
around the world tend to not even register in our accounting of social reform - rendered
virtually invisible within the discourses of adversarialism. But adversarial struggles are
clearly not the only means by which social reform has ever been achieved. In fact, a proper
Foss and Griffin, "Beyond Persuasion", pp. 16-17.
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accounting might reveal that, throughout much of history, meaningful social reform has been
achieved primarily through non-adversarial means, while adversarial strategies have
absorbed enormous amounts of human energy and generated significant attention, yet yielded
few lasting results. Such an accounting is, unfortunately, beyond the scope of this
dissertation. But it warrants future attention.
A Response to Skeptics
Of course, all of the propositions outlined above warrant considerable skepticism when
viewed from within the culture of adversarialism. From that vantage point, they may not
appear "realistic" because they are inconsistent with the "reality" that it generates. Thus the
non-adversarial prescriptions outlined above may appear naIve, impractical, or even
oppressive within the culture of adversarialism because they are incongruous with the
common sense that it cultivates.
For instance, the culture of adversarialism generates the appearance of evidence that
human nature is incorrigibly selfish and aggressive, and therefore it appears that we do need
to harness and constrain these impulses by structuring most of our social interactions as
rational contests. Based on this apparent evidence, non-adversarial prescriptions appear not
only unworkable, but also vulnerable to the self-interested motives and manipulations that
Western-liberal institutions have allegedly been designed to harness and constrain. On the
other hand, even within the culture of adversarialism, there are enough "anomalies" to
suggest that human beings also have the capacity for mutualism and cooperation. And
though the former view has a long genealogy in Western-liberal discourses, the latter view
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appears to be gaining many contemporary advocates, including respected scholars in the
fields of anthropology, economics, and other disciplines.2
The problem, of course, is that it is difficult to empirically verify which of these views is
more valid. Rather, we are confronted with two competing sets of difficult-to-test
assumptions about human nature and culture. The analysis in this dissertation suggests,
however, that it is at least in our broadest collective interests to critically re-examine
prevailing assumptions and begin experimenting more systematically with non-adversarial
social structures and practices.
Skeptics of this suggestion might warn, in turn, of the oppressive uses that "harmony
models", "organicism", "the rhetoric of consensus", and other allegedly non-adversarial
constructs have been put to in the past.3 As acknowledged in Chapter V, consensual and
organic conceptions of society have historically been invoked by privileged social groups as
a means of imposing harmony under terms that are favourable to their own self-interests.
Organic metaphors and the rhetoric of consensus have thus been used to stifle diversity,
suppress human rights, and perpetuate status quo social relations.
Recognizing this, many people assert that conflict is more desirable than a false or
imposed consensus and that adversarial practices are therefore essential if an oppressive
social order is to be reformed. However, as with the argument that rational debate is more
desirable than violence or war, this argument embodies a false choice because it obscures
other alternatives. As demonstrated in Chapters IV and V, organic metaphors can also be
2 Refer back to discussion in Chapter III.
Refer, for example, to critiques articulated or summarized by Nader, "Harmony Models"; Schweitzer,
"Harmony Ideology"; Bush and Folger, Promise ofMediation; and de Jouvenel, On Power.
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conceptualized as the basis for social justice and reform. Indeed, humanity's reluctance to
recognize its organic interdependence and pattern its collective life accordingly can be
interpreted as a root cause of social injustice.
Of course, it is again difficult to empirically verify which of these views is more valid.
But the analysis in this dissertation at least raises the possibility that our common sense
commitments to normative adversarialism may be misinformed. Indeed, if adversarialism is
a hegemonic construct that serves the interests of some social groups more than others, then
these common sense commitments may be analogous to the anti-suffrage commitments held
by some Western women only a few generations ago.
Skeptics might still argue, however, that this entire analysis is self-contradictory because
it invokes the theory of hegemony to critique adversarialism, yet the theory of hegemony is
rooted in a generally adversarial view of history. The theory of hegemony interprets history
as an ongoing sequence ofpower struggles, played out in the arenas of discourse and culture,
between social groups with competing interests. Thus the contradiction: How can
adversarialism be a hegemonic construct when hegemony is an adversarial construct?
A closer reading of this dissertation, however, suggests a resolution to this apparent
contradiction. In the preceding analysis, I acknowledge that human history has indeed been
characterized by various historical struggles between competing social groups. At the same
time, however, I assert that human history has not been limited to these expressions and that
hegemonic struggle has never been the sole determinant of human culture. Mutualism and
cooperation have also played a significant, if not frequently overlooked, role in human
history. Adversarialism and hegemonic struggle are only half the picture. Mutualism and
cooperation are the other half of the picture.
240
In addition, the relative prominence of either adversarialism or mutualism appears to be
historically specific and susceptible to change. In this regard, it is possible that the relative
prominence of adversarial struggle will diminish over time in response to the pressures of
global interdependence. As the discussion in Chapter V points out, our own reproductive and
technological success as a species is steadily drawing us together into a single social order
whose boundaries are those of the planet and whose concerns are increasingly complex and
intractable. Under these radically changing historical conditions, mutualism may prove an
increasingly successful strategy for all social groups, even as adversarialism proves
increasingly anachronistic and unworkable.
If this is the case, age-old patterns of hegemonic struggle between competing social
groups might gradually recede as patterns of mutualism and cooperation expand. Thus one
can envision movement toward a "post-hegemonic" world order characterized by social
structures and practices that promote the broadest possible collective interests. Though
isolated expressions of adversarialism may never be entirely eliminated, adversarialism may
no longer be prescribed as a normative ideal throughout the public sphere.
It is this perspective that allows one to reconcile the apparent contradiction identified
above. Even though a post-hegemonic world order may not be inevitable, it is at least
logically possible. The theory of hegemony can therefore be used to interpret aspects of
human history without constraining our vision of the future. Indeed, if human societies are
anything like most other complex dynamic systems, then past patterns or states are not the
only predictors of future states. Many complex systems are characterized by punctuated
processes of evolutionary adaptation that result in qualitative transformations over time.
Why should human societies be any different? Again, mutualism and cooperation are not the
241
only possible outcomes of such a qualitative transformation. But they are potential outcomes
and they are worth working toward. Thus my perspective derives not from historical
determinism but from historical agency. In contrast, the prevailing assumption that
individuals or social groups are incapable of transcending selfish pursuits or hegemonic
struggles is the more deterministic or fatalistic view.
Again, however, it is difficult to empirically verify which of these views is more valid.
But the analysis in this dissertation at least raises the possibility that the latter view may be
misinformed. What is called for, therefore, is an open mind and a willingness to experiment
with and evaluate alternatives.
Toward Empirical Validation
Of course, an open mind is not an empty mind - and the comments above do not imply
suspending all critical judgement. In this regard, the propositions outlined above need to be
tested empirically. Although an effort has been made to anchor the preceding analysis to
empirical reference points when possible, all cannot be accomplished within a single
dissertation. Hence this larger empirical project remains. Toward this end, this dissertation
will close with a brief discussion of how the above propositions might be empirically tested.
As discussed in the preceding section, these propositions are as difficult to empirically
verify as they are to empirically refute. What can be asserted with confidence, however, is
that they cannot be tested simply by studying human behaviour within the dominant cultural
environment. Western-liberal discourses define human nature as essentially adversarial, and
they structure our collective thought, talk, and action largely in those terms. Thus they are
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likely to cultivate or reinforce the public behaviours they assume to be universal and
inevitable. In this regard, the culture of adversarialism may construct much of the
"empirical" evidence with which it legitimates itself. Because of this possibility, one cannot
test the above propositions by looking only at societies of people who have been born and
raised within a culture that cultivates or reinforces adversarial behaviours. But given the
increasingly global influence of Western-liberal culture, what other options are available for
testing these propositions?
One option is to undertake comparative anthropological studies of populations that are
still relatively untouched by Western culture, in order at least to assess the degree to which
adversarial behaviours are biologically determined and inevitable. The political
anthropologist Marc Howard Ross recently undertook an extensive cross-cultural analysis
that provides a solid first step in this direction.4 Ross's findings suggest that there is indeed
significant variation from culture to culture in the relative amount of conflict or cooperation
expressed. Moreover, he attributes these variations not merely to socio-structural factors, as
many economists and sociologists would, but also to psycho-cultural factors. As Ross
explains, "objective situations alone do not cause conflict; interpretations of such situations
also playa role".5 "The empirical results", he continues,
clearly show that a society's early socialization is intimately associated with patterns of conflict
and violence. Psychocultural effects cannot be reduced to structural conditions explained in
terms of simple interests.. ,.interest-based rational-choice models are not so much wrong as
more limited than many of their proponents suggest. Interests matter, I agree, but psychocultural
forces are crucial in determining how these interests are defined and what actors do to defend
them.6
4
6
Ross, Culture ofConflict.
Ibid., p. 11.
Ibid., pp. 9-10.
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At the same time, Ross also acknowledges the role that social institutions play in
reinforcing these psycho-cultural dispositions throughout life.
Early social relationships provide the foundations for the model of social behaviour (what I call
psychocultural dispositions) one carries throughout life .... But early childhood is not the only
formative time for interpretations of the world that shape conflict behaviour. A wide range of a
society's institutions and practices reinforce important psychocultural dispositions through the
values and behaviours that are encouraged or discouraged, through cultural definitions of group
identity (we versus they), and through culturally approved responses to perceived aggression.7
Ross's investigation, of course, represents only a first step toward an empirical
understanding of whether or not human beings have the capacity to replace adversarialism
with mutualism and cooperation. His comparative analysis is encouraging, however,
because it demonstrates that normative adversarialism is not ubiquitous across pre-industrial
cultures and that culturally specific factors (both socio-structural and psycho-cultural) playa
significant role in determining the degree and expression of conflict or cooperation.
Granted, studies of pre-industrial societies cannot be generalized to complex modem
societies. It could be, for instance, that the complex divisions of labour inherent in modem
capitalist economies create structural conflicts of interest that make contest models of
resource allocation both necessary and inevitable. Even if this is true, however, it simply
means that efforts to transcend adversarialism are limited more by social structure than by
human nature. Our social structures, unlike our biological natures, are at least cultural
constructs that can potentially be reformed. In any case, based on studies of pre-industrial
cultures, we can still only make limited inferences about complex modem societies.
Empirical methodologies that evaluate the efficacy of non-adversarial models in complex
modem societies are also clearly needed. Fortunately, a few evaluations ofthis type have
7 Ibid., pp. 10, parentheses in the original text.
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also been undertaken already - again with similarly encouraging results. For instance, both
micro- and macro-level evaluations of alternative dispute resolution suggest that, compared
to traditional litigation, alternative dispute resolution can lead to higher outcome satisfaction
and lower costs (both financial and emotional) for all parties in many types of disputes.8 In
addition, initial evaluations ofnon-adversarial decision-making models suggest that these
models tend to yield more thoughtful, creative, and effective decision making than partisan-
adversarial approaches.9 Similarly, initial evaluations of models such as public journalism
and symmetrical two-way public relations (discussed in Chapter IV) are also beginning to
yield some promising results. 10
As evaluations such as these are expanded, they will begin to shed light on the efficacy of
alternative practices that are congruent with the broad propositions outlined above. Again,
however, these evaluations also have limitations that must be taken into account. Members
of virtually all modem societies have internalized various adversarial norms and behaviours
due to the global influence of the Western culture ofadversarialism. These psycho-cultural
dispositions are likely to confound efforts to measure the true efficacy of non-adversarial
models because the models are likely to be undermined by these previously internalized
norms and behaviours. Even so, such evaluations can still provide tentative insights,
provided one takes into account the potentially confounding effect of these predispositions.
On a closely related note, these kinds of evaluative studies are also limited, because they
8 Refer back to discussions and evidence presented in Chapters II and III.
9 Refer, for example, to Kolstoe, "Improved Thinking".
10 For evaluations ofpublic journalism, refer to Austin, "Progress Report"; Charity, Doing Public Journalism;
and Schaffer, Miller, and Kramer, eds., Six Case Studies. For evaluations of two-way symmetrical public
relations, refer to Grunig and Grunig, "Review ofa Program of Research" and "Models of Public
Relations".
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tend to examine the efficacy of specific non-adversarial models in isolation from one another.
The ultimate test of such models, of course, would be within an integrated framework of
mutually consistent and reinforcing non-adversarial structures and practices. This is
important not only because such an integrated framework might cultivate more supportive
psycho-cultural dispositions in the individual's implementing them, as discussed above, but
also because different social structures and practices influence one another through complex
linkages, and the efficacy of any given social structure or practice can be affected by these
linkages.
For instance, the model of public journalism referred to above, which tries to cultivate a
more inclusive and participatory civic culture by focusing on democratic deliberation rather
than adversarial spectacle, embodies many non-adversarial ideals that are congruent with the
propositions outlined above. Currently, however, public journalism experiments typically
occur within commercially owned, advertising-supported media. The efficacy of public
journalism is likely to be constrained within this context because these commercial
advertising-supported media are governed by a profit-seeking logic that often contradicts or
constrains public journalism ideals.
Similar linkages, of course, affect many other social structures and practices, such as the
linkages between our economic, political, and legal systems discussed in Chapter III.
Isolated experiments in anyone of these arenas are therefore likely to be confounded by their
linkages to other arenas that are still characterized by adversarial norms. For instance, how
can one evaluate the full efficacy of alternative dispute resolution models when such models
currently operate within a larger framework of laws and regulations that have been
formulated through contest models of governance, which are in tum linked to the political
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economy of a capitalist free market and which therefore tend to privilege economically
powerful groups? Within such a framework, privileged social groups often have little
incentive to work toward mediated resolutions because they can often fare better in a legal
adversary system designed to enforce laws and regulations that may already favour their
interests. And even when these groups do work within alternative dispute resolutions
processes, they often come to the table with significant political advantages over other social
groups. Therefore, non-adversarial alternatives ultimately need to be evaluated within a
larger framework in which they are linked to models that structurally reinforce rather than
undermine them.
This confounding problem of linkages, as well as the problem of cultural predispositions
discussed earlier, therefore present substantial challenges to the empirical evaluation of non-
adversarial social structures and practices within the contemporary culture of adversarialism.
In order to address all of these confounding problems and still be able to generalize about
complex modem societies, one would ideally need to set up a controlled experiment on a
society-wide scale. This would require manipulating a wide range of social structures and
practices within subsets of otherwise complex modem populations and comparing them, over
several generations, to control groups from the same populations. This, of course, is
impossible.
The next best thing, however, would be to look within complex modem societies for
existing subcultures or populations that already integrate a wide range of non-adversarial
social structures and practices within a relatively comprehensive framework. If such groups
could be found, then one could evaluate their social structures and practices relative to the
structures and practices of the larger societies they live within. One would have, in effect, a
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naturally occurring experiment that at least partially approximates the ideal experiment
described above.
Although the ideal experiment described above is clearly impossible, at least one instance
of this naturally occurring experiment already exists. As the discussion in Chapter V
demonstrates, the Baha'i International Community provides a close approximation of the
alternative cultural formation described above. Other subsets of the population may also
embody a wide range of non-adversarial structures and practices in other forms. But for the
purpose of this discussion, the Baha'i International Community provides a clear illustration
of a naturally occurring experiment that approximates the ideal experiment described above.
Indeed, many Baha'is consciously view themselves in exactly this manner: as participants in
a social experiment that is testing the efficacy of non-adversarial structures and practice
across a wide range of human activity. Furthermore, the Baha'i International Community
has already offered itself as a model for study in this regard. 11
Of course, the Baha'i community is still in an early formative stage of its development as
its participants strive to learn and implement a wide range of non-adversarial structures and
practices and develop the skills and capacities these call for. In addition, because Baha'is are
not isolationist, they continue to live with a foot in two cultural universes. Therefore many
Baha'is continue to struggle with cultural dispositions they have internalized from the
surrounding culture of adversarialism. With each successive generation, however, the
experience of the Baha'i International Community yields increasingly valuable insights as
children raised within Baha'i families and Baha'i communities internalize non-adversarial
11 Universal House ofJustice, The Promise ofWorld Peace, p. 13.
248
principles and practices in their formative years and carry these dispositions into adulthood in
ever-greater measure. In this regard, a longitudinal study ofthe Baha'i International
Community offers a unique opportunity to test the propositions outlined above within a
relatively holistic empirical framework - even if the ultimate outcome of the experiment will
not be known for generations.
All of the methodologies discussed above therefore have their strengths and limitations.
However, if all of these methodologies are considered complementary, each could gradually
provide pieces of a larger picture, through which we could arrive at a more informed
assessment of the propositions outlined above. In addition, other methodologies not explored
above can undoubtedly be adapted or devised to further clarify this picture and refine our
overall assessment.
The first step, however, is formulating a theoretical framework that permits us to begin
asking these questio~s. Thus it is the heuristic value of this dissertation that constitutes its
most significant and original contribution. The questions it raises are more than mere arm-
chair speculations. They pertain to the lives and living conditions of real people everywhere.
They pertain to the ways that we construct our social reality, as well as the ways that we
pursue social change. In this context, they form the basis for an applied but critically
informed research agenda with eminently practical implications.
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